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Peter Drucker: Making good decisions is a crucial skill at every level. 
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Access to information and knowledge is a source of competitive advantage (Ford et 
al., 2005). This has resulted in, inter alia, the mushrooming of a huge management 
consultancy and report writing business. Ford et al. (2005) say that consulting 
industry in the United States alone stands at $15 billion. However, they also draw our 
attention to the fact that managers’ quest for knowledge and information rarely draws 
them to university based management researchers.1 The primary reason for this, 
according to Ford et al. (2005), is divergence in thoughts and needs between 
academics and consulting groups. This is surprising because both of them seek to 
improve the workings of business. Managers often feel that works by academics are 
incomprehensible and irrelevant to their day-to-day work whereas academics think 
managers are more interested in quick fixes and the latest fads than in any systematic 
research (Ford et al., 2005). 
 In order to improve the relationship between managers and management 
researchers, Ford et al. (2005) suggest that more ‘practice-relevant’ research should be 
carried out. They suggest that even though a rapid shift to practice-relevant research 
may not be feasible, a step in the direction of applied management research would be 
mutually beneficial. This, they suggest, can happen by adopting a two-prong strategy: 
management faculties stop looking at practice-relevant research as second-rate; and 
researchers understand that ‘being both too academic and insufficiently academic 
inevitably gives rise to a rather persecuted imagination’ (Mohrman et al., cited in Ford 
et al., 2005:32). 
 This study aims to achieve both relevance for direct practical applications and 
academic rigour. It aims to demonstrate, within the new venture context, the link 
between the decision process and the performance of the decision—i.e., which styles 
of decision processes are likely to yield what sort of results, taking into account the 
decision-maker(s). Hence, the research aims to establish a relationship between the 
decision-maker and the decision process, and between the decision process and the 
performance (outcome relative to objective) of the decision—i.e., what sort of 
decision-maker will most likely follow which decision process approach and what the 
consequence is likely to be. The study will be beneficial to decision-makers 
                                                 
1 Ford et al. (2005) say that even though about $1 billion worth of business books are sold each year, 
only a small portion of them are written by management researchers. They observe that in 2001 only 10 
per cent of Business Week’s ‘Top Business Books’ were authored by academics. 
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(especially entrepreneurs and senior managers in a new venture) as it will identify 
more effective approaches to decision-making.2   
 It is imperative to bring to the notice of readers that while the decision process 
involves many steps, it is the ‘planning’ in decision processes that has attracted the 
most attention from researchers. Different researchers have suggested different 
typologies for the decision process based largely on the ‘level’ of planning (discussed 
in Chapter 3). There is much debate about precisely this point—the extent to which 
entrepreneurs do plan—and it remains a source of confusion (discussed in Chapter 2).  
While seeking to develop a broader understanding of entrepreneurial decision-making 
in the new venture context, this thesis aims to address this area of confusion.   
 The research reported here, which involves detailed studies of new 
biotechnology ventures based in India and Australia, addresses two questions: 
1. Is there a relationship between the characteristics of the decision-making 
process and the outcomes of the decision? 
2. How does prior experience of the entrepreneurs/entrepreneurial team affect the 
decision process in a new venture? 
1.1 What is Entrepreneurial Decision-Making? 
High technology new ventures may be more attractive for investors and employees, 
and more innovative, but they are also more risky. They exist in a very dynamic 
business environment with high levels of uncertainty. While statistically there are 
more failures than success stories, it is the phenomenal success of a few that leaves an 
enduring impression. 
 Mitchell (1997) is puzzled by the popular opinion that sees entrepreneurs as 
people with ‘extraordinary powers’ to create new ventures.3 He suggests that the 
                                                 
2 Ford et al. (2005) suggest that researchers should make clear upfront ‘[w]hy this research should 
matter to managers.’  
Gartner et al. (1992) quote Hales to emphasise the need for empirical evidence about the difference 
between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ managerial work.  
3 The general perception about the entrepreneur tends to be based on either their peculiar characteristics 
or their peculiar way of doing things. While there is no consensus among researchers on the latter front, 
researchers have failed to link the personality dimensions of entrepreneurs to performance (Deakins & 
Freel, 1998; Gartner, 1989; Lee et al., 2001). It seems that characterising an ‘ideal’ entrepreneur is 
pointless. 
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‘mystical status of the entrepreneur’ arises because ‘the ‘ordinary’ is rarely news, 
[while] the ‘extraordinary’ and the ‘idealized’ assume an unwarranted pre-eminence’ 
(p. 122). He also says that the ‘extraordinary’ seems extraordinary because it is 
portrayed that way to outsiders though in fact it may be viewed as ordinary by 
insiders. Not surprisingly, popular opinion is of the ‘seat-of-the-pants,’ ‘intuitive,’ 
and ‘opportunistic’ styles of successful entrepreneurs. More surprising is the fact that 
many researchers consider that successful entrepreneurs are successful not because 
they plan well but because they seize whatever opportunities come their way.  
 But, if this popular image of an entrepreneur is correct, why do almost all 
‘how to be a successful entrepreneur’ books emphasise the importance of being very 
systematic and taking a planned approach to new venture formation? Similarly, why 
do venture capitalists value business plans highly and carefully assess the competence 
and experience of new venture managers? 
 While ‘how to’ guides emphasise planning, many are formulaic in their 
approach to such planning. This compelled Mowen (1993:10) to comment that ‘high-
stakes decisions cannot be approached from such a simplistic viewpoint and these 
cookbook-style recipes for success will not help you.’   
 To move beyond the picture of daredevils or formulaic planners, Mitchell 
(1997) suggests that understanding the approach taken by entrepreneurs would be 
useful. For Russo and Schoemaker (2002:xii), ‘decision-making prowess is a skill that 
can be learned—and that should be learned.’ This is important (and encouraging) 
because ‘some managers make very poor strategic choices, with devastating 
consequences for their firms, while others in very similar circumstances make much 
better choices’ (Dean & Sharfman, 1996:369). In this regard, Russo and Schoemaker 
(2002:xviii) draw our attention to an old joke about a man who is asked if he can play 
the piano. He replies, ‘I don’t know. Give me a piano and let’s find out.’ They 
comment that such an approach to decision-making is not so funny (p. xviii).  
 According to Ireland et al. (2003), wealth is created by entrepreneurship (i.e., 
opportunity seeking behaviour) and by strategic management (i.e., advantage seeking 
behaviour). However, an integration of strategic management and entrepreneurship 
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frameworks in academic research has not developed despite a call for this by several 
authors (Hitt et al., 2001). 
 The vast strategic decision-making literature usually focuses on the context of 
large companies. In considering this literature, the advice of Gartner et al. (1992:17) 
is important: ‘Emerging organizations are not smaller, ‘incomplete’ versions of 
existing organizations, but unique states of existence with organizational properties 
that are arranged in a fundamentally different way from an existing organization.’4 
 Also, according to Dean and Sharfman (1996), a link between the decision 
process and the level of effectiveness of the decision has not yet been convincingly 
demonstrated, even in large firms. This may be because the ‘decision processes in 
large firms are often disconnected from organizational actions’ (Brunsson, cited in 
Forbes, 2005:357). However, the decision process in new ventures is more likely to 
be ‘a functional exercise that is genuinely representative of firms’ interactions with 
their environments’ (Forbes, 2005:357).  
1.2 Approach to the Research 
In researching the decision process, it is imperative to appropriately align the unit of 
performance with the unit of analysis. First, Dean and Sharfman (1996) note that in 
many cases researchers have tended to assess the effectiveness of decision-making by 
assessing overall firm performance. They argue that this is problematic because ‘firm 
performance is a function of a diverse array of factors, which may mask the effect of 
the decision processes’ (p. 371). 
 Second, Long and McMullan state (cited in Krueger, 1993:5) that ‘few 
researchers follow the process from the idea stage to the ultimate decision to initiate 
the venture.’ This study follows decisions in response to opportunities or problems 
                                                 
4 The approach to the present study also followed the suggestion by Davidsson and Wilkund (2001) 
that the start of any new economic activity falls within the purview of entrepreneurship. It also notes 
Hornday’s observation (cited in Davidsson & Wiklund, 2001:94) that ‘research on small business…is 
well worth doing but neither that researcher nor the emerging scholarly field of entrepreneurship 
benefit from attaching the entrepreneurship label to it….’ Wortman (1987) has also observed that 
research in small business is distinct from entrepreneurship research, although many researchers 
conflate the two fields. 
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from the initial stage to their enactment and at least proximate outcome. This has been 
done not by observation or direct participation but by retrospective interviews. 
Langley et al. (1995:267) quote Simon’s view that ‘such verbalized articulations of 
thought are sufficient to capture the essence of what goes on in the head of a decision 
maker.’ 
Much of the iceberg is, indeed, below the surface and inaccessible to 
verbalization, but its concealed bulk is made of the same kind of ice as the 
part we can see…. The secret of problem solving is that there is no secret. 
It is accomplished through complex structures of familiar simple elements. 
The proof is that we have been able to stimulate it, using no more than 
those simple elements as the building blocks of our programs. (Simon, 
1977, quoted in Langley et al., 1995:267) 
 
 Third, Langley et al. (1995:261) quote Dewey and Bentley’s statement that 
‘decisions typically become inextricably intertwined with other decisions… So no 
decision can be understood de novo or in vitro, apart from the perceptions of the 
actors and the mindsets and cultures of the contexts in which they are embedded.’ 
They argue that decision-making must be studied in toto and in vivo at the individual 
level. The research design followed here strikes a compromise between the 
demanding objective and the practicalities of the research.  
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
 Entrepreneurial decision-making: Do we know what it is? This chapter 
reviews the literature relevant to decision-making in a new venture context. 
The review identifies the conceptual and methodological limitations of 
alternative approaches. 
  Decision-making in management: There is little empirical work related to 
decision-making in a new venture context. Consequently, it is necessary to 
derive useful insights from the vast literature on decision-making in 
management science.  
 Developing a ‘working’ framework: The approach here is to develop a 
preliminary decision-making framework from the decision-making literature. 
This framework provides a basic guide to direct the initial research. That 
framework is later developed in light of the empirical insights. 
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 Research methodology: This research presents a range of methodological and 
organisational challenges. This chapter discusses these challenges and how 
they were addressed. 
 Decision process: Qualitative analysis: This chapter draws on the many 
decisions studied within the 31 case studies of new biotech ventures in 
Australia and India to evolve a new framework from the basic ‘working’ 
framework. The revised framework is discussed along with illustrative 
examples from the empirical work. The chapter concludes with a discussion 
on whether decision-making by entrepreneurs has any typical characteristics 
and, hence, whether there is ‘entrepreneurial decision-making.’  
 Decision-making and Decision Outcomes: This chapter makes use of 
quantitative data to tease out any difference between ‘successful’ and 
‘unsuccessful’ decisions. The analysis shows that there is a clear distinction 
between decision processes that were seen to be generally associated with 
successful and with unsuccessful decisions. 
 Does ‘relevant’ prior experience make any difference to the decision 
process? Decision-maker(s) are central to the decision process because they 
drive it. But do decision-makers make a difference to the decision process? 
This chapter analyses how and why the decision-making characteristics of 
decision-makers affect the process of making decisions. 
 Does ‘relevant’ experience make any difference to the outcome? The 
previous chapters analysed relationships between the process and outcome of 
decision-making, and the decision-maker and the decision process. This 
chapter provides an integrated analysis of the decision-maker, decision process 
and outcome. It makes extensive use of qualitative data and quantitative data. 
 Key findings: This chapter draws out and discusses the key findings and 
makes suggestions for future research.  
 Who learns what? This chapter is an addendum in that it was not the focus of 
the research. However, it has been written because a major lacuna in 
entrepreneurship literature concerns ‘who learns (in terms of ‘key’ learning) what 
in what context,’ and this research has generated an opportunity to also address 
this question. Learning is central to entrepreneurship (and indeed management 
more generally). This chapter assesses whether there is any relationship 
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Entrepreneurial Decision-Making: 
Do we know what it is? 
 
Robert H. Schuller: ‘Spectacular achievement is always preceded by unspectacular preparation.’ 
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Many consider that there is an entrepreneurial style of decision-making. Discussion of 
the nature of decision-making in new ventures remains ambiguous and confusing.  It 
is argued that this is due in large part to a lack of careful systematic empirical 
research. Researchers may have been deterred by the lack of an appropriate 
framework or by the complexities of research where the unit of analysis is a 
‘decision.’ Indeed, entrepreneurial decision-making has never been well understood; 
different lines of analyses with different assumptions and methods have led to varied 
empirical results. 
 This chapter discusses the distinct lines of thought that have developed on 
entrepreneurial decision-making.  It identifies the reasons why different findings have 
emerged from different research approaches. Drawing on that discussion, a 
framework for understanding ‘entrepreneurial decision-making’ and the research 
questions that shape the inquiry are outlined.   
2.1 ‘Research’ in Entrepreneurship 
An entrepreneurial culture encouraging innovation has become one of the hallmarks 
of any society looking to achieve high growth and development. In Russia, India, 
China, East Europe and indeed in most other parts of the world, there has been a 
systematic effort over past two decades to embrace the ‘free-enterprise revolution’ 
pioneered by the US society. From this perspective there is, as Bygrave (1993) 
suggests, particular value in understanding entrepreneurship better.  
The problem with understanding entrepreneurship better starts at the first 
step—the definition of an entrepreneur (Gartner, 1994; Hornaday, 1992). As stated by 
Kanbur, ‘it is a phenomenon that is all pervasive yet least understood and defined by 
economists’ (Herbert & Link, 1988:xvii). There are many different meanings of the 
term ‘entrepreneur’ (Herbert & Link, 1988). For Smith, the entrepreneur is a 
‘capitalist’; for Cantillon, a ‘decision maker’; for Say, an ‘industrial leader’ and a 
‘manager’; for Pigou, an ‘owner of an enterprise’; and for Kirzner and Schultz, an 
‘allocator of resources for alternative uses’.1 Herbert and Link (1988:155) propose 
their own definition, which they believe takes into account most of the factors related 
to an ‘entrepreneur’. For them, an entrepreneur is one ‘who specializes in taking 
                                                 
1 Herbert and Link (1988) discuss the evolution of the concept and definition of ‘entrepreneur.’ 
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responsibility for and making judgemental decisions that affect the location, the form, 
and the use of goods, resources, or institutions.’  This definition not only emphasises 
the activity side of the ‘entrepreneurship’ (i.e., taking responsibility, making decisions 
etc.) but also relates it to the context and the content.  
Others focus on entrepreneurial activity rather than the entrepreneur. Danhoff 
(as quoted in Gartner, 1985:699) focuses entirely on the activity: ‘Entrepreneurship is 
an activity or function and not a specific individual or occupation…the specific 
personal entrepreneur is an unrealistic abstraction.’ Bygrave (1993) also emphasises 
activities in arguing for entrepreneurship research to focus on entrepreneurs, 
entrepreneurial processes and entrepreneurial events. Similarly, Spilling (1996:93) 
usefully distinguishes between entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial activity: 
Although all entrepreneurs are people, and all entrepreneurial action is 
taken by people, the role of an entrepreneur may be just one of many roles 
taken by a person, or the role of being an entrepreneur may be just 
temporary. Thus, it may be important to distinguish between individuals 
and the entrepreneurial role. According to Barth (1972/63, pp. 5-6, 12), the 
entrepreneur is not a person in any strict sociological sense. Rather the 
concept should be interpreted as an aspect of a role. The concept relates to 
actions and activities, and it characterizes certain qualities and orientations 
within these activities. 
 
Entrepreneurial activity is not restricted to the formation of a new venture, but 
‘new venture formation’ (especially by nascent entrepreneurs) has been a focus of 
much attention by researchers.2 For example, for Hitt et al. (quoted in Robinson and 
McDougall, 2001:659) ‘[t]he establishment of new ventures lies at the foundation of 
entrepreneurship.’  
This focus on new venture formation follows an earlier focus on the 
characteristics of entrepreneur and entrepreneurial activity. Within that field, 
behavioural studies in entrepreneurship (i.e., what entrepreneurs do) grew in influence 
over trait-based studies (i.e., who entrepreneurs are) after the latter failed to provide 
any evidence of a relationship between entrepreneurs’ characteristics and venture 
performance (Lee et al., 2001). Gartner (1989) was one of the first to emphatically 
make a case for behavioural studies in entrepreneurship. Reviewing earlier empirical 
                                                 
2 Davidsson and Wiklund (2001:89):‘Like Gartner (1988), we think the main focus of entrepreneurship 
should be on emergence, but what emerges is new economic activity and not necessarily a new 
organisation.’ 
 20
work, he concluded, ‘In empirical research…when certain psychological traits are 
carefully evaluated, it is not possible to differentiate entrepreneurs from managers or 
from the general population based on the entrepreneur’s supposed possession of such 
traits’ (p. 58). He added that ‘[t]he entrepreneur is not a fixed state of existence, rather 
entrepreneurship is a role that individuals undertake to create organizations’ (p. 64).3 
Box 2.1 What Do Entrepreneurs Do? 
Gartner (1985) has categorised the activities by entrepreneurs (as interpreted by various researchers) 
into following six categories: 
1. The entrepreneur locates a business - Cole (1965), Kilby (1971), Maidique (1980), 
Schumpeter (1934), Vesper (1980). 
2. The entrepreneur accumulates resources - Cole (1965), Kilby (1971), Leibenstein (1968), 
Schumpeter (1934), Vesper (1980). 
3. The entrepreneur markets products and services - Cole (1965), Kilby (1971), Maidique 
(1980), Libenstein (1968), Schumpeter (1934), Vesper (1980). 
4. The entrepreneur produces the product - Kilby (1971), Maidique (1980), Schumpeter (1934), 
Vesper (1980). 
5. The entrepreneur builds an organisation - Cole (1965), Kilby (1971), Leibenstein (1968), 
Schumpeter (1934). 
6. The entrepreneur responds to government and society - Cole (1965), Kilby (1971). 
Gartner (1985) has put all six dimensions of ‘what do entrepreneurs do’ in the ‘process’ element of his 
framework.  
But are most of these things done by entrepreneurs only? Perhaps not. This might be one of the 
reasons why, in order to bring clarity and distinguish the field of entrepreneurship, Gartner 
(1988) has made it synonymous with the ‘creation of organizations.’ He prepared a framework of 
four dimensions for studying new ventures: the individuals involved in the creation of the new venture; 
the activities undertaken by those individuals during the new venture creation process; the 
organisational structure and strategy of the new venture; and the environmental context of the new 
venture. 
 
                                                 
3 According to Bolton and Thompson (cited in Lowe & Marriott, 2006:105), entrepreneurship is as 
much a function of technique as it is of temperament or talent and one can learn to manage 
temperament. 
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Despite this attention on new ventures (and entrepreneurs) in the field of 
entrepreneurship, understanding how entrepreneurs carry out the activities to create 
new ventures has remained limited. Katz and Gartner (1988) explored organisation 
theory and the entrepreneurship literature to identify a theoretical and empirically 
based framework for identifying the properties that would indicate an organisation in 
the process of creation. They found that ‘most theories on organizations assume 
complex properties that occur only after organizations achieve some particular size…’ 
(Carter et al., 1996:153). 
Most empirical studies into entrepreneurship have focussed on what 
entrepreneurs (refer to Box 2.1) and new venture formations have done and not how 
those activities are carried out.4 For example, while there has been inconclusive 
empirical research on the writing (and use) of business plans during the initial phase 
of the company, little empirical attention has been given to the approach to planning 
during initial start.  
Carter et al. (1996) conclude that future studies should focus more on how 
issues and more precisely identify the kinds of behaviours appropriate for certain new 
venture conditions, particularly how entrepreneurs make judgements about the 
potential success and how entrepreneurs undertake planning. Similarly, Gartner et al. 
(1998:229) also suggest that ‘[p]aying attention to the details involved in a start-up 
might be one important aspect of learning about entrepreneurship.’ Gibb (cited in 
Harris et al., 2000) has also emphasised the importance of the how dimension by 
stating that the design of entrepreneurship programmes should concentrate on the 
process rather than the content.  
There are many dimensions to entrepreneurial process (Huff & Reger, 1987). 
Most researchers in this area, however, have focused on ‘planning’ (Olson & Bokor, 
1995), the results of which are quite varied. Lumpkin et al. (1998) observe that 
‘[l]earning more about the types of planning that can best contribute to entrepreneurial 
success is a fruitful area for future research.’ Burmeister and Schade (2006:3) also 
encourage researchers in entrepreneurship to look into the process side: 
                                                 
4 On the basis of a review of the literature, Mueller and Naffziger (1999) state that most of the research 
within strategic management has focused on ‘developing a written plan’ while little (or no) research 
has examined ‘who engages in planning and who does not’. They argue that it is important to 
understand how plans are made. 
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[E]ntrepreneurship researchers may want to analyse the empirical 
relevance of other characteristics that are ascribed to the stereotypical 
Schumpeterian entrepreneur such as making decisions in an intuitive 
manner. 
 
Surprisingly, decision-making in new ventures has been a relatively neglected 
area of study. For example, in a recent survey by Chandler and Lyon (2001), there 
was no mention of any study that has taken a ‘decision in a new venture’ as the unit 
of analysis. That is, none has focused on decision-making. In fact, many consider that 
entrepreneurial planning is an oxymoron.5 McMullen and Shepherd (2006) make a 
case for studying the ‘process’. They state that overlooking it has contributed to the 
generation of alternative theories of the entrepreneur. In this chapter, the endeavour is 
to assess whether entrepreneurship and planning are incompatible or whether that 
assumption has been an obstacle to systematic research.  
2.2 ‘Entrepreneurial Decision-Making’: The Dominant Concept 
Entrepreneurial decision-making has generally been characterised as an intuitive, ad 
hoc and opportunistic style of decision-making—i.e., action oriented (Delmar & 
Shane, 2003). The prevalence of this notion is such that, in their review of approaches 
to strategic management, Mintzberg and Lampel (1999:22) claim that ‘like the design 
school, the entrepreneurial school centred the process on the chief executive; but 
unlike the design school and opposite from the planning school, it rooted that process 
in the mysteries of intuition and not planning.’ Similarly, Frese et al. (2000), in 
categorising various types of strategy, characterise ‘opportunistic’ strategies in terms 
similar to Mintzberg’s entrepreneurial mode.  
Similarly, Pira and Gillin (2005) emphasise that along with ‘intellectual’ 
intelligence, entrepreneurs widely use emotional and spiritual intelligence. They 
suggest that by using intuition and value driven motivations ‘the serial entrepreneur 
can change a business-as-usual paradigm to a creative business of high growth and 
spiritual worth.’6  
                                                 
5 Gruber (2006) highlights that there is a lack of empirical evidence that can substantiate the arguments 
of the opposing schools (that are discussed in this chapter). 
6 Quinn et al. (1988:615) categorise a style of organisational structure as ‘entrepreneurial adhocracy’: 
‘because the adhocracy must respond to a complex environment that it cannot predict, it is unable to 
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Much other research has concluded that the entrepreneurial style of 
management is not systematic and planned but is rather ad hoc and opportunistic. 
Robinson (1979) concludes that during the early stages of a new venture, 
entrepreneurs’ decisions are more likely to be intuitive (‘seat-of-the pants’) and it is 
only after a venture becomes large that they rely on more formal and systematic 
planning.7 Bhide (2000:15) says:  
[M]ost Inc. company founders did not spend much time searching for 
opportunities, doing market research, or writing business plans; they 
merely replicated or modified an idea they encountered through previous 
employment or by accident…. The Inc. companies did not have seasoned 
professional managers at their helm, rather they had enthusiastic and 
inexperienced founders who personally undertook most of the crucial 
functions of the business….  
 
In writing about their ‘devil may care’ attitude, he says, ‘Entrepreneurs can 
pursue ‘heads I win, tails I don’t lose much’ opportunities because they are less prone 
than average to irrational ambiguity aversion and they have a talent for exploiting the 
cognitive biases and defects of other individuals’ (2000:19). Bhide (1994) argues that 
a comprehensive analytical approach to planning doesn’t suit most start-ups. 
According to Bhide, the 1990 National Federation of Independent Business Study 
(USA) of 2,994 start-ups showed that founders who spent a long time in study, 
reflection and planning were no more likely to survive their first three years than 
people who seized opportunities without planning. In order to support his view, he 
gives examples and excerpts of interviews with many successful entrepreneurs (see 
Box 2.2).  
                                                                                                                                            
rely on deliberate strategies. In other words, it cannot predetermine precise patterns in its stream of 
activities….’ 
7 This article is based on the experience of consultants of the Small Business Development Centre (of 
the University of Georgia) with several small business owners. Robinson, in this article, suggests three 
different stages of decision-making—from an intuitive style to a very formal style. He finally suggests 
that a middle path is the best for small business owners. 
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 Box 2.2 Bhide and Entrepreneurialism 
Bhide (1994): 
 
 In a section entitled ‘Does Planning Pay?’ all the examples depict people succeeding by sheer 
chance and no former thought. For example, Peter (Bohdan Associates) observes, ‘We’re very 
reactive, not proactive. Business comes to us, and we react. I’ve never had a business plan’ (p. 
152). 
 
 ‘Bill Gates turned Microsoft into a multibillion-dollar company without a breakthrough 
product by showing up in the industry early and capitalizing upon the opportunities that came 
his way’ (p. 155). 
 
 ‘…the astute entrepreneur isn’t interested in completeness. He or she understands that returns 
from additional analysis diminish rapidly and avoids using spreadsheet software to churn out 
detailed but not particularly insightful analyses of a project’s break-even point, capital 
requirements, payback period, or NPV’ (p. 157). 
 
 ‘Screening out unpromising ventures requires judgement and reflection, not new data’ (p. 
151). 
 
Bhide (2000): 
 
 ‘Only 4% of the Inc. founders found their business ideas through a systematic search; 71% 
replicated or modified an idea encountered through previous employment, and the other 20% 
discovered their ideas serendipitously’ (p. 54).  
 
 ‘41% of the entrepreneurs had no business plan at all and 26% had just a rudimentary plan… 
5% worked up financial projections for investors. Only 28% wrote a full-blown business 
plan.’ 
 
 ‘More than half did not consult with a lawyer, for instance, and three-quarters did not develop 
any marketing materials’ (p. 55). 
 
 John Mineck, co-founder of Practice Management Systems, said, ‘People buy a salesperson. 
They bought me and I had no sales experience…’ (p. 51). 
 
 ‘When Paul Allen and Bill Gates developed Microsoft’s first product, they did not do any 
market research or competitor analysis first’ (p. 53). 
 
 ‘Thus entrepreneurs like Gates and Allen might have such confidence in their programming 
skills that they do not bother with an objective evaluation of the abilities of their rivals and 
under-invest in research and planning’ (p. 56). 
 
 ‘Bohdan’s founder, in contrast, started selling computers out of his home by accident—he 
placed an ad to sell his used computer and was surprised by the demand. Then, simply by 
‘reacting’ to customers, Bohdan grew to a $48mn revenue business’ (p. 61). 
 
 ‘Entrepreneurs experiment to solve a problem…. A few entrepreneurs start out with a long-
term vision for their business. Many entrepreneurs do not; consequently they have a 
propensity to pursue any option that yields them a short-term profit’ (p. 65-66). 
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More interesting are the observations made by Pascale (1984). He 
characterises the role of ‘peripheral vision’ and suggests that a ‘single-minded’ 
strategy can be detrimental. He draws on a case study of Honda to argue that ‘[t]he 
Japanese have particular discomfort with strategic concepts’ (p. 48). He is particularly 
critical of the BCG study of Honda Motors—a source for cases written for use at 
Harvard Business School and others. Pascale’s case study reflects on how critical 
decisions were made from the start of the Honda Company to their early success in 
the USA. He argues that the decisions that made Honda a success were not made in a 
systematic manner but were of an ad hoc and opportunistic nature. Thus, according to 
Pascale, the case written by BCG is inaccurate as it takes a biased approach to the role 
of rational decision-making in Honda. For example, he quotes a senior executive 
from Honda as saying: 
In truth we had no strategy other than the idea of seeing if we could sell 
something in the United States. It was a new frontier, a new challenge, and 
it fit the ‘success against all odds’ culture that Mr. Honda had 
cultivated…. We did not discuss profits or deadlines for breakeven, 
Fujisawa told me if anyone could succeed, I could and authorized $1mn 
for the venture. (p. 54) 
 
Baker and Aldrich (cited in Baker et al., 2001) found that most firms had 
created plans only in order to obtain financing and that in most cases the financing 
attempts failed. Similarly, Berman et al. (1997), on the basis of a survey of the 
presidents of small business firms (from different industries) located in 
Massachusetts, found that 26 per cent of the respondents engaged in planning while 
74 per cent said that they did not plan in a systematic manner. 
In short, the dominant and prevailing concept related to entrepreneurial 
decision-making is that it is ad hoc, opportunistic and intuitive. However, there is an 
alternative view.  
2.3 Confusion vis-à-vis ‘Entrepreneurial Decision-Making’ 
A challenge for developing a theoretical construct of ‘entrepreneurial decision-
making’ is that the empirical research appears to have had contradictory results. Some 
researchers (Delmar & Shane, 2003; Langley, 1988; Lyles et al., 1993; Robinson & 
Pearce, 1984) find that engaging in a formal planning process gives in-depth 
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knowledge of the business and, thus, helps in obtaining a better understanding of the 
situation and options related to it. A study by Olson and Bokor (1995), based on a 
mail survey to CEOs of the 500 firms listed in the December 1987 issue of Inc., also 
concluded that the performance of small, rapidly growing firms is influenced by the 
interaction of planning formality (strategy process) and product/service innovation 
(strategy content). Haber and Reichel (2006), based on interviews with 305 small 
tourism ventures (an industry not considered technology intensive), concluded that 
planning does contribute to higher customer satisfaction. 
 In the same vein, Ireland et al. (2001:60) observe that the most successful 
innovations that result in the growth of a firm and more wealth creation are the result 
of well-designed and implemented strategies. In support of their viewpoint, they put 
forth several examples. Sull (2004:71), based on in-depth case-study of several start-
ups over five years, arrived at a similar conclusion: 
Uncertainty lurks in every corner and comes in many flavours: known 
unknowns (what you know you don’t know); unknown unknowns (what 
you don’t know you don’t know); new information that is imperfect or 
incomplete; and conflicting signals. At one extreme entrepreneurs can 
ignore uncertainty—simply jump into the fray and make it up as they go 
along. This approach was favoured by a generation of dot-com 
entrepreneurs…. Rather than ignore uncertainty in the foolhardy hope that 
the business is coated with Teflon, attempt to avoid it altogether or get 
burned while perpetually fighting fires, entrepreneurs should instead 
manage uncertainty by taking a disciplined approach. 
 
Such conclusions by researchers who contradict the ‘dominant’ view on 
entrepreneurial decision-making are not the only source of confusion. Contradictory 
observations by the same author also add to the equivocality. For example, Bhide 
(1994, 2000) has related entrepreneurial actions to an ad hoc, intuitive and 
opportunistic style. However, he also suggests: 
The apparently sketchy planning and haphazard evolution of many 
successful ventures…doesn’t mean that entrepreneurs should follow a 
ready-fire-aim approach. Despite appearances, astute entrepreneurs do 
analyze and strategize extensively. (1994:161)  
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Box 2.3 Bhide’s Comments Supporting Planning 
While some successful ventures may have begun through ‘intuitive’ decision-making and opportunistic 
strategies, it does not follow that such approaches and strategies are more likely to be successful than 
other approaches and strategies. Bhide acknowledges this, as is reflected in some of his writing: 
Bhide (1994): 
 ‘Successful entrepreneurs don’t take risks blindly. Rather they use a quick, cheap approach 
that represents a middle ground between planning paralysis and no planning…. Our evidence 
suggests three general guidelines for aspiring founders: 
1. Screen opportunities quickly to weed out non-promising ventures. 
2. Analyse ideas parsimoniously. Focus on a few important issues. 
3. Integrate action and analysis. Don’t wait for all the answers, and be ready to change 
course.’ (p. 150) 
 ‘…the entrepreneur may require considerable technical know-how in deal making, strategic 
planning, managing overhead, and other business skills’ (p. 153). 
 ‘…niche markets cannot support much investment or overhead, entrepreneurs do not need the 
revolutionary’s ability to raise capital and build large organizations. Rather, the entrepreneur 
must be able to secure others’ resources on favourable terms and do with less, building brand 
awareness through guerrilla marketing and word of mouth instead of national advertising, for 
example’ (p. 154). 
 ‘…entrepreneurs should favour ventures that aren’t capital intensive and have the profit 
margins to sustain rapid growth with internally generated funds. In a similar fashion, 
entrepreneurs should look for a high margin for error, ventures with simple operations and low 
fixed costs that are less likely to face a cash crunch because of factors such as technical 
delays, cost overruns, and slow build-up of sales’ (p. 156). 
 ‘…the entrepreneur only does as much planning and analysis as seems useful and makes 
subjective judgement calls when necessary’ (p. 157). 
 ‘Entrepreneurs who hope to secure a niche face different problems…entrepreneurs should 
therefore analyse carefully the incremental costs of serving a niche…’ (p. 158). 
 ‘Trial and error is less feasible with large scale, capital-intensive ventures’ (p. 160). 
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While the studies cited above conclude that ‘planning’ often has a key role in 
venture success and contrast such considered approaches with intuitive decision-
making, the work of many other authors is even more ambiguous. Pascale (1984) 
argued that Honda had no ‘entry strategy’ for the US market, yet many quotes from 
senior officials of Honda in his case study contradict this. The following is an 
example: 
We chose Los Angeles where there was a large second and third 
generation Japanese community, a climate suitable for motorcycle use, 
and a growing population. (1984:55) 
 
In their study of first-time entrepreneurs, Harris et al. (2000) found that the 
entrepreneurs did not use business plans and that there was no evidence of higher 
growth for those who did. Most of the entrepreneurs abandoned structured analysis 
(taught to them) in favour of an emergent approach.  However, in a related study of 
four ventures, Harris et al. (2000) found that many entrepreneurs integrated elements 
of the emergent processes with useful aspects of the planning approach and that many 
used detailed computer based financial planning and control systems (both in short-
term control and longer-term thinking).  
The challenges of developing theory related to entrepreneurial decision-making 
are further complicated when prior studies are interpreted differently. For example, 
the study done by Schwenk and Shrader (1993) has been quoted in two different 
ways: 
 Mueller and Naffziger (1999) and Olson and Bokor (1995) state that Schwenk 
and Shrader, after examining 14 studies, conclude that there is a positive 
association between the strategic planning and performance of small 
businesses. 
 Frese et al. (2000:14) state that as ‘Schwenk and Shrader (1993) pointed out, 
the relationship between strategic planning (as customarily defined by 
management science) and success is not as high as one would expect.’ 
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This begins to look like the argument about whether the glass is half full or half 
empty. Schwenk and Shrader (1993) found a low but positive relationship between 
strategic planning and performance.8 
While the academic literature may come to no clear conclusion about this 
relationship, many prescriptive books advertising ‘the best way to start a new venture’ 
have few doubts. These books (Nesheim, 2000; Timmons, 1999) provide suggestions 
to prospective entrepreneurs for following a very systematic and planned approach.9  
Jolly (1997), in his book on the commercialisation of new technologies, 
provides similar prescriptive advice. However, the conclusions he draws are based on 
the commercialisation of new technologies by well-established firms, a view of 
Jolly’s approach also shared by Boussouara and Deakins (1999). A study that has 
been primarily based on examples derived from established firms does not provide a 
basis for developing suggestions about how to commercialise new technologies in a 
new venture context. 
2.4 What is the Source of this Confusion? 
All human beings are ‘boundedly’ rational, and all plan (to some extent). The concept 
of ‘bounded rationality’ is based on the assumption that ‘individuals are intendedly 
rational’ (March, 1994:9). If entrepreneurs are really intuitive and ad hoc decision-
makers,10 what makes some of them successful and others not? Is it just their good 
luck? 
                                                 
8 However, an earlier study by Shrader et al. (1989), based on a survey of CEOs or top managers of 
small business firms (in manufacturing, retail and service industries) located in central Iowa, showed 
that there is partial support for a negative relationship between performance and strategic planning. 
9 In the context of quite limited systematic research into decision-making in new ventures, many 
authors have used the broad terms ‘planning’ (‘analysis’) and ‘intuition’ as mutually exclusive 
characterisations. Perhaps reality is more nuanced than these a priori positions suggest. 
10 The occurrence of ‘opportunistic’ behaviour (be it entrepreneurs or any other human being) is not 
surprising. What an entrepreneur may have to watch against is losing direction/focus (van Gelderen et 
al., 2000) while grabbing all sorts of opportunities coming along the way. For example, Sull (2004:74) 
says: 
…some ventures rush willy-nilly into dozens of partnerships with any company that will say yes, 
never articulating the business case for these relationships or figuring out the costs of making them 
work. As a result, they end up with a long list of partnerships that amount to little more than names 
on a press release. 
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There are several reasons for the confusion in the literature regarding the 
characterisation of decision-making as either by intuition or analysis. 
First, and perhaps most important, has been the varying interpretations of 
‘planning’ or ‘strategic planning.’ Mintzberg (2000) has listed quite a few, and a 
comprehensive literature review would no doubt lead to many more definitions.  
Miller et al. (cited in van Gelderen et al., 2000:167) argue that, in the 
psychological sense, it is impossible to have no strategy because any goal directed 
behaviour is connected to some kind of strategy. Van Gelderen et al. (2000:167) 
explain that while ‘strategy in the sense of strategic management is usually 
externalized in a written strategic plan,’ they consider that a strategy can be a 
carefully followed written down plan or a loosely followed sketch in the mind of a 
business owner.  
Mintzberg and Waters (1985) questioned the very concept of ‘strategic 
planning,’ which then was interpreted as ‘complete’ deliberate strategy making. They 
identified many styles of decision-making that lie between purely ‘deliberate’ and 
purely ‘emergent’, and they suggested that practice usually lies somewhere in 
between. This is now as widely accepted as the concept of ‘bounded rationality.’ 
What has happened, however, is that the majority of researchers seem to have 
accepted all strategy making with any element of ‘emergent’ as emergent and have 
characterised ‘strategic planning’ as a pure form of deliberate strategy making. In 
other words, the majority of researchers still have not changed the operational 
definition of ‘planning/strategic planning’ even since the establishment of the concept 
of ‘bounded rationality’.11 Harris et al. (2000:126) has the following to say about this: 
                                                 
11 Slevin and Covin (1997), while reviewing the literature on strategy formation, also point towards the 
highly fragmented literature in this area. While they have highlighted the nature of fragmentation, in 
this research article they go with the widely popular definitions of ‘planned’ and ‘emergent’ strategies. 
They only seek to relate the ‘strategy formation’ types to the context. The say: 
 …planned strategies represent decision-making in the rational mode. Emergent strategies, on the 
other hand, represent decision-making under conditions of bounded rationality; that is, where 
cognitive limitations, incomplete information, behavioural processes, and the like, intervene to 
preclude optimal a priori decisions from being made…  (p. 191) 
The 10 different schools of thought about strategic management further reflect more 
fragmentation that has taken place over the years. Mintzberg and Lapel (1999), in a very thought-
provoking article, ask for more integration.  
 31
The planned approach to strategy involves assumptions of a strict process 
approach to strategy formation, with strategic decision-making taking 
place in a number of steps. 
Second, some researchers have not followed a sound analytical methodology. 
In particular, while analysing a decision, several researchers have used the firm as 
their unit of analysis. They then draw conclusions about the decision based on the 
performance of the firm. Ucbasaran et al. (2001:68) caution: 
Focusing on firm-level aspects, while important, may be insufficient for 
understanding fully the outcomes associated with the entrepreneurial 
phenomenon… It is crucial, therefore, that any study exploring the 
outcome(s) of the entrepreneurial process is clear on the unit of analysis 
being used. 
 
If one were to analyse the excerpts used by Pascale (1984), one would conclude that 
many of decisions by Honda executives were quite logical (not intuitive or ad hoc) 
and turned out to be successful. For example, they went to Los Angeles because a lot 
of third generation Japanese lived there. Their advertising campaign and positioning 
were very successful. The board decided in favour of the idea by the director of sales 
(who naturally would have more knowledge of the market), not those offered by the 
president and treasurer. However, many of the decisions made in ad hoc way, and for 
which they neither planned nor had any prior experience, failed. For example, they 
thought that their bikes were better than European or American bikes in US 
conditions. What would have been the outcome had they known about the nature of 
the use of motorcycles in the US and had tested their motorcycles on American roads?  
Third, many researchers do not adequately take context into consideration. For 
example, Baker and Aldrich (cited in Baker et al., 2001) found that most firms had 
created plans only in order to obtain financing and that in most cases the financing 
attempts failed. In fact, the majority of attempts to raise new venture finance fail, and 
in almost all cases a business plan is a necessary, if certainly not sufficient, condition 
for attracting investment.  
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Similarly, some researchers are sufficiently cognisant of the relevance of the 
industrial context on the nature of decision-making.12 For example, the nature of, and 
the method used to make, decisions (and the consequences of those decisions) in high-
risk, high-capital industries may be quite different from those in low-risk, low-capital 
industries. Apart from other contextual factors, it is imperative to take into account the 
amount of risk and the level of uncertainty associated with a particular decision. 
Fourth, much research in strategic assessment and decision-making has been 
developed in the context of a large firm, where there are formal structures, processes 
and roles and decision-making must be carefully managed. When researchers focus on 
the strategy process in the new venture or small business, the framework is often 
derived from previous research work in large firms.13 Seen through this lens, 
entrepreneurial decision-making tends to be seen as intuitive, ad hoc and 
opportunistic. Gartner et al., (1992:17), in their widely quoted theoretical article, 
argue that, ‘Emerging organizations are not smaller, ‘incomplete’ versions of existing 
organizations, but unique states of existence with organizational properties that are 
arranged in a fundamentally different way from an existing organization.’ Many 
researchers—many of whom have been discussed here—have come to the conclusion 
that entrepreneurs make intuitive and ad hoc decisions. However, that conclusion is 
reached through a framework comparing entrepreneurial decision-making with the 
strategy process used by managers in a large firm. Some examples of this approach 
are shown  in Box 2.4. 
                                                 
12 Autio (1999:342) while criticising multiple-industry based studies observes, ‘While sampling 
strategy should be dictated by the research question, many of the multiple-industry samples appear to 
have been convenience samples.’ 
13 Autio (1997) on the basis of a literature study highlighted ten misconceptions related to NTBFs (new 
technology-based firms) in the academics. One of the misconceptions is, 
 The traditional approach to research on new, technology-based firms is largely rooted in 
the neoclassical economic paradigm. This paradigm has essentially viewed new, 
technology-based firms simply as small versions of large, established firms. (p. 197) 
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 Box 2.4 Using a ‘Large Firms’ Lens to Identify Entrepreneurial Decision-Making 
In a large firm, a manager would have a team to assist with making and implementing decisions 
whereas entrepreneurs (or entrepreneurial teams) often have to make and implement decisions 
themselves. Similarly, a large company would be more concerned with a large market size to 
sustain the business whereas a small business can occupy a niche market or can still be profitable 
with a smaller market. Not surprisingly, Kaish and Gilad (1991:56) found that:  
‘[M]anagers are more concerned than entrepreneurs with economic issues of profit and market i.e., 
the end result, but entrepreneurs focused more on the implementing factors of who was involved 
in the deal, the role of the government, and how much money would have to be put into the 
deal…. The managers are concerned with the objective economic measures of outcome, profit and 
market size possibly, because their success depends exclusively on these economic indicators of 
performance.’ 
According to Busenitz and Barney (cited in Alvarez & Busenitz, 2001:758), ‘entrepreneurs use 
heuristics more extensively than managers in larger organizations.’ Alvarez and Busentiz 
(2001:758) further add: 
‘The term heuristics refers to simplifying strategies that individuals [entrepreneurs in this case] use 
to make strategic decisions, especially in complex situations where less complete or uncertain 
information is available…. [M]anagerial cognition is more factual-based while entrepreneurial 
cognition builds from limited or key experiences and beliefs.’ 
 
One irony has not escaped Drucker (1986:29), who suggests that, 
‘Entrepreneurship is ‘risky’ mainly because so few of the so-called entrepreneurs 
know what they are doing. They lack the methodology. They violate elementary and 
well-known rules. This is particularly true of high-tech entrepreneurs…’ (See Box 2.5 
for other observations made by Drucker.) Ireland et al. (2001) add that the most 
successful entrepreneurs carefully evaluate risk-return relationships, rejecting 
ventures when the relationship is unattractive.  
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Box 2.5 Drucker’s Observations on Entrepreneurs as Risk-takers 
‘A year or two ago I attended a university symposium on entrepreneurship at which a number 
of psychologists spoke. Although their papers disagreed on everything else, they all talked of 
an ‘entrepreneurial personality,’ which was characterized by a ‘propensity for risk-taking.’ A 
well-known and successful innovator and entrepreneur who had built a process-based 
innovation into a substantial worldwide business was then asked to comment. He said: ‘I find 
myself baffled by your papers. I think I know as many successful [italics added] innovators 
and entrepreneurs as anyone, beginning with myself. I have never come across an 
‘entrepreneurial personality.’ The successful ones I know all have, however, one thing—and 
only one thing in common: they are not ‘risk takers.’ They try to define the risks they have to 
take and to minimize them as much as possible...’ (1986:139). 
‘The popular picture of innovators—half pop-psychology, half Hollywood—makes them look 
like a cross between Superman and the Knights of the Round Table. Alas, most of them in real 
life are unromantic figures, and much more likely to spend hours on cash-flow projections 
than to dash off looking for ‘risks.’ Of course innovation is risky. But so is stepping into the 
car…. All economic activity is by definition ‘high risk’ [italics added]’ (1986:139). 
 
Fifth, because new ventures are inherently more risky, entrepreneurs have 
been seen as risk takers with a high tolerance for ambiguity (Low & Macmillan, 
1988). This widely held image of a risk taker couples easily with intuitive and ad hoc 
decision-making. It is unclear whether entrepreneurs’ appetite for risk is any different 
from that of the general population (Brockhaus, 1980). 
With an over-reliance on, and simplistic interpretation of, the binary concept 
of ‘intuition’ and ‘planning’ and a lack of careful systematic empirical research, 
ambiguity and confusion have continued.  
2.5 Reconciling the Differences 
2.5.1 ‘Intuition’ in Entrepreneurship 
The Oxford Dictionary gives definitions of ‘intuition’ that are strikingly dissimilar: 
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 ‘The immediate apprehension of an object by the mind without the intervention of any 
reasoning process’ 
 ‘The action of looking upon or into; contemplation; inspection’ 
It is the former definition of ‘intuition’ that is more widely used and 
understood. Indeed, Mitchell et al. (2005:667-668) rightly observe: 
Put the word intuition into ‘Google’ and your web search will associate 
intuition with…intuitive parenting, psychic spying, intuitive tarot 
reading…intuitive feng shui, living intuitively, building magical 
business success by unlocking intuitive powers… etc. It is therefore not 
surprising that the overpowering linkage of intuition to mystery and 
myth that pervades…also predispose entrepreneurship researchers to 
expect intuition to be a construct in entrepreneurship research that 
cannot be well understood, if understood at all.  
 Mitchell et al. (2005) argue that entrepreneurs often use intuition. However, 
entrepreneurial intuition is poorly defined in the research literature. They provide a 
useful theoretical definition of intuition developed through a comprehensive literature 
survey of antecedents. They focus on an individual’s role in the entrepreneurial 
process (which itself may involve various processes and sub-processes) rather than 
the traits and attributes of an individual (which they see as a static view of 
entrepreneurial intuition). They note that intuition is a dynamic process that involves 
‘coming-to-consciousness.’ However, as one becomes adept in something, the same 
conscious and deliberate effort is not required—that is, it becomes a ‘routine’ or a 
usual ‘procedure’ for them.14 As Gordon (cited in Mitchell et al., 2005:665) has said: 
‘People becoming competent in a given domain move away from the use of symbolic 
or declarative knowledge and toward a reliance on perceptual, non-verbalizable 
procedural knowledge.’ This suggestion, according to Mitchell et al. (2005:665), 
echoes assertions by other researchers that ‘experts utilize procedural knowledge 
more than novices do’.  
Gordon (quoted in Mitchell et al., 2005:666) further elaborates on the 
applicability of intuition in different problem situations: 
                                                 
14 Lowe and Marriott (2006:106) have a similar opinion, 
[Intuition] is often referred to as gut feeling and can be a powerful source of ideas, when used 
appropriately. The most successful entrepreneurs also often comment that they were lucky in 
having the right idea at the right time. The truth is that structured idea generation combined with 
intuition is probably the successful approach to idea generation and, undoubtedly, leads to lucky 
breaks too. 
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In [both novel and familiar problem-solving], the expert has access only to 
the information that comes into working memory, and that information is 
declarative in nature. The major implication of this view is that by 
definition procedural knowledge cannot be directly verbalized. It is 
therefore counterproductive to ask an expert how he or she made a 
decision or solved a problem. The best that the expert can do is verbalize 
the thoughts that came to working memory as a product of the procedures 
and use declarative knowledge to conjecture what those procedures must 
have been. 
 
Mitchell et al. (2005:666) conclude that ‘intuition is not a unidirectional 
process of coming to consciousness, but is instead a dynamic process that initially (as 
it is developing) involves an explicit awareness of the coming-to-consciousness 
process, and which is subsequently experienced as ‘having a hunch’ or ‘just 
knowing.’’  
Although the proposals of Mitchell et al. (2005) on what entrepreneurial 
intuition is seem realistic, in this research ‘intuition’ will still be used in the popular 
sense—that is, the apprehension of a situation without conscious reasoning. 
Nevertheless, following Mitchell et al., the research will carefully consider the role of 
‘relevant experience’ or ‘expert advice’15 in entrepreneurial decision-making.  
Prior experience clearly has a major role in decision-making. Many scholars in 
the field of entrepreneurship (like Dutton & Duncan, 1987; Hart, 1992; Hart & 
Banbury, 1994; Hitt & Tyler, 1991; Schweiger et al., 1989; Sharfman & Dean, 1997) 
have emphasised the importance of experience based decision-making for efficient 
and quick decisions across all functions in a turbulent environment. Boyd and Fulk 
(1996), based on survey responses by 74 executives from various industries, conclude 
that regardless of the importance of impersonal information (i.e., external data 
gathered by formal means), executives will still make use of introspective information 
(i.e., knowledge based on personal experiences and sources) more than formal 
scanning techniques. In a useful study by Barringer et al. (2005), founders of 
companies with prior experience in the same or a closely related industry were 
identified in 76 per cent of the rapid-growth firms in the sample but only 24 per cent 
                                                 
15 Bonaccio and Dalal (2006:1), on the basis of their literature review, observe that the ‘field of 
judgment and decision-making has not systematically investigated the social context of decisions.’ By 
this they mean the impact of advice seeking and taking on decision-making. 
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of the slow-growth firms. They conclude that related industry experience provides a 
founder with critical knowledge plus the advantage of access to a network of contacts 
that can help a firm overcome liabilities of newness and build a growth-oriented 
business. Their study also affirmed the importance of a college education, which 
seems to provide the founders with the skills necessary to launch a venture, 
particularly if the venture is in a technically oriented industry such as biotechnology 
or computer science. Drucker (1986:26) again provides a useful summary perspective: 
But everyone who can face up to decision making can learn to be an 
entrepreneur and to behave entrepreneurially. Entrepreneurship, then, is 
behaviour rather than personality trait. And its foundations lie in concept 
and theory rather than in intuition. 
2.5.2 ‘Planning’ in Entrepreneurship16 
The creation, identification and exploitation of opportunities have become 
increasingly organised, indeed planned, over the past century. Drucker (1986:34) 
wrote: 
…one of the great achievements of the nineteenth century was the 
‘invention of invention.’ Before 1880 or so, invention was mysterious; 
early nineteenth-century books talk incessantly of the ‘flash of genius.’ 
The inventor himself was a half-romantic, half-ridiculous figure, tinkering 
away in a lonely garret. By 1914 the time World War I broke out, 
‘invention’ had become ‘research,’ a systematic, purposeful activity, 
which is planned and organized with high predictability both of the results 
aimed at and likely to be achieved. 
Something similar seems to be happening with reference to entrepreneurial 
decision-making. Several researchers have been redefining the concept of ‘strategic 
planning.’ They see strategic planning as a continuous process because there is 
usually some limit to completely removing the uncertainty associated with a decision 
and with the passage of time an uncertain variable may become more comprehensible. 
Most people try to plan within their limitations (experience, resource, time etc.). This 
is, in effect, the definition of ‘strategy’ by Miller et al. (1960); that is, any goal 
directed behaviour is connected to some kind of strategy.  Pineda et al., (1998:60) in 
their empirically based article, rightly observe that ‘any small business manager 
                                                 
16 Also refer to Delmar and Shane (2003) for a detailed discussion on the dominant understanding of 
the use of planning in entrepreneurship and its counterargument.  
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‘worth his salt’ knows that a good decision has to be based upon adequate and 
accurate information.’  
As stated above, ‘strategy’ is not a one-time process or event but an ongoing 
process. In the 1980s, Mintzberg talked extensively about ‘emergent strategies’. More 
recently, this term has been misused or misinterpreted to mean that strategy cannot be 
planned but is only an emergent process. This seems to imply that ‘planning’ is a 
useless exercise. The effect of this thinking has been more profound in 
entrepreneurship, especially following the creation of the concept of entrepreneurial 
typology (discussed earlier) by various researchers (e.g., Frese et al., 2000; Mintzberg 
& Waters, 1985; Quinn et al., 1988 etc.).  
2.5.2(a) Understanding the ‘emergent process’  
The construct of ‘strategic experimentation’ is based on the notion that ‘no matter 
how much attention to detail is involved in the preparation of the business plan, the 
actual formation and development of the business will involve considerable 
adjustment to and/or deviation from that plan’ (Nicholls-Nixon et al., 2000:494). 
Many researchers (Drucker, 1986; Nicholls-Nixon et al., 2000; Sull, 2004) have used 
the term ‘strategic experimentation’ instead of ‘emergent process’. Perhaps in using 
the term ‘strategic experimentation’ one doesn’t fall into the trap of meaning ‘pure’ 
emergent process because strategic experimentation implies that strategy does have 
elements of both deliberate and emergent process, as originally proposed by 
Mintzberg in the 1980s.  
 Sull (2004) discusses the power of strategic experimentation in an 
entrepreneurial context. He identifies several types of uncertainty: known unknowns 
(what you know you don’t know); unknown unknowns (what you don’t know you 
don’t know); new information that is imperfect or incomplete; and conflicting signals. 
Although one has to be prepared to learn (Nicholls-Nixon et al., 2000:498) and be 
ready to make amendments, Sull (2004:76) cautions against ‘experiment creep’, 
which he says ‘occurs when an experiment drags on too long, costs too much or lacks 
clarity about which sources of uncertainty are being tested.’ Drucker (1986:215), 
based on his vast experience of consulting entrepreneurs and business people, makes 
this observation: 
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The entrepreneur of so much of the popular literature or of Hollywood 
movies, the person who suddenly has a ‘brilliant idea’ and rushes off to 
put it into effect, is not going to succeed with it. In fact, for this strategy to 
succeed at all, the innovation must be based on a careful and deliberate 
attempt to exploit one of the major opportunities for innovation. 
2.5.2(b) What sort of planning do entrepreneurs do (if they do it)? 
The term ‘planning’ is traditionally related to formal and complete planning. More 
recently, researchers have debated the use of the terms ‘formal’ versus ‘informal’ 
planning and ‘complete’ versus ‘critical point’ planning.17  
Boussouara and Deakins (1999) argue that the performance and development 
of high technology start-ups depend on critical incident decision-making. Frese et al. 
(2000) has made a similar observation. They add that critical point strategy is perhaps 
the best for start-ups as it requires business owners to do some amount of planning in 
order to decide which issues are more important and thus need to be prioritised. 
Stewart (cited in Zacharakis & Meyer, 1998) says that although decision-makers 
believe they thoroughly consider all relevant information, most typically they rely on 
only three to seven factors or cues.  
Van Gelderen et al. (2000) state that while success leads to a higher use of 
planning strategy and planning strategy leads to higher success, a ‘critical point’ is 
connected to success at an earlier phase of a new venture. They also conclude that 
reactive strategy leads to failure and failure leads to a higher degree of reactive 
strategy. In a very valuable empirical study, Bracker et al. (1988) found that a 
combination of opportunistic and (structured strategic) planning orientation accounted 
for significantly better performance.18  
 Sull (2004:72) observes that ‘[a]n entrepreneur or manager begins the process 
by formulating a hypothesis—a mental model that generally includes a definition of 
                                                 
17 It is necessary to clearly distinguish between the two constructs of ‘formal’ planning and ‘complete’ 
planning. For the purpose of this article, ‘complete’ planning simply means a rational way of planning 
in which the idea is not to leave anything uncertain and equivocal. ‘Formal’ planning means that formal 
methods have been used, including a formal survey, formal business plan and a methodological top-
down approach. Together, these constructs (i.e., ‘formal’ and ‘complete’) comprise the construct of 
‘traditional’ planning. ‘Formal’ planning is not synonymous with ‘complete’ planning. (Refer to Frese 
et al. (2000); Gibson & Cassar (2005); Matthews & Scott (1995); and Olson & Bokor (1995) for 
definitions of ‘formal’ planning and ‘complete’ planning.)  
18 In this study, Bracker et al. (1988) has given due consideration to the ‘context’. The research was 
done in the electronics industry and industry specific performance measures were used. 
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the opportunity, the resource required to pursue it, the value that would be created if it 
were to be successful and a plan to pursue it. The model may reside implicitly in the 
head of the entrepreneur or it may be expressed explicitly as a business plan.’ This 
implies that what is important for an entrepreneur is to have a plan, formal or 
informal. Drucker (1986:192) seems to be suggesting that even a reasonable degree of 
planning that is not too difficult to achieve would suffice: 
To build market focus into a new venture is not in fact particularly 
difficult. It does not require a great deal of money to find out whether an 
unexpected market is an indication of genuine potential or a fluke. It 
requires sensitivity and a little systematic work… The greatest danger for 
the venture is to ‘know better’ than the customer what the product or 
service is or should be, how it should be bought, and what it should be 
used for…Businesses are not paid to reform customers. They are paid to 
satisfy customers. 
 
Having reviewed studies into the use of information in SMEs, Fuellhart and 
Glasmeier (2003:233) suggest that most small firms are ‘opportunistic in their 
information-seeking behaviours, leaning largely towards those sources that can be 
accessed with little additional effort outside of the scope of normal business activities. 
Information such as trade journals, customers, and members of the supply chain figure 
prominently in this list…’ Similarly, Brush (1992) concludes that entrepreneurs use 
customers, business contacts, competitors, suppliers, employees and industry experts 
more often than friends, consultants, social networks and family members to gather 
market information.  
Indeed, one can find many examples of entrepreneurs using various simple 
approaches to assess their ideas. For example, Vesper (1990:167) gives an example of 
two people who had an idea to sell a mix that people could use to make hot-spiced 
wine without having to look up a recipe and gather all the ingredients. He quotes their 
experience: 
We went out into the kitchen and mixed up a batch, put some into a 
thermos bottle and drove to a supermarket. The store manager listened to 
our description of the product, then took a taste from the thermos. He told 
us that if we would package it to sell for under one dollar retail he would 
order a couple of cases and let us put it on the shelf. From there we went 
to some more stores and got similar reactions from the other managers. 
That convinced us we at least had a market for getting the product tried. 
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 For Bahrami and Evans (1987), the style of decision-making in high 
technology companies (which includes new ventures) has two distinctive features— 
simultaneously centralised and decentralised; and emphasising path finding and 
implementation rather than problem solving through extensive analysis. They believe 
that ‘[t]his orientation is reflected in their planning process, which places 
considerable emphasis on updating strategies by establishing systematic forums for 
discussion, rather than extensive forecasts of future conditions’ (Bahrami & Evans, 
1987:57-58). 
 A careful analysis of the literature reveals that decision-making in 
entrepreneurship cannot be simply generalised and labelled as ad hoc and intuitive. 
One should expect different degrees of rationality, planning, intuitiveness and 
adhockery for different types of decisions in a new venture. To empirically test this, 
the research design must consider various aspects of decision-making (in a new 
venture).   
2.6 What Needs to be Done? 
Clearly there would be value in exploring further the decision-making process in new 
ventures and analysing the factors that influence the process and its outcomes. This 
section draws on the strategic decision-making literature and the entrepreneurship 
literature to identify factors that are likely to play a role in the decision process in a 
new venture context.19 
2.6.1 Internal Context 
The internal context of a firm is related to the organisation’s structure and its 
resources. In a new venture (especially if it is being started by an entrepreneur or a 
group of entrepreneurs), the internal context will be primarily a function of the 
founder(s) (i.e., the entrepreneur/entrepreneurial team) (Beckman, 2006:745) because 
                                                 
19 Hitt et al. (2001) and Ireland et al. (2003) have specifically called for a closer integration of strategic 
management and entrepreneurship. 
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the founders, along with a few other key employees (if there are any), would 
constitute the organisation.20  
 The main asset of any new venture is usually the founders and their knowledge 
base, and generally they lack resources. It is their past experiences and their beliefs 
that constitute entrepreneurial cognition (Alvarez & Busenitz, 2001). Entrepreneurs 
who use their available information to make decisions that utilise the available 
resources in a superior and more efficient way will be more successful (Alvarez & 
Busenitz, 2001). The capability to make such decisions will have a direct relationship 
with both the relevant experience (Gavetti et al., 2005; Grebel et al., 2003; 
Mosakowski, 1998; Ottesen, 2005; Sexton et al., 1997; Srivastava & Lee, 2005 etc.) 
and the social networks of the entrepreneur(s) (Ireland et al., 2003; Witt, 2004).21 
Again, the emphasis is on the characteristics of the entrepreneurial process as a 
determinant of performance rather than the characteristics of the entrepreneur, a point 
emphasised by Drucker and Gartner time and again. 
 The nature of planning is in part determined by the available information. The 
more information is available, the more comprehensive22 the decision-making is 
likely to be and the more confidence can be attached to that decision (Forbes, 2005). 
                                                 
20 Gartner et al. (1994:6) observe, ‘The ‘entrepreneur’ in entrepreneurship is more likely to be plural, 
rather than singular. The locus of entrepreneurial activity often resides not in one person, but in 
many.’ They say that people with direct influence on an entrepreneurial activity are not the only ones 
to be called entrepreneurs. Other people, such as advisors, suppliers, junior employees or anyone else 
involved with the activity, should also be called entrepreneurs. 
I do not completely disagree with Gartner et al. (1994). However, that observation may not 
always be correct. The use of that definition would make research in this field complicated because 
there would then be no boundary. For the purpose of this research, an entrepreneur is someone with 
high stakes (like senior management and major shareholders) in a particular entrepreneurial activity.  
21 The social capital of an entrepreneur or an entrepreneurial team has probably received the maximum 
attention by researchers in the field of entrepreneurship. Refer to Ireland et al. (2003) and Witt (2004) 
to get an overview of research in this area. Murray (2004) discusses specifically the social capital of 
academic scientists and its usefulness to the firm established by them. This is especially relevant to this 
research as most of the firm founders in biotechnology are academic scientists. 
22 According to Dean and Sharfman (as quoted in Forbes, 2005:629), ‘the construct of decision 
comprehensiveness captures the extensiveness with which organizations scan, analyse and plan in 
confronting decision situations.’ 
Frederickson and Mitchell (1984:401-402) quote Janis and Mann’s definition of a 
comprehensive process that includes the following characteristics: 
‘(1) the thorough canvassing of a wide range of alternatives, (2) surveying a full range 
of objectives, (3) carefully weighing the costs and risks of various consequences, (4) 
intensively searching for information to evaluate alternative actions, (5) objectively 
evaluating information, or expert judgment regarding alternative actions, (6) re-
examining the positive and negative consequences of all known alternatives, and (7) 
making detailed plans, including the explicit consideration of contingencies, for 
implementing the chosen action.’ 
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The availability of information is largely determined by the availability of time and 
resources, which in turn will shape the ‘boundary spanning’ activities of the firm and 
the quality of the information. Pineda et al. (1998) also suggests that there is a 
relationship between the boundary spanning activities and the decision priority 
(important or not-so-important decision)23 and decision-makers’ perception of their 
competence in making a particular decision (which may be determined by their 
functional knowledge and their experience in that field). 
 Some other decision-specific factors that affect the decision process are power 
structure24 and past strategies25.  
2.6.2 External Context 
External context refers to the industry specific environment and the location of the 
business. These two factors will usually determine the nature of the external 
context—dynamic versus static; complex versus simple; high competition or low 
competition; high barriers to entry or low barriers to entry; mature industry or a new 
industry. (Refer to Box 2.6 for definitions of constructs describing external context.) 
 High-technology companies (such as biotechnology and information 
technology) are usually considered to be knowledge intensive, existing in a dynamic 
and complex environment. This means that many decisions have to be taken rapidly 
and there can be a relatively high degree of uncertainty while making decisions.26 
This could have a bearing on the decision-making process, as Cooney et al. (2001) 
suggest: ‘If entrepreneurial behaviour and endeavour emerges from, and is influenced 
by the context within which the entrepreneur operates then the process cannot be 
homogeneous but instead reflects the particular environment in which it takes place.’ 
                                                 
23 Nutt (1998, 2000) suggests that the more important the decision, the greater the decision-makers’ 
use of analysis informed by quantitative data and/or subjective expert opinion that ‘the perceived 
importance of the decision has a bearing on the information gathering and thus, on decision formulation 
stages of the decision process.’ Regner (2003) and Pineda et al (1998) also suggest that the likelihood 
of using systemic approaches, involving the organised acquisition of information, increases with the 
level of importance of the decision. 
24 This will be a function of all the stakeholders (including founders).  
25 Decisions that are interrelated with one another tend to influence decisions that are of present 
concern. This is often termed ‘strategic coherence’ or ‘strategic fit’ in a positive context and ‘strategic 
inertia’ in a negative context. Schwenk (1984) makes use of a postulate called ‘anchoring process’ by 
Tversky and Kahneman to explain ‘strategic inertia’. 
26 Refer to McMullen and Shepherd (2006) for a detailed discussion on the relationship between 
perceived uncertainty, prior knowledge, motivation and entrepreneurial action. 
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Box 2.6 Definitions of Constructs Describing (External) Environment 27 
• Complexity is related to the number of elements and interconnectedness among them 
(Rajgopalan et al., 1993).  
• Munificence is related to the resource support provided by an environment (Rajgopalan et al., 
1993). 
• Dynamism is related to the rate of change. An environment can be dynamic (unstable) even if 
it changes in predictable ways or is composed of only a few simple linkages (Hart & Banbury, 
1994). 
• A turbulent environment, however, is one that is both dynamic and complex; it changes both 
frequently and unpredictably (Hart & Banbury, 1994). 
 
 Rauch and Frese (1998) suggest that environmental conditions such as 
hostility and uncertainty act as moderators of the relationship between planning and 
small-scale enterprise success. If one has few resources, one needs to be particularly 
careful in one’s steps of action. In such cases, planning helps. Even though Rauch and 
Frese (1998) provide evidence of the use of planning in uncertain conditions, they do 
not suggest the type of planning (formal/informal, critical point/complete, etc.) that 
would be most useful. Van Gelderen et al. (2000) suggest that ‘complete planning’ is 
of not much use in a changing environment. For a complex environment, they say, 
entrepreneurs tend to use ‘complete planning’ but not ‘critical point’ planning or 
opportunistic strategy.28 In their opinion, a ‘reactive’ strategy will be used more often 
in an environment with many competitors and few resources because one finds it 
difficult to plan in whatever form. Similarly, Matthews and Scott (1995) suggest that 
it is more likely that under conditions of high uncertainty, future orientation will give 
                                                 
27 ‘Rate of change’ is the key construct for both ‘dynamic’ and ‘turbulent’ environment, whereas 
‘uncertainty’ is the key construct of ‘turbulent’ environment only.  
 Dess and Beard (1984) discuss munificence, dynamism and complexity in relation to 
environmental contexts. Rajgopalan et al. (1993) provide a detailed account and framework that 
integrates various dimensions related to the strategic decision process. 
28 A very useful empirical study by Gruber (2006) shows that ‘critical point’ planning is better in a 
dynamic environment and a munificent approach to planning in less dynamic environments. This 
questionnaire-based study involved entrepreneurs from multiple industries using high technology. 
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way to a preoccupation with the immediate survival and the growth needs of the firm. 
As such, sophistication of strategic and operational planning will decline. 
 From her research, Eisenhardt (1989) concluded that executives making fast 
decisions (in a new venture) used extensive real-time information, not forecasted 
information. These executives considered several options alternatively and made 
maximum use of experienced counsellors. She added that executives making fast 
decisions routinely paid close attention to quantitative indicators such as daily and 
weekly tracking of bookings, scrap, inventory, cash flow, engineering milestones and 
competitors’ moves. Similarly, Daft et al. (1988:134) suggests that decision-makers 
in high performing firms ‘tailor scanning more closely to perceived uncertainty.’ 
2.7 The Decision-Making Process and the Content of Decisions 
Olson and Bokor (1995:34) say ‘strategy process and content are interrelated concepts 
when linked to performance; that is, the content-performance relationship is 
influenced by process, while the process-performance relationship is sensitive to 
content.’ Content and process are in turn influenced by context. Different 
environmental sectors—customers, suppliers, distributors, competitors, government, 
public attitudes, technology and financial markets—also affect strategic and 
operational planning differently (Matthews & Scott, 1995), so some dimensions of the 
firm’s strategy are more likely to change than others (Nicholls-Nixon et al., 2000). 
Nicholls-Nixon et al. (2000:501) say that ‘[m]ost resistant to change are dimensions 
that define the purpose of the organization, give institutional reality to insiders and 
outsiders, and determine the distribution of resources.’ They propose that the 
organisational attributes most likely to be changed, ranked from the most likely, were: 
marketing strategy, core technology, forms of authority and stated goals. Another way 
of looking at this is that up front more effort is put into removing any major 
uncertainty about the ‘core’ dimensions.29 In different industrial contexts, there will 
be differences in what is ‘core’ to a new venture, which is then likely to affect the 
content of their strategy.  
                                                 
29 The characteristic (or nature) of the decision therefore has a bearing on the process of decision-
making. Baron (2004), Bourgeois III (1980), Papadakis et al. (1998) and Regner (2003) discuss the 
effect of the nature of the decision on the decision-making process.  
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2.8 Decision-Making Process and Performance 
2.8.1 Introduction 
Brockmann and Simmonds (1997:463) categorically state that ‘determining a link to 
firm performance should complete the entire decision-making, implementing, and 
evaluating phases of the strategic management process.’ However, Dess and Robinson 
(1984:265) observe that ‘organizational performance (OP) has become an important 
component of empirical research in the field of business policy’. Researchers 
frequently talk about it when investigating such organisational phenomena as 
structure, strategy and planning. Pettigrew (1992) suggests that building an outcome 
into a process research design has at least two important advantages. Firstly, the 
outcome provides a focal point or anchor for the whole investigation. ‘Performance’ is 
becoming a central construct of interest in research concerned with the planning and 
performance relationship (Ebben & Johnson, 2005).  Secondly, it adds value to the 
study because there is the possibility of exploring how and why variations in context 
and process shape variability in the observed outcomes. 
Much of the entrepreneurship literature, and particularly the literature on new 
venture strategy, as observed by Cooper (cited in Gartner et al., 1998:220), has 
focused on identifying variables that predict new firm performance. However, Cooper 
(1993) believes that there has been limited success when it comes to determining the 
predictors of new venture performance at a ‘firm’ level. Carter, et al. (1996) has 
emphasised the need for future studies to explore how entrepreneurs undertake 
planning and make judgements about the potential success of a venture. They make a 
strong case for in-depth case studies to analyse the process of planning by linking it to 
the ‘context’ and the ‘performance.’  
Most researchers, however, tend to relate the outcome of the decision process 
to the performance of the firm. Many decisions would indeed have an impact on the 
firm, but there may not be a direct relationship. Hough and White (2003) argue that 
relating decision processes directly to firm performance is problematic. This is 
because the causal ordering is ambiguous, the relationship is likely to be confounded 
and firm-level analyses always ask questions concerning the extent to which an 
organisation usually uses a particular type of rational decision process, thereby 
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ignoring the possibility that decision-makers may in practice vary their use of 
processes among specific decisions.  
2.8.2 Operationalising ‘Performance’ 
It is vital that researchers aim to relate specific decisions to the outcomes of these 
decisions. Venkataraman and Ramanujam (1986:801) observe that ‘the treatment of 
performance in research settings is perhaps one of the thorniest issues confronting the 
academic researcher.’ What is the appropriate operational definition of performance, 
especially in the new venture context? Murphy et al. (cited in Ebben & Johnson, 
2005) found 71 different operational measures of performance in the 51 articles they 
studied:  
According to Hickson et al., (2003), researchers have generally used either 
financial criteria or adoption criteria to define success, but it is not always 
possible to isolate the specific financial impact of an individual decision, 
and decisions even when made (i.e., adopted) may or may not work when 
implemented. 
 
Kirchhoff (1977) suggests that there is no ultimate criterion of effectiveness 
because complex organisations pursues multiple goals and simplistic single variable 
models are inadequate expressions of the real world.30  Dess and Robinson (1984) 
suggest that, when available, objective measures of organisational performance 
(particularly economic performance) are preferred to subjective measures. However, 
subjective measures may be useful in attempting to operationalise the broader, non-
economic dimensions of organisational performance.31 
Venkataraman and Ramanujam (1986:804) recommend the inclusion of 
operational (or more proximate) performance indicators. They suggest that this 
approach ‘takes us beyond the ‘black box’ approach that seems to characterize the 
exclusive use of financial indicators and focuses on those key operational success 
factors that might lead to financial performance.’ 
                                                 
30 The majority of research on the linkage between strategy-making processes and firm performance 
has adopted an econometric approach (Hart & Banbury, 1994). While such analyses can isolate 
statistically the independent effects of each of the predictors, they do not provide insight into which 
combinations of processes perform especially well. Relating decision processes directly to firm 
performance is also problematic because the causal ordering is ambiguous (Hough & White, 
2003:481). 
31 Smith et al. (1988), in their empirical study, found consistency between different performance 
assessments (objective vs. subjective), which suggests that subjective performance data are reliable.  
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Kirchoff (1977) refers to ‘derived’ and ‘prescribed’ approaches to evaluating 
organisational performance. ‘Derived’ refers to judgements of an individual (or 
group) external to the organisation whereas ‘prescribed’ refers to those that an 
organisation defines for itself. He emphasises that ‘[r]eal effectiveness can only be 
measured relative to a particular set of derived or prescribed goals’ (p. 352).32 
2.9 What are the Objectives of This Research? 
While some scholars in entrepreneurship (Ardichvili et al., 2003; Cooper et al., 1995; 
Gaglio, 2004; Gaglio & Katz, 2001; Holcombe, 2003; Keh et al., 2002; Krackhardt, 
1995; Lumpkin & Dess, 1996) have started to build a theoretical and empirical 
framework to better understand the ‘recognition of the opportunity’, the process 
dimension has remained largely neglected. When the process of entrepreneurial 
decision-making has been studied, the results have been divergent. This review of the 
literature also suggests that context has a strong influence on the process and content 
and, therefore, should not be neglected.  
 Figure 2.1 provides a diagrammatic framework integrating the four broad 
dimensions: context, process, content and performance. It is argued that each of these 
dimensions must be carefully assessed in any systematic research into entrepreneurial 
decision-making. This simple framework reminds the researcher about ‘what 
influences’ and ‘what gets influenced’ by the decision-making process in a new 
venture. 
                                                 
32 Dean and Sharfman (1996), though, suggest that the use of factual information is better than asking 
entrepreneurs their general impression of decision effectiveness. 
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Meso Context 
 Entrepreneurial Team 
 Cumulative Social Network
 Resources 
Macro Context 
 Industry (Business 
Environment) 
 Business Segment 
 Business Culture 
 Regional Business Support 
System 
Micro Context 
(Nature of the Decision) 
 
 Simple/Difficult 
 Strategic/Tactical 
 Urgent/Non-urgent 
 Routine/Non-routine 
 Opportunity/Crisis 
 Important/Non-important 
Decision Process 
Decision-making 
 
Content 
 
Performance 
Figure 2.1 Links between the Decision Process and the Decision Context, Decision Content and the Performance 
 51
                                                
This literature review of decision-making (especially planning) within an 
entrepreneurial context (especially new ventures), raises several questions, some of 
which are: 
 Is there such a thing as ‘entrepreneurial’ decision-making?  
o If so, what are its characteristics? 
o If not, how does/do an entrepreneur/entrepreneurial team make(s) 
decisions?33 
 Why do some new ventures perform better than others? 
o Is it in any way possible to relate the performance of a decision made 
in a new venture to the way it has been made?34 
 Is there any relationship between the experience of the entrepreneurial team 
and the start of the new venture? 
 Is there any relationship among the experience of the entrepreneurial team and 
the way they make decisions and the performance of the new venture? 
To pursue systematic research addressing these issues, the following are required: 
 A conceptual framework for the research. While there is no suitable 
framework to operationalise the research,35 an initial ‘working’ framework for 
the research can be developed based on a thorough review of the research 
literature on strategy process/decision-making. Such a review is provided in 
the next chapter.36 
 A sound research design and methodology (Chapter 5). 
 
33 Gruber (2006:6) argues that ‘the level of effort entrepreneurs put into different activities should be 
studied, because such a view improves on dichotomous conceptualizations that merely report whether 
or not a certain activity has been pursued.’ 
34 Low and MacMillan (1988:141) have strongly recommended that researchers in entrepreneurship  
‘go beyond descriptive studies and … pursue causal inference.’ Wortman (1987) has also 
recommended that studies investigate causal relationships. This study will have both elements. The 
research methodology is discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
35 Forbes (1999) identifies various cognitive stages—intention, scanning, interpretation, action and 
performance—in the new venture formation context. Most of these stages are similar to stages that 
researchers of strategy process have identified (discussed in the next chapter) for the decision process 
(i.e., micro-level study). However, his linking these cognitive stages at meso-level (i.e., firm level) is 
not empirically supported and is difficult to understand using simple logic. He relates intention to the 
pre-founding of new ventures and the rest of the stages to post-founding. For this reason, this 
framework was not used.  
  
 
 
 
 
Decision-Making in Management  
 
 
 
 
George L. Morrisey: ‘Developing the plan is actually laying out the sequence of events that 
have to occur for you to achieve your goal.’ 
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3.1 ‘Decision-making’ in the Strategic Management Literature 
‘Decision-making’ in the strategic management literature can be classified into two 
broad categories: strategy content (i.e., a decision per se) and the process by which it 
is made and implemented (Rajgopalan, Rasheed & Datta, 1993).1 However, managers 
often see the value of strategic planning in the process rather than the plan per se 
(Bryson & Bromiley, 1993).2 One can also gauge the importance of the ‘strategy 
process’ from a definition of strategic management by Schendel and Hofer (quoted in 
Pettigrew, 1992:5): ‘Strategic management is a process that deals with the 
entrepreneurial work of the organization, with organizational renewal and growth, and 
more particularly with developing and utilizing the strategy which is to guide the 
organization’s operations.’ In fact, Bourgeois (1980), while not denying the relation 
between strategy content and organisational performance, suggests that it is equally 
important to gain knowledge about the processes through which management 
determines strategies in the first place. Pettigrew (1992) takes this idea a step forward 
by suggesting that processes actually shape outcomes and, therefore, research into 
strategic management should explore this.   
 Despite the importance of the process dimension, the ‘content’ issue 
dominates the research agenda in strategic management (Pettigrew, 1992; Rajgopalan 
et al., 1993). Rajgopalan et al. (1993) reason that strategy process research has lagged 
behind strategy content research because the latter benefited from the early 
development of integrative models by researchers; however, there is an absence of 
such integrative models in strategy process research.   
 The reason for the lack of an integrative model in strategy process research is 
that the research in this area remains highly fragmented and characterised by limited 
                                                 
1 Researchers concerned with the process side of strategic management have traditionally been 
concerned with exploring well-established companies and how they tend to be successful over time. As 
such, the strategies have drawn maximum attention and research work. Decision-making in strategic 
management has generally been labelled the ‘strategy formation process’. However, decisions can be 
long-term strategies or short-term ‘tactics’. It should be noted that, more recently, researchers like Nutt 
(1993) have shed light on tactical decision-making in organisations. For the purpose of this research, 
the strategy formation process is synonymous with the decision-making process that involves both 
strategy and tactics. 
2 Bryson and Bromiley’s (1993) research is exploratory in nature and is based on a cross-sectional 
analysis of 68 cases using secondary data. They reported that while context affects both process and 
outcome, it is the process that has maximum effect on the outcome. For example, communication and 
problem solving strategies seem to have maximum effect on outcome. 
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cumulative theory building (Rajgopalan et al., 1993). This is primarily due to strategy 
making always being portrayed in dichotomous terms: rational versus incremental; 
planning versus intuition; emergent versus deliberate; formal versus informal; 
formulation versus implementation; or exploration versus exploitation (Hart & 
Banbury, 1994; Friend & Hickling, 1987). 
 This chapter focuses on these dichotomies in the strategy process, particularly 
planning versus intuition and deliberate versus emergent. This is because the contrast 
seems to be more profound along these dimensions. Moreover, these dichotomies 
have led researchers to develop ‘typologies’ of the decision process (such as Ansoff, 
1987; Bourgeois & Brodwin, 1984; Chaffe, 1985; Grandori, 1984; Hart, 1992; 
Idenburg, 1993; Miles & Snow, 1978; Mintzberg, 1973, 1987; Mintzberg & Waters, 
1985; Nonaka, 1988; Nutt, 1984; and Shrivastava & Grant, 1985).  These typologies 
represent the how characteristics of decision-making. But are these typologies useful 
or misleading? Do they provide a way of understanding the decision process? Are 
these different typologies one of the reasons for the lack of an integrative model to 
study the decision process? Should they be used to develop a framework for this 
research? To explore these questions, an understanding of how typologies were 
created is required. The effect of this approach on the study of the decision-making 
process is also needed. This will enable a more suitable approach to be identified. 
3.2 Typologies of Decision Processes 
Two theoretical constructs—‘bounded rationality’ and ‘emergent strategies’—have 
had a major impact on management science. They explain many issues that the earlier 
dominant concepts of ‘rationality’ and ‘planning’ cannot. While these new constructs 
provide many useful alternative explanations, they are more useful as a complement 
to the dominant concepts. While there has been acceptance of these as independent 
constructs, there has been less acceptance of attempts to integrate the newer and the 
older concepts. This has led to theoretical fragmentation that, as will be discussed 
further, has had a major effect on the process dimension of strategic management.  
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3.2.1 Prescriptive Versus Emergent Strategies  
Mintzberg and Waters (1985:270) state that deliberate and emergent strategies in their 
‘pure’ form can be taken as two ends of a continuum: 
[T]he fundamental difference between deliberate and emergent strategy is 
that whereas the former focuses on direction and control 
—getting desired things done—the latter opens up this notion of ‘strategic 
learning’…Emergent strategy itself implies learning what works—taking 
one action at a time in search for that viable pattern or consistency. 
 
The logic of the notion of emergent strategy has been very clearly stated by Quinn 
(1989:47): 
[N]o organization—no matter how brilliant, rational, or imaginative—
could possibly foresee the timing, the severity, or even the nature of all 
such precipitating events. Further, when these events did occur there 
might be neither enough time, resources, or information to undertake a full 
formal strategic analysis of all possible options and their consequences. 
 
The influential concept of ‘emergent strategy,’ now accepted by almost all 
researchers, was developed in response to the prescriptive schools’ promotion of 
‘thought independent of action’. This is where ‘strategy formation above all is a 
process of conception, rather than…one of learning’ (Mintzberg, 1990:182). 
Mintzberg and Waters (1985) took a balanced approach when they emphasised that 
real-world strategies lie somewhere between the two ends of the spectrum—
‘emergent’ and ‘deliberate’ strategies. The dominant logic behind this is that emergent 
and deliberate strategies are not orthogonal in nature. Researchers have perhaps not 
followed this logic in theory and practice. The sharp criticism of ‘planning’ is a 
continuing phenomenon, the basis of which lies in the treatment of deliberate and 
emergent strategies as necessarily contradictory. For example, Farjoun (2002:570), 
while reviewing the literature on strategic management, criticises not only the 
mechanistic/prescriptive school of thought (i.e., planning) but also the analytical tools 
suggested by it: 
[P]orter’s (1996, 1997) reflection on the concept of strategy, which 
includes several dynamic extensions, still retains a view of strategy as a 
planned and stable position, and suggests a linear causal flow running 
from environment to position (i.e. strategy) to internal organization. 
Similarly, SWOT analysis rooted in mechanistic ideas, still remains a 
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primary consulting tool (Hill and Westbrook, 1997) and serves as an 
organizing framework for research and teaching (Barney, 1997)…. 
 
However, March (2006:208), defending ‘technologies of model-based rationality’, 
observes that the failures related to these technologies are mainly due to their 
misguided use. It is probably because of this that Nutt (2002:92) argues that while 
some of the organisational decision-making literature has denigrated the role of 
analysis, (if used appropriately) analysis produces superior results when matched to 
the decision task. 
3.2.2 Rationality Versus Intuition 
Decision-making is usually not completely rational but boundedly rational (March, 
1994, 2006). ‘Bounded rationality’—also termed ‘limited rationality’ by March 
(1994)—means that as there will always be some uncertainty, so the decision-maker 
has to exercise judgement.3 Some decisions may have a high level of uncertainty 
because of a very low level of available information. March (1994:8-9) observes that 
both enthusiasts and sceptics endorse limited rationality as a natural extension of 
theories of pure rationality. Yet again they relate planning to pure rationality and 
adhockery to intuition.  
 
Some researchers, however, take a more balanced approach. Mitchell et al. 
(2005) develop a useful theoretical definition of ‘intuition’ from a comprehensive 
literature survey of antecedents. They note that intuition is a dynamic process that 
involves ‘coming-to-consciousness’. However, as one becomes adept at something, 
the same level of conscious and deliberate effort is not required; that is, it becomes a 
routine or a usual procedure that is referred to as ‘having an hunch’ or ‘just knowing’ 
(2005:666). Miller and Ireland (2005) also conceptualise intuition as a ‘holistic 
hunch’, which corresponds to judgement or choice made through a subconscious 
synthesis of information drawn from experience. They say that ‘gut feeling’ is often 
used to describe the final choice but that the subconscious process involved in a 
                                                 
3 Rottenstreich and Kivetz (2006), however, observe that people demonstrate ‘non-probabilistic’ 
behaviour (leading to rational behaviour) when there is low uncertainty or when they think that they 
have either total (or even partial) control. For example, a decision to eat sandwiches for lunch does not 
involve uncertainty and leads to a non-probabilistic act. (Refer to Rottenstreich and Kivetz (2006) for a 
detailed discussion and related examples.) 
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holistic hunch is not well understood. Klein (1999:31) also defines intuition as ‘the 
use of experience to recognize key patterns that indicate the dynamics of the 
situation.’ Intuition, then, is not simply a gut feeling, as is characterised by many 
researchers. Dane and Pratt (2007) give four elements of intuition: non-conscious, 
holistic, associative and faster. The key word is ‘associative’, which, according to 
them, differentiates intuition from guessing.4 
3.3 Decision Process and Typologies 
For Eisenhardt and Zbaracki (1992:22), ‘rationality is multidimensional, and so 
strategic decision makers are rational in some ways, but not others.’ Spender (quoted 
in Hitt & Tyler, 1991:331) comments that ‘[w]hile the decision process has rational 
components, a process of judgement is used to deal with uncertainty.’ For Farjoun 
(2002:579), ‘formulation includes not just analysis and synthesis but also invention, 
intuition, persuasion, and negotiation.’ His definition of strategy blends mechanistic 
ideas (postures, states and plans) with organic ideas (such as emergent strategies). 
Hart (1992:345) suggests that ‘high performance requires a balancing and 
simultaneous mastery of seemingly contradictory or paradoxical organizational 
capabilities—decisiveness and reflectiveness, broad vision and attention to detail, and 
bold moves and incremental adjustment.’ Isenberg (1986), based on his small-scale 
but effective empirical study, found that while managers make contingency plans (a 
rational strategy), they also often act quickly on incomplete information. It was found 
that while managers often used satisficing behaviour for decision-making, they valued 
information highly. Using an in-depth case-study approach, Eisenhardt (1989) found 
that, in fast-paced environments, executives sought information from many sources 
but focused on a few. Fredrickson (1986), after reviewing literature on the strategic 
decision process (and organisational structure), observed that the approaches taken by 
managers were simultaneously rational and intuitive (i.e., executives engaged in some 
but not all aspects of rational choice). The typologies proposed by some of the 
researchers are summarised in Table 3.1. 
 Hart (1992:335), who claims to have developed an integrated set of 
typologies, is able to capture the essence of the diverse typologies made by other 
                                                 
4 Refer to Dane and Pratt (2007) for definitions of intuition proposed by different researchers. 
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researchers. He nevertheless states that none of his individual composite typologies 
captures the range of themes and dimensions associated with the strategy-making 
process: ‘The five modes are not seen as mutually exclusive. In practice, 
organizations may combine two or more modes into distinctive combinations of 
strategy-making processes.’ In fact, he further suggests that ‘[f]irms that are able to 
combine several modes into a high ‘process capacity’ might be expected to perform 
well on more performance dimensions than single-mode…’ (p. 345).  
TABLE 3.1 TYPOLOGIES PROPOSED BY DIFFERENT RESEARCHERS 
Researchers Typologies of the Decision Process 
Ansoff (1987) Systematic; Ad hoc; Reactive; Organic 
 
Bourgeois and Brodwin (1984) 
Commander; Change; Collaborative; Cultural; 
and Crescive 
Chaffe (1985) Linear; Adaptive; and Interpretive 
Grandori (1984) Optimizing; Satisficing; Incremental; Cybernetic; 
and Random 
Hart (1992) Command; Symbolic; Rational; Transactive; and 
Generative 
Idenburg (1993) Rational Planning, Logical Increment; Guided 
Learning; and Emergent 
Mintzberg (1973) Entrepreneurial; Planning; and Adaptive 
Mintzberg (1987) Plan; Position; Ploy; Perspective; and Pattern 
 
Mintzberg and Waters (1985) 
Entrepreneurial; Planned; Ideological; Umbrella; 
Process; Consensus; Unconnected; and Imposed 
Nonaka (1988) Deductive; Compressive, and Inductive 
 
Nutt (1984) 
Normative; Bureaucratic; Behavioral; and 
Adaptive 
 
Shrivastava and Grant (1985) 
Managerial Autocracy; Systematic Bureaucracy; 
Adaptive Planning; and Political Expediency 
 
3.3.1 Are Typologies Useful? 
The rationale to construct typologies is that there is a finite set of processes from 
which strategic decisions evolve and that these take the form of patterns or gestalts 
that can be characterised and identified across organisations (Dess et al., 1997). While 
this approach is useful, determining typologies associated with a particular decision 
gives only a partial understanding of the decision process. For example, two decisions 
(A and B) may have components of adhockery and systematic procedures (using 
Ansoff’s typology), but this information alone does not provide a practical 
understanding of the complete decision process.    
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  A more realistic approach begins with the recognition that every decision is 
unique because the way the decision-making process evolves depends on many 
variables. Typologies only seem to increase our understanding of the pure types of 
decision-making (or strategy formation) processes, which are generally not pure in 
nature. Some researchers (discussed below) have sought to build generic models of 
decision-making that are more useful for understanding the decision process.  
3.4 Decision-Making Models 
According to Mintzberg (cited in Hickson, 1987:167), ‘the decision process 
encompasses all those steps taken from the time a stimulus for an action is perceived 
until the time the commitment to the action is made.’5 Mintzberg et al. (1976:247) 
had earlier concluded from their empirical work that ‘decision processes are 
programmable even if they are not in fact programmed.’ They say that even though 
the processes may not be explicit, there seemed to be a basic logic or structure 
underlying what the decision-maker does and that this structure could be described by 
the systematic study of his or her behaviour. A few years later, Lyles (1981) 
concluded from her study that the problem formulation process could be analysed and 
flowcharted.  
 A basic decision-making model that would be sufficiently realistic and 
inclusive to be useful for the analysis of decision-making for this study should: 
• incorporate iterative decision-making processes. Rarely are strategic decisions 
taken without a reconsideration of some aspect of them, if not most (Lyles, 
1981). The concept of ‘strategic experimentation’ has been proposed to 
capture these iterative processes (Nicholls-Nixon et al., 2000). Therefore, a 
useful generic decision-making model must include iterative decision-making 
processes. 
• include different types of decision-making. As suggested earlier, many 
researchers have developed typologies that pitch rationality and intuitiveness 
and planned and adaptiveness at two extremes. While such approaches are 
useful for establishing a broader taxonomy of decision-making, they lack 
                                                 
5 More recently Hastie (2001:657) has observed that ‘[d]ecision making refers to the entire process of 
choosing a course of action.’ This should involve, according to McMullen and Shepherd (2006), a 
consideration of both attention and the evaluation stage. 
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utility. Decision-making more often includes aspects of several typologies 
rather than conforms to one typology. A generic decision-making model must 
also be able to accommodate elements of different typologies of decision-
making.  
• integrate into a model of ‘process’ the role of ‘context’ and ‘content’. Many 
researchers have argued for an integrated approach to strategy formation, 
taking content, context and process into consideration simultaneously. Ansoff 
(1987) made the strategy formation process central to his concept of the 
‘strategic paradigm’. He linked the strategy formation process to power, 
culture, environment, capabilities and the final outcome (i.e., decisions about 
strategy).  
 There is a range of analytical models of the decision-making process. 
Researchers typically delineate different phases, such as the three phase 
characterisation: identification of the problem or opportunity; development of the idea 
(mainly related to validating the idea by giving meaning to the data); and 
implementation of the idea. Some researchers have added sub-phases to each as more 
clarity in concepts has emerged.  
 One direction for the development of decision-making models involves 
essentially the elaboration of these stages (as suggested) while retaining the basic 
linear sequential approach (when it comes to forming a model or framework). Most 
researchers taking this approach acknowledge iteration in decision-making but use a 
linear model because of complications in framing an iterative model (e.g., Bourgeois, 
1980; Beyer & Trice, 1982; Heerkens, 2006; Schwenk, 1984; Witte, 1972). A second 
approach, however, actually builds iterative processes into their models of decision-
making (e.g., Daft & Weick 1984; Lyles, 1981; Mintzberg et al. 1976; Nutt 1993). 
 Nutt (1993) has outlined a structured model of the decision process. However, 
this approach is inadequate as a generic model because it does not provide a means to 
take into consideration the political dimension of decision-making. Most decision-
making does not rely on authorisation for the decision by a single decision-maker. 
Daft and Weick (1984) have proposed a model that includes iterative ‘feedback’ loops 
within an essentially linear three-phase model. But the simple categorisation of the 
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phases has limited utility as an analytical framework. The model by Shrivastava and 
Grant (1985) is iterative. However, if one compares it with the model by Mintzberg et 
al. (1976), it is only partially iterative. Narayanan and Fahey (1982) proposed an 
iterative model but only from the ‘political’ perspective of decision-making. Friend 
and Hickling (1987) have developed an iterative model, but it is too reductionist in 
approach.  
 The Mintzberg et al. (1976) model attempts both to provide a detailed structure 
to describe decision processes and to incorporate the iterative nature of decision 
processes. It takes into consideration three central phases: the identification phase 
(this includes decision recognition routine and diagnosis), the development phase 
(this includes search routines and design), and the selection phase (this includes 
‘screening’ by way of bargaining, judgement and analysis and the final authorisation). 
These central phases are supplemented by decision control routines, decision 
communication routines and political factors. Mintzberg et al. (1976) show that the 
model applies to different types of decisions, from a ‘simple decision’ process to a 
‘complex decision’ process. The Mintzberg et al. (1976) model of decision-making 
does meet the criteria identified above and, therefore, provides an initial foundation 
for empirical analysis. In the following chapter, the Mintzberg et al. (1976) model is 
used as a foundation to develop a working model for this empirical research. 
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Developing a ‘Working’ Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
Peter Marshall: ‘Give to us clear vision that we may know where to stand and what to stand 
for—because unless we stand for something, we shall fall for anything.’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                             
 
As discussed earlier, the purpose of this research is to explore decision-making in new 
ventures for which no specific framework has existed. Based on the review of the 
literature on the strategic decision process, it was decided that the Mintzberg et al. 
(1976) model remained a robust model for this research. However, it needed to be 
revised to take into account relevant research conducted after 1976.  
The purpose of this chapter is to revise the Mintzberg et al. (1976) model of 
decision-making and propose a new model through which decision patterns can be 
investigated in early-stage new ventures. The framework extends the Mintzberg et al. 
(1976) model by adding new dimensions based on recent literature in decision-
making and entrepreneurship. In drawing on both these bodies of literature, the 
identification of relevant additional dimensions is particularly oriented to the new 
venture context.  
The idea was to use this proposed framework as a working framework (Figure 
4.1). This decision process framework analyses concept development, decision 
formulation and decision implementation. The rationale for using a working 
framework rather than a purely emergent approach is that a completely emergent 
approach to research may be unsuitable when a large number of cases needs to be 
studied to allow generalisation (Nutt, 2000). There is a risk that the researcher could 
lose direction (Miles & Huberman, 1994).1 However, with an imposed framework 
there is the danger of losing important messages that do not fit the framework (Nutt, 
2000). As such, it was decided to have a working framework that would be modified 
(if need be) as the analysis progressed. The framework did get modified, which is 
normal and even desirable (Miles & Huberman, 1994) in explorative work. While this 
revised framework will be discussed in Chapter 6, the discussion in this chapter will 
be limited to the working framework developed from Mintzberg et al. (1976). 
4.1 A Working Framework: Pre-Empirical Study 
4.1.1 Stage 1: Concept Development 
The concept development stage in the decision process is characterised by a focus on 
the identification, acquisition and assessment of just enough information to validate 
                                                 
1 This is discussed further in the research methodology chapter. 
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the opportunity or problem prima facie. Casson (1982) considers that the profit 
generation capacity of an entrepreneur is related to his or her access to information 
and his or her way of making decisions based on such information. For Casson, the 
control of information is more important to an entrepreneur than market power.  The 
acquisition of information is not costless, so it is imperative for an entrepreneur to 
collect relevant information in an effective and efficient manner. Hence, at this stage 
of new venture formation, the acquisition and assessment of relevant knowledge is a 
key investment and the competencies for selection and evaluation are key 
competencies. Kaish and Gilad (1991) say that the reality about entrepreneurial search 
and alertness to an opportunity lies somewhere between a ‘neoclassical information 
search’ and a ‘Kirznerian non-deliberate learning experience’. They argue that the 
discovery of opportunity cannot be systematised but is serendipitous, depending more 
on ‘entrepreneurial alertness’ than a cost-benefit approach to the information search. 
Recognition is characterised by a ‘not too clear’ understanding of the situation, 
the objective or idea and the venture’s environment.2  Entrepreneurial decision 
makers have to rely on limited information to identify their relevant environment. In 
order to achieve equivocality reduction3, such decision-makers tend to rely on a range 
of information sources but at the same time don’t have any formal structure and 
resources to reassess their beliefs.  In the very early stage of venture creation, the 
entrepreneur collects information to make a broad assessment of his or her ideas. The 
information gathering is often undirected in the sense that there are very few formal 
measures to generate information; most of the data tends to be irregular and casual. 
Further, Kaish and Gilad (1991) postulate that entrepreneurs usually make use of 
readily available business sources and media, informal gatherings (such as trade 
shows and conferences etc.), and informal and non-business sources to identify 
opportunities. In the early stages of new ventures, the reason for this approach can be 
the unanalysable environment or a lack of resources and time to completely analyse 
the environment.  
                                                 
2 Ideas drawn from Daft and Weick (1984). 
3 Daft and Weick (1984:291), based on work by other researchers, say that ‘[e]quivocality is the extent 
to which data are unclear and suggest multiple interpretations about the environment.’  
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Deliberation4 and Formal Analysis5 come after the entrepreneur has partially 
ascertained the validity of the belief in a wider and generic perspective that has led to 
reduction in uncertainty about the idea. The next step is to look into the host of other 
issues that are specific to that decision. The new venture decision-maker addresses 
these issues not only in order to make decisions on whether and how to proceed but 
also in order to garner support from other possible stakeholders. Being typically short 
of resources and time to make a formal study, a new venture decision-maker relies on 
proactive and purposive methods to reduce the uncertainty associated with these 
issues. This phase is thus more systematic and the search for information is more 
logical.6
                                                 
4 The idea has been drawn from Daft and Weick (1984) but the terminology has been changed to suit 
the needs and make it more appropriate to this research. ‘Deliberate’ is used instead of ‘enact’. 
‘Deliberate’ as used here is derived from the Oxford Dictionary and means ‘of a body of persons: to 
take counsel together, considering and examining the reasons for and against a proposal or course of 
action.’  The meaning of ‘deliberation’ has also been expanded to include decisions that are based on 
relevant self-experience. This construct seems more appropriate and directly relevant to the research 
than ‘enact’ that means ‘to work in or upon’, according to the Oxford Dictionary. 
5 Similarly, ‘Formal Analysis’ is used instead of  ‘discovering’ (Daft & Weick, 1984). ‘Formal’ in the 
Oxford Dictionary means ‘marked by extreme or excessive regularity or symmetry; stiff or rigid in 
design; wanting in ease or freedom of outline or arrangement’ and ‘analysis’ means ‘when reduced to 
its fundamental elements; at the conclusion of the investigation or examination involved; all things 
duly considered and weighed.’ This again seems to convey a better meaning in the present research 
context. Analysis can take place for decisions that are not so ambiguous and can be analysed by more 
formal means. This is close in meaning to what ‘planning’ or ‘formal analysis’ stands for in the 
traditional strategic management literature. ‘Discovering’, on the other hand, means ‘to divulge, reveal, 
disclose knowledge (anything secret or unknown)’. This concept is a bit too broad because discovering 
can also take place in deliberation.  
6 ‘Logic’, as used in this research, is derived from the Oxford Dictionary and means ‘the branch of 
philosophy that treats of the forms of thinking in general, and more especially of inference and of 
scientific method’ or ‘the science or art of reasoning as applied to some particular department of 
knowledge or investigation.’ ‘Logical’, thus, is not synonymous with ‘formal’ and is not to be used 
interchangeably. A ‘logical’ decision may be taken with or without ‘formal analysis.’  
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Note:      are the critical points in the decision process where process options are selected. 
Figure 4.1 Proposed Generic Model for Strategic and Tactical Decision-making Process in New Ventures  
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The deliberation mode reflects an active strategy to overcome an unanalysable 
environment. The environment may be unanalysable because of the dynamic nature of 
the industry concerned, the newness related to the opportunity or problem, lack of 
adequate resources to carry out analysis within the timeframe or a combination of any 
of these. The decision-makers then tend to rely on their own experience7 and a host of 
advisers and experts for the best possible information. 
Formal analysis is also an active strategy to gather information to facilitate 
decision-making. The only difference is that some decision variables (if not the whole 
environment) are considered to be analysable. Carefully devised tools and techniques 
are used to gather required information about the environment and relay it back to the 
organisation and the decision-maker. 
4.1.2 Stage 2: Decision Formulation  
The decision formulation stage comprises steps related to coming up with different 
plausible courses and then choosing one that is likely to give optimum results. The 
entrepreneur must ‘contrive’ a solution appropriate to the decision-makers’ specific 
situation.8 Deciding on a course of action that is well-established or designing a 
unique solution to the circumstantial need can do this. The latter approach can take 
two paths: custom-made solution(s) and modified solution(s) (Mintzberg et al., 1976). 
During the information-gathering phase (especially deliberation), one can come up 
with one or several plausible options that have been successfully put into practice 
before in quite a similar environmental context. In the latter event (i.e., generation of 
several options), the decision-makers can decide to pursue an option without change 
or decide to modify an option that adequately fulfils their needs. In the former case, as 
deliberation/formal analysis brings forth tested options/solutions, selection would 
automatically follow by any one means (discussed later). 
The information-gathering phase may reveal much required information but 
may fail to reveal any plausible course of direction that has previously been 
 
7 It is to be noted that the experience can be of various types - directly relevant to the decision; 
indirectly relevant to the decision; generic in nature; etc.  
8 The meaning of ‘contrive’ as applied here has been taken from the Oxford Dictionary and means ‘to 
invent, devise, excogitate with ingenuity and cleverness (any plan or purpose)’. In order to come up 
with a unique solution, the qualities that define contrive are essential. 
                             
 
                             
 
successfully put into practice in a related environment. Given that situation, the 
decision-makers have to frame a completely new option. In order to do so, they make 
use of the information gathered earlier to suggest one or a few new options. In the 
latter case, the decision-makers can decide to pursue an option that fits their needs in a 
reasonable manner.  
 ‘Selection’ is the step to eliminate options that are not feasible and to 
determine what is appropriate (Mintzberg et al., 1976).9 In this step, the idea is to 
challenge the appropriateness of alternatives. The choices to be made can be from 
ready-to-use alternatives gathered during concept development stages or from custom-
made or modified solutions or both. Different options may be considered 
simultaneously to speed up the process or can be considered sequentially. The 
selection can take place in several ways depending upon the context. The major 
approaches to selection in decision-making are: 
 Analytical Decisions: This involves an evaluation of the merits of individual 
decisions based on available facts and the consideration of a range of factors 
such as affordability, cost-benefits and compatibility et cetera. 
 Judgemental Heuristics10: In many circumstances, entrepreneurs have to rely 
on heuristics to make decisions because entrepreneurial decision-making 
typically combines high ambiguity and uncertainty with the need for speedy 
decisions (Busenitz & Barney, 1997).11 Lei et al. (cited in Alvarez & 
Busenitz, 2001:759) support this idea by pointing out that ‘[h]igher-level 
learning involves the formation and use of heuristics to generate new 
insights into solving ambiguous problems.’ Such learning associated with 
heuristic based logic, according to Krabuanrat and Phelps (cited in Alvarez 
& Busenitz, 2001:759), may use less information and be less accurate, but 
the use of individual specific clusters of knowledge facilitates quick 
                                                 
9 ‘Select’ is more appropriate than ‘screen’, which, according to the Oxford Dictionary, means ‘to 
examine systematically in order to discover suitability for admission or acceptance.’ The decision, as 
mentioned above, on an option can be made without being systematic.  
10 ‘Heuristics’ refers to simplifying strategies that entrepreneurs use to make strategic decisions in 
complex situations, where less complete or uncertain information is available (Alvarez & Busenitz, 
2001:758). The entrepreneurial heuristic is made of limited or key experiences and beliefs that are 
available to the entrepreneur. This could comprise the entrepreneurs’ own experience or that of others 
whom (s)he is in contact with. 
11 This article by Busenitz and Barney (1997) has been widely cited by academics. 
 68
                             
 
adjustments to emerging trends. One can think of several ways in which 
heuristic processes influence decision-making. 
- In the case of ‘availability heuristics’, decisions are based on recent 
events relating to the situation at hand. 
- In ‘representativeness heuristic’ processes, a decision is based on 
similarities between the situation at hand and stereotypes of similar 
occurrences. 
- In the case of ‘anchoring and adjustment heuristic’ processes, decisions 
are based on incremental adjustments to an initial value determined by 
historical precedent or some reference point. 
 Intuition or Gut-feeling: This is the ability to know or recognise quickly and 
readily the possibilities of a given situation without much deliberation. This 
may lead to speedy and reasonable decisions if rooted in experience in the 
given domain; without experience, this can be risky. 
4.1.3 Stage 3: Decision Implementation 
A major criticism of the prescriptive schools (especially the ‘design’ school) is that 
they consider strategy formulation and implementation as two separate activities 
(Farjoun, 2002). Majone and Wildavasky (as quoted in Moore, 1995), who were 
among the first theorists to challenge the separation of formulation and 
implementation, say that formulation should actually be seen as part of 
implementation. However, Beyer and Trice (1982) and Nutt (2000) suggest that 
implementation is an integral part of the decision-making process but that it follows 
after the adoption of the selected decision. Since the latter undertook sound empirical 
studies, it was decided to follow them, albeit with some change. In a new venture, 
decisions are made by the entrepreneur or the entrepreneurial team (along with 
investors) and they have to implement them. As such, it was assumed that adoption 
and implementation would be simultaneous or contiguous (unlike a large company, 
where adoption and implementation may be distinct). 
   Hickson (1987:173) reminds us of the political nature of decisions: ‘In a 
decision-making process, therefore, the search is not only for problem solving but for 
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interest accommodating alternatives…Since there are multiple interests, all of which 
cannot be met at once…each decision is only a ‘quasi-resolution of conflict.’’12 
Similarly, Eisenhardt and Zbaracki (1992:23) discuss the significance of the political 
model of decision-making that is based on the premise that ‘people are individually 
rational, but not collectively so.’ The key assumption behind this is that though 
individuals may share common goals (like the welfare of the firm), they also have 
competing interests. These competing interests, as stated by Allison (cited in 
Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1982:23), arise out of conflicting preferences and from 
‘different bets on the shape of the future…and clashes in personal ambitions and 
interests.’ By applying a micro perspective to politics in strategy formulation, 
Narayanan and Fahey (1982) show the pervasiveness of conflicts among different 
actors in strategic decision-making. The final decision for action can be achieved in 
various ways (discussed below) and is circumstantial, dependent on the importance of 
the decision to be taken and many other factors (as discussed in chapters 2 and 3). 
Some ways of arriving at a decision include: 
 Directly:  This is where the decision-maker is the sole authority, there is 
consensus among the actors on the decisions (even if there is not complete 
agreement on the facts and assumptions underpinning that decision) or there 
is only one obvious or preferred way of doing things.  
 Involvement13: A decision can be reached by consensus when two or more 
individuals or parties, having a strong interaction, arrive at a decision to 
pursue a course of action. Agreement on a course of action through the 
involvement of two or more stakeholders can be arrived at by various 
processes, for example: 
- Dialectical inquiry (Schweiger et al., 1989): In this approach, different 
recommendations for action are developed from the same data but are 
based on contrary assumptions. The recommendations and the 
underlying assumptions are subjected to critical evaluation through 
                                                 
12 It is noted that in the early stages of a new venture there might not be a proper organisation. 
However, due to the involvement of many different actors, it takes the shape of a quasi-organisation , 
so the same concept can be put to good use. 
13 Nutt (1998b) described participation as one of the approaches for implementation and said that 
people react more favourably and become more committed when they participate in the decision-
making process.  
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debate. Thereafter, assumptions that have survived the debate are 
considered and new recommendations are made. 
- Devil’s advocacy (Schweiger et al., 1989): In this approach, a 
subgroup develops a solid argument for a reasonable recommendation 
and submits that recommendation and its underlying assumptions for a 
formal critique. The other group tries to show why the proposed 
recommendation must not be adopted. This process of criticism and 
revision goes on until there is mutual acceptance. 
 Others: The agreement on a final decision is made by a group of decision-
makers who may have conflicting goal systems: 
- Decision-making by ‘edict’ happens when one individual is the sole 
authority in making a decision and it is deemed appropriate by him or 
her to overrule different opinions and make a decision that best suits 
his or her ideology (Nutt, 1998b). 
- When different parties show an adequate level of conciliation on an 
agreeable solution, the decision is based on ‘bargaining’ (Nutt, 1998a). 
- Managed Procrastination14: A need is presented for action and the 
proposed solution is justified on the basis of its usefulness for another 
comparable organisation. A conciliatory result is time dependent—that 
is, a ‘wait and watch’ policy for the need to emerge for the desired 
action. 
- Where one party is able to persuade others about the efficacy of a 
proposed course of action, a decision arises from ‘persuasion’ (Nutt, 
1998b). 
- Forced Upon: The entrepreneurial decision-maker may have to make a 
decision that is effectively forced upon him or her by some external 
body or individual (for example, an investor).  
Having developed a working framework for decision-making in new ventures, 
the next step was to develop a suitable methodology for relating the decision-making 
process in a new venture to suitable performance criteria. This would theoretically 
                                                 
14 The idea presented here is similar to ‘intervention’ presented by Nutt (1998b:224). 
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formalise the research and give suitable direction for the empirical study. This step is 
discussed in the following section. 
4.2 Operationalising ‘Decision-Making and Performance’                                                            
in a New Venture Context 
Amason et al. (2006:127) say that, in strategic management research, relating the 
variables to performance is considered to be ideal and that a similar objective is 
emerging in the field of entrepreneurship. In fact, several recent studies (as discussed 
in chapters 2 and 3) have tended to focus on the use of planning in a new venture 
(albeit with varied findings). Other studies (such as Amason et al., 2006; Fiegener, 
2005; Hambrick et al., 2005) have focused their attention on the performance of the 
‘top executive team.’15  
For the purpose of this research, it was decided to follow the advice of both 
Venkataraman and Ramanujam (1986) and Kirchoff (1977), as discussed in Chapter 
2, in order to develop a construct for ‘performance’. Given that the research was to be 
at the micro level of decisions, the assessment of performance needed to be at that 
level. As several types of decisions would be discussed within a company, no one 
variable would suit all decisions. It was decided to compare the declared ‘expected’ 
goal of the company vis-à-vis a particular decision to the level of attainment of that 
goal. Many decisions to be discussed were operational decisions, so operational goals 
were taken into account. This approach proved to be useful for the following reasons: 
1. The research involved the study of multiple decisions in multiple 
companies. Given that each decision within a company is unique to it, 
so are the objectives related to each decision. 
2. The context for the study of decisions in new ventures was the 
biotechnology industry. Companies in this sector usually have a long 
gestation time, so financial indicators were not suitable. 
The approach of using factual information rather than asking entrepreneurs 
their general impression of decision effectiveness was proposed by Dean and 
Sharfman (1996). 
                                                 
15 As mentioned previously, in a new venture (especially founded by nascent entrepreneurs), founders 
basically make the organisational structure.  
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Operationalising this approach was made simpler by following the 
recommended approach of Venkataraman and Ramanujam (1986). Information about 
the operational and financial (if any) goals related to a particular decision from both 
secondary and primary sources was collected. They suggest that this has maximum 
validity. However, it is a bit difficult to operationalise. As such, the primary indicators 
of decision outcomes were objective facts relevant to each specific decision—for 
example, the level of success of an initial public offering (IPO) in raising the required 
capital. 
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Richard C. Cushing: Always plan ahead. It wasn't raining when Noah built the ark. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                             
 
The importance of a research methodology chapter in a research report, particularly a 
PhD thesis, cannot be gainsaid. Miles and Huberman (1994:262) observe that most 
reports are ‘most often heavy on the ‘what’ (the findings, the descriptions) and rather 
thin on the ‘how’ (how you get to the ‘what’)…So, we don’t know how much 
confidence we can place in them.’ In this chapter, the approach taken to conduct the 
research is outlined in detail. 
In order to do this research, a systematic and disciplined approach was 
required. Some decisions had to be made upfront and revisited when the need arose. 
The order of the sections of this chapter reflect the systematic and detailed manner in 
which decisions were made regarding the conduct of the research—finding an 
appropriate research design; establishing the research strategy based on the research 
design; and executing the research strategy. In the section on execution, there is a 
detailed discussion of the conduct of the research: the collection of (primary and 
secondary) data; different methods of the data analysis, including their sequence and 
purpose; and the triangulation of the data. The chapter concludes with a discussion of 
some of the limitations and ethical issues in the research. 
5.1 Research Design: Finding an Appropriate Direction 
The following observation and suggestion by Bygrave (1989:17-18) provided a 
valuable guide for research design: 
A worrisome trend in recent years is the increasing number of strategy 
types of papers that are appearing in entrepreneurship. Approximately half 
the winners of the Academy of Management Entrepreneurship Heizer 
Award wrote business strategy dissertations. It is an understandable trend 
because a doctoral dissertation on business strategy is a “classic” 
dissertation…. The classic dissertation is seldom the most suitable format 
for an emerging paradigm such as entrepreneurship because it is too 
rigid…. [A]t the beginning of a paradigm, inspired inductive logic (or 
more likely enlightened speculations) applied to exploratory, empirical 
research may be more useful than deductive reasoning from theory….  
 
There is no established framework for research on the decision-making process 
in a new venture. The approach that has been developed could be described as 
‘limited exploration’ (Stebbins, 2001:2-3). It is a limited exploration because quite a 
few researchers have studied the decision-making process but not in a new venture 
 75
                             
 
context. As such, there were approaches to the decision-making process to build 
upon.1  
Miles and Huberman (2001:155) make the following suggestion:  
[T]he deductive researcher starts with a preliminary causal network, and 
the inductive researcher ends up with one…In either approach, the initial 
version is amended and refined as it is tested against empirical events and 
characteristics. By the end of data gathering, both species of researchers 
are about at the same place. 
 
Miles (1979) suggest that a rough working framework needs to be in place near 
the beginning of fieldwork because those who come to the study with no assumptions 
usually encounter much difficulty. A preliminary framework was constructed, which 
was expected to change based on the data to be gathered. Hence, the research design 
had components of both deductive and inductive approaches.2   
This approach in practice is similar to that described by Stebbins (2001:7): 
[I]t is more accurate to qualify exploration as primarily inductive and 
confirmation as primarily deductive. During an exploratory study, 
researchers do think deductively at times, although they do so largely 
within their emerging theoretical framework rather than within established 
theory and a set of hypotheses deduced from it. Moreover they engage in 
confirmation, but what they confirm are their emergent generalizations 
rather than an ensemble of a priori predictions.  
 
The research design also provided a methodological approach to the analysis of 
‘partially known’ phenomena (Figure 5.1) that was consistent with the advice of both 
Miles (1979) and Bygrave (1989).  
  
                                                 
1 Stebbins (2001:10) states: 
[E]ven though a program of exploration can bring a field to the point of diminishing returns in new 
ideas, it is still better to abide by the rule, when in doubt explore, rather than by its opposite, when 
in doubt confirm. Following the first rule avoids premature theoretical closure… 
2 Nutt (1993) states that both emergent frameworks and imposed frameworks have drawbacks. While 
imposing a framework may result in losing important messages that do not fit a framework, emergent 
frameworks may not be useful to handle large cases, and so lead to a very limited (or no) 
generalisation. I intended to take care of both pitfalls by using this middle approach. 
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Figure 5.1 The Relationship between Qualitative and Quantitative Methods  
Source: Stebbins (2001:7) 
Stebbins (2001:5) also argues that ‘[e]xploration is not a synonym for 
qualitative research…’ According to him, the former emphasises the ‘development of 
theory from data’ whereas the latter emphasises ‘methodology and the actual 
collection of data by which this development is accomplished… He says that 
‘qualitative elements are found in most kinds of social science research, including 
many at confirmatory level’ (p. 5). Since exploration is distinct from confirmatory 
procedure, Stebbins (2001:5) believes that using the qualitative descriptor masks ‘the 
role of exploration as a crucial scientific process.’  
 Given that in most exploratory studies qualitative data predominate, they may 
well be augmented, where possible, with quantitative analysis (Stebbins, 2001:6). 
Similarly, Miles and Huberman (1994:215) note that ‘the tactic of counting is not 
irrelevant in qualitative research’ as it makes it easier to see what is there, and 
‘[d]oing qualitative analysis of all data with the aid of numbers is a good way of 
testing for possible bias, and seeing how robust our insights are’ (p. 254). 
 Mintzberg (1979:587), while exploring decision-making processes, observed: 
[S]ystematic data creates the foundation for our theories, it is the anecdotal 
data that enables us to do the building…I believe that the researcher who 
never goes near the water, who collects quantitative data from a distance 
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without anecdotes to support them will always have difficulty explaining 
interesting relationships (although he may uncover them). 
 
While this study was exploratory and the data primarily qualitative, the methodology 
was designed to provide a basis for systematic quantitative analysis. 
 Schwartz and Jacobs (cited in Walker, 1985:12) observe that researchers 
following a ‘humanistic’ style believe that in order to appreciate the meanings 
conferred upon social events by interacting individuals, one must first interpret the 
social context in which these events occur. Walker (1985:11-13) suggests that, 
because of this, qualitative methods came to occupy an honourable position within the 
humanistic tradition.  This is also true for exploration that aims to generate new ideas 
to form grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). That being the case, ‘ideas are the 
main reason of the enterprise and everything else—study design, measurement 
techniques, received theory without an exploratory base—is subordinate to them’ 
(Stebbins, 2001:9-10).  
 These social sciences exploratory methods have been criticised for being 
inadequately scientific. Stebbins (2001:17) states that exploration in the social 
sciences has been ‘pejoratively described as a mere ‘fishing expedition’… [which] is 
more akin to serendipity rather than exploration.’ He further adds that ‘Social science 
exploration is positivistic, in part, because it is nomothetic, its principal goal being 
production of valid generalizations about a type of group, process, activity, or 
situation’ (2001:11). 
 Recognising the challenge of carrying out sound research in a complex area 
where initial frameworks may not be adequate, the approach developed combines: 
 Conceptual exploration (semi-exploratory) 
 Qualitative and quantitative data  
 Deductive and inductive approaches. 
 
5.2 Research Strategy: Think Before You Leap 
Figure 5.2 gives an overview of the research strategy for this thesis. 
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Figure 5.2 Overview of the Research Strategy 
In the following sections, there is a detailed discussion of the various steps 
involved in this research answering the ‘how’ of this research.  
5.2.1 Pilot Study 
A pilot study (Yin, 2003) was conducted to ascertain whether the research framework 
and the questionnaire based on this framework would generate useful and reliable 
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data. The pilot study was also useful in conceptualising the data organisation and style 
of coding in NVivo®3, a qualitative analysis software tool used for the data analysis.   
5.2.2 Unit of Analysis 
The sampling unit was a company whereas a ‘decision’ was the recording unit. 
‘Sampling’ units related to sampling and provide the basis for statistical 
considerations whereas ‘recording’ units collectively carry the information within 
sampling units and provide the basis for the analysis (Krippendorff, 1980:60).4  
For analysis, a ‘decision’ was where a clear boundary could be set up.5 For 
example, a decision to go to an initial public offering (IPO) may include several sub-
decisions regarding timing, market capital valuation and choice of underwriters et 
cetera. This boundary setting is to some extent inevitably subjective. Too much 
atomisation may lead at times to ‘losing the sight of the forest for a tree.’ This style of 
boundary demarcation is similar to the suggestion by Langley et al. (1995) ‘to move 
beyond ‘decision processes’ per se to issue streams.’6 
                                                 
3 ‘NVivo is designed for researchers who need to combine subtle coding with qualitative linking, 
shaping, searching and modelling. NVivo is ideal for those working with complex data, such as 
multimedia, and who want to conduct deep levels of analysis.’ (Hwww.qsrinternational.comH, 
accessed on 7 February 2006) 
 NVivo allows ‘the researcher to specify relationships among codes and use these relationships 
in analysis, and to write memos and link them to text and codes’ (Weitzman 2003:312). 
 Campbell and Gillin (2002) say that ‘[t]o ensure that both the richness and complexity of the 
sources is captured, without sacrificing academic rigour, NVivo® software (used by Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor—GEM) is employed to help extract coherent data from the interview 
transcripts in a systematic and holistic way.’ 
4 Going by this definition, in some of the analytical constructs for content analysis, a ‘decision’ is the 
sampling unit as well as recording unit, whereas in other places ‘company’ is the sampling unit and 
‘decision’ is the recording unit. In that way, the research is a multi-level analysis.    
5 Langley et al. (1995) identified this problem related to fixing a clear boundary for ‘decisions’ because 
decisions tend to interact with one another. This observation is very useful in shaping the strategy for 
analysis. The example mentioned by Krippendorff (1980:58-59) was very useful in getting a clear 
understanding of it: 
Suppose during a study of television violence, one notices in one program that one violent incident 
triggers a long chain of violent encounters which constitutes the theme of the drama while in 
another program many violent encounters are separately provoked and not precipitated by others. 
Now, should the chain of violent encounters be regarded as one sampling unit or separated into 
many? Should each carry the same weight? … Unless one finds units that are independent as far as 
the phenomenon of interest is concerned, breaking a highly organized message into separate 
sampling units invariably distorts the information contained in the resulting data. 
6 Mintzberg et al. (1976) approached this problem in a similar way. 
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5.2.3 Sampling 
The scope of this research is new ventures in the biotechnology sector. The 
biotechnology sector was chosen because (1) it is considered to be technology 
intensive, knowledge based, risk prone and existing in a dynamic environment; and 
(2) the researcher has a degree in life sciences and working experience in business 
development in a biotechnology venture.7 Knowledge of the characteristics of the 
industry is often required to make some judgements about the nature of decisions 
(Lyon et al., 2000).  
Ventures were selected from two countries: Australia and India. Although 
cross-cultural comparison was not an objective of the study, this design enabled some 
analysis along these lines.8  
5.2.3(a) Sample Size  
There was no standard benchmark for sample size in similar studies. For example, 
Mintzberg et al. (1976) had 25 decisions; Nutt (1984) had 78 projects; Quinn (1990) 
studied decisions in 10 companies; and Nutt (1998) studied 376 decisions. In all of 
these studies, a similar methodology was used for data collection—retrospective 
interviews.  
Eisenhardt (1989) advises that a number between four and 10 cases (in this 
context, a ‘case’ is a company) usually works well. However, as the research strategy 
included use of NVivo® for data analysis, this observation made by Miles and 
Huberman (1994:45) was also taken into consideration: ‘Is it easier to do it with the 
                                                 
7 Flick (2002) and Horsburgh (2003) argue that a researcher’s background and experiences are an 
important part of the data collection and analysis in any qualitative study. A strong background of 
knowledge about the technology and the sector enabled a focused discussion in the interviews on the 
decision process. 
8 Eisenhardt and Zbaracki (1992:33) say: ‘Studies of different cultures would be particularly timely 
since most research on strategic decision-making has been conducted in Northern European and North 
American contexts.’ 
Rajgopalan et al. (1993:359): ‘[S]trategic decision process has paid very little attention to the cultural 
and institutional context within which the organisation is embedded…For example, consensual 
decision-making is more common among Japanese firms than among US firms…’ This observation is 
at the macro level—that is, it is about decision style in a culture. This research is at the micro level. If 
there is a consensus or not in a decision process (irrespective of culture), it will be evident for that 
decision process and will also reflect the micro context of the decision.  
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right software? Yes, two or three times easier. Some programs automatically generate 
and store material of this sort as you go along.’ 
A sample size of 20 to 30 companies was considered to be manageable and 
adequate for generating the required data. For the pilot study, a sub-sample of 10 per 
cent of the expected total was selected (three companies). 
5.2.3(b) Sample Selection 
The population for the sample was decided on following parameters: 
1. The venture had to be an independent venture and not a corporate venture. 
2. The venture should have been formed between the start of 1998 (so that key 
decisions were not too long ago)9 and the end of 2002 (so that ventures were 
sufficiently developed).  
3. The venture must have started in Australia or India.10  
4. Reasonable information about the company had to be available from 
secondary sources. 
 
The following databases were used to choose companies, based upon the above 
criteria: 
 Department of State Development, Trade and Innovation, Queensland 
Government, Australia (website accessed in late 2004–early 2005). 
 Department of Innovation, Industry and Regional Development, 
Victorian Government, Australia (website accessed in late 2004–early 
2005). 
 Department of State and Regional Development, New South Wales 
Government, Australia (website accessed in late 2004–early 2005). 
 Biospectrum-ABLE11 2005 survey for Indian Companies (hard copy). 
                                                 
9 Amason et al. (2005) define new ventures as firms that are six years old or younger because the first 
six years have been reported (in The State of Small Business, 1992) to be crucial to success or failure. 
Beckman (2006) considered firms that were less than 10 years of age as young high-technology firms 
for her empirical study. The sample by McGee and Dowling (cited in Autio, 1999:339) of ‘young 
independent firms’ consisted of firms that were less than eight years old. 
10 The ‘initial start’ of the company is thought to be significantly affected by the environment (among 
other factors), and the ‘initial start’ may influence the what and why of subsequent decisions. The 
researcher had knowledge of the Australian and Indian contexts, so it was decided to have only those 
ventures that had started in Australia and India.  
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It was decided that the companies would not be differentiated on the basis of 
various sub-sectors within biotechnology as it was not the intention to relate decision-
making to industrial sub-sectors. Therefore, the study included: agri-biotech 
companies, veterinary biotech companies, contract research organisations, diagnostic 
companies, drug discovery companies, drug delivery companies and bioinformatics 
companies.12 
TABLE 5.1 NUMBER OF AUSTRALIAN COMPANIES CONTACTED AND THE NUMBER THAT 
PARTICIPATED 
 
 Companies 
formed between 
1998-2002 
Companies deemed 
to fit the criteria and 
contacted for 
interview 
Companies 
participating 
New South Wales 
(Sydney)/ 
Canberra 
 
17 
 
10 
 
7 
Queensland 
(Brisbane) 
18 10 5 
 
Victoria 
(Melbourne) 
43 15 10 
Total 78 35 22 
 
 
TABLE 5.2 NUMBER OF INDIAN COMPANIES CONTACTED AND THE NUMBER THAT 
PARTICIPATED 
 
 Companies 
formed between 
1998-2002 
Companies 
deemed to fit the 
criteria and 
contacted for 
interview 
Companies 
participating 
Hyderabad 6-7 5 3 
Bangalore 12-14 9 8 
Total 18-21 14 11 
 
Note: In total, 33 companies participated (including companies that participated in the pilot study), but 
only 30 companies were considered for analysis because the data collected from three companies was 
                                                                                                                                            
11 ABLE: Association of Biotechnology Led Enterprises. Biospectrum is the only magazine in India 
dedicated to the ‘business of biotechnology.’ 
12 This is not to say that the specific context may not be important in influencing the characteristics of 
the decision-making process. 
 83
                             
 
not considered to be adequate. The list of companies that participated is provided in Table 5.3. From 
these 30 companies, 232 decision units were collected, which did not include ‘initial start and the very 
first external funding (if any).’ (See Appendix A for the details of the companies that participated and 
the interviewees). All 232 decision units were coded. 
  For practical reasons, the selection of companies was restricted to the major 
cities of Canberra, Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane in Australia and Bangalore and 
Hyderabad in India. 
TABLE 5.3 LIST OF COMPANIES THAT PARTICIPATED 
Country Companies 
 
Australia 
Acrux, BioDiem, Biotron, CBio, Clone International, Cryosite, 
Cytopia, Epitan, Evogenix, Genera Biosystems, Genetic Solutions, 
Genetraks, Illiad Chemicals, Norwood Abbey, Peplin, Pharmaxis, 
Phenomix, Plantic Technologies, Prana Biotech, Proteome Systems, 
Tissue Therapies, VRI Biomedical 
 
India 
Avesthagen, Bigtec, Genotypic Technologies, Genotex International, 
Helix Genomics, Jalaja Technologies, Lotus Labs, Metahelix Life 
Sciences, Ocimum Biosolutions, Strand Genomics, Thinkgen 
 
 Based on the above criteria, a list of companies in these cities was drawn up 
and ordered according to the availability of secondary data.13 The companies were 
approached for interview in that order. 
5.2.4 Data Collection  
5.2.4(a) Collection of Primary Data  
Collecting useful data on decision-making poses a challenge: 
  ‘Measuring in real organisational terms means measuring things that really 
happen in organisations as they experience them’ (Mintzberg, 1979:586).  
                                                 
13 Essentially this was based on the amount of information available through Factiva®. Factiva®, a 
Dow Jones and Reuters company, provides essential business news and information together with the 
content delivery tools and services that enable professionals to make better decisions faster. Factiva’s 
unrivalled collection of more than 9,000 authoritative sources includes the exclusive combination of the 
Wall Street Journal, the Financial Times™, the Dow Jones and Reuters newswires and the Associated 
Press as well as Reuters Fundamentals, DandB™, and Bureau van Dijk company profiles. 
 84
                             
 
  ‘[L]ongitudinal field research is excruciatingly time consuming, so it does not 
fit the time constraints imposed on most researchers, especially doctoral 
students’ (Bygrave, 1989). 
 Protocol analysis (Ericsson & Simon, 1993; Newell & Simon, 1972) was 
considered as an approach to data collection. Although this method has recently been 
widely used to understand the process of ‘individual’ problem solving and decision-
making, it was not considered to be the best alternative for the purpose of this 
research because: 
• Protocol analysis relies on hypothetical cases given to individuals, so it 
analyses the process based on the short-term memory of the individuals. 
According to Ericcson and Simon (1993), any situation that does not make 
use of short-term memory will result in a distorted verbalised process. Most 
real-life situations are complex and are made over time with many iterations; 
this is difficult to achieve in hypothetical cases in a laboratory setting 
(Cooper & Holzman, 1985).  
• Most decisions (especially strategic decisions) in business settings are not 
taken by an individual. However, the protocol method is best suited to 
understand the problem solving or decision-making process of individuals, 
making it unsuitable for this study.  
• Important decisions in a new venture are expected to be non-routine in 
nature. One objective was to relate the real process to the performance. 
Ericsson and Simon (1993), on the contrary, bring to notice variability in the 
verbalised responses of subjects when dealing with new situations that were 
typically non-routine in nature.  
For the above reasons, semi-structured interviews supported by secondary 
data on a particular decision were considered the best option. They were able to 
provide the most information on the ‘process’ along with good ideas about the ‘know-
how’ and ‘know-what’ of the team involved in the decision process (Hoffman, 1989). 
 The interviews were retrospective, semi-structured and in-depth in nature. The 
approach was similar to the collection of oral histories. Gartner et al. (1992) have 
suggested the need to legitimise the use of oral histories as a way of gathering 
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information on the nature of entrepreneurial activity. They further suggest that these 
oral histories are best taken from entrepreneurs themselves.14 In fact, Mitchell (1997) 
has even shown how ‘entrepreneurial oral histories can demystify a portion of the 
entrepreneurial experience by illuminating the content of insider success and 
failure.’15 
  The detailed analysis of secondary sources on each firm usually allowed the 
identification of the major decisions. Interviews were then used to focus on a 
particular decision and understand its decision process. Retrospective interviews were 
expected to be appropriate, as this approach has been used by many researchers 
(Mintzberg et al., 1976; Nutt, 1984; Nutt, 1998; Quinn, 1990) to understand the 
decision-making process. The present research had a similar objective—that is, to 
understand the decision-making process in a new venture context.16 
With regard to the validity of retrospective interviews, an empirical 
investigation by Huber (1985) showed that the stability of the information was not 
significantly related to how much time elapsed between the making and first reporting 
of decisions and that the most important issues were the most stable. 
Walker (1985:4-5) states that the in-depth interview is a conversation in which 
the researcher encourages the informant to relate, in their own terms, experiences and 
attitudes that are relevant to the research problem so the interviewer is not bound by a 
rigid questionnaire. Quoting Dean et al., he adds that an in-depth interview is not 
completely unstructured because the skilled interviewer constantly ‘appraises the 
                                                 
14 According to Johns (2006:402): 
Well-conducted qualitative research has great potential to illuminate context effects, for at least two 
reasons having to do with circumventing the omitted variables problem. First, alert qualitative 
researchers can be sensitive to the full range of discrete contextual levers (and their interactions) 
that might affect behaviour in a studied setting. Second, they can be sensitive to the full range of 
behaviours and attitudes that context might affect, often ‘working backwards’ to make inferences 
about the situation. 
15 Mitchell (1997:136) says that oral history serves research in three ways: ‘First, it illuminates. 
Second, by this illumination it demystifies. And third, by demystifying it renders doable that which was 
previously deemed to be impossible.’ He says that in oral histories ‘asymmetricity’ is likely but that 
analysis is expected to compensate for it. 
16 The majority of research on the linkage between strategy-making processes and firm performance 
has adopted an econometric approach (Hart & Banbury, 1994). While such analyses can isolate 
statistically the independent effects of each predictor, they do not provide insight into which 
combinations of processes perform especially well. Relating decision processes directly to firm 
performance is problematic because the causal ordering is ambiguous (Hough & White, 2003:481). 
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meaning of emerging data for his problem and uses the resulting insights to phrase 
questions that will further develop the implications of these data’ (p. 5).  
This technique was particularly suitable for exploring the decision process. 
While every decision has its own unique trajectory, it was expected that a decision 
process could be characterised through concepts similar to those outlined in the 
framework. The interview approach drew on the aide memoire idea of Walker 
(1985:4-5). It also followed the advice of Russo and Schoemaker (2002:86-89) to ask 
contradictory questions to the prevailing trend so that the respondent takes an extra 
effort to explain; and to ask ‘probing questions, such as asking people to explain how 
they know what they assert to know, the process they used to arrive at their 
conclusions.’  
5.2.4(b) Selection of Interviewees 
Huber and Power (1985) suggest that if only one informant is to be questioned, an 
attempt should be made to identify the person most knowledgeable about the issue of 
interest. Because the focus of the research was to understand the decision process for 
early decisions in a new venture, the founders and the senior managers hired quite 
early in the stage were considered to have the best knowledge. A substantial effort 
was made to interview more than one person so that more decisions per company 
could be covered and triangulated (discussed later in the chapter).17 
5.2.4(c) Preparations done prior to Interviews 
As discussed above, a conceptual framework for decision-making was used as a guide 
for the interviews (and for the data analysis) rather than as a predictive framework. 
However, the approach to data collection was carefully designed and each interview 
involved significant preparation. The design took into account the advice of 
Mintzberg (1979:585): 
                                                 
17 Chandler and Hanks also found evidence relating to the reliability and validity of self-reported, 
single reported data when they examined the self-reports of owners or chief executives of small firms 
(Lyons et al., 2000). However, I still made an effort to take all the required precautions by using 
various triangulating techniques. 
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No matter how small our sample or what our interest, we have always 
tried to go into organizations with a well-defined focus—to collect 
specific kinds of data systematically. 
 
It also considered Fielding and Fielding (1987:34): 
It is impractical to list all the available means of data collection and 
analysis and use as many as possible. What is important is to choose at 
least one method which is specifically suited to exploring the structural 
aspects of the problem and at least one which can capture the essential 
elements of its meaning to those involved…The implication is to 
incorporate at least one method of data collection that describes and 
interprets the context in which the interaction occurs and one that is 
designed primarily to illuminate the process of interaction itself.18 
 
The design of the interview process involved: 
1. Secondary Data Collection: Apart from generic biotechnology reports for the 
respective countries, secondary data was collected for each of the companies 
(prior to interviews) that had given their consent for interview. This data was 
collected from the company website, ASX (Australian Stock Exchange) 
website (if the company was a listed company), and Factiva. A complete file 
for each company was made and all press releases concerning various 
decisions/developments were put in chronological order.  
2. Interview Schedule: A generic interview schedule was developed based on 
the framework and a characterisation of the key decisions usually required in a 
new biotechnology venture. The questionnaire was pilot tested and revised. 
(See Appendix B.) 
3. Personalising the interview schedule: The data from the secondary sources 
for a company was analysed to identify major decisions and the 
interrelationships between decisions and, where possible, an ordering of the 
steps in a particular decision. 
 Given the expected limitation of time for the interviewees and the objective of 
discussing some particular decisions at length, a few decisions for each company were 
selected and a matrix prepared for each company (akin to an aide memoire), giving an 
overview picture on one page of issues to be discussed. (See Appendix C.) 
                                                 
18 In this case, it was secondary sources for the former and interviews for the latter. 
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5.2.5 Data Analysis 
The overall strategy for analysis was greatly influenced by the work of Miles and 
Huberman (1994). Denzin (cited in Fielding & Fielding, 1987:25) suggests that 
multiple methods increase the reliability of the analysis. Three styles of analysis were 
used because they were not only used in similar studies but also seemed to fit 
appropriately with the logic of the research: 
1. Descriptive Qualitative Analysis: This first stage involved the 
development of categories and subcategories of the decision process and 
the establishment of  preliminary associations among them. 
2. Flow Charts or ‘Decision Process’ Diagrams: ‘Decision process’ 
diagrams of decisions were constructed. This approach is based on the 
work of Mintzberg et al. (1976) and Nutt (1993). 
3. Quantitative Substantiation: Drawing on methodological ideas of 
Barringer et al (2005), Isenberg (1986), Miller and Friesen (1978) and Nutt 
(1984, 1993, and 1998), content analysis was used to develop quantitative 
data. Content analysis also provided the opportunity to go beyond the 
simple descriptive statistics and undertake the more complex analysis that 
Chandler and Lyon (2000) consider desirable for the development of 
entrepreneurship research.  
According to Krippendorff (1980), content analysis is a research 
technique for making replicable and valid inferences from data to their 
context. Its history is rooted in the journalistic fascination with numbers, 
supposedly making a quantitative statement more convincing than a 
qualitative one.  Krippendorff (1980:21) further quotes Berelson, who 
defines content analysis as ‘a research technique for the objective, 
systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of 
communication.’ 
4. Statistical Tool: Bergmann (cited in Bygrave, 1989:11) observed that 
‘[c]ounting is, indeed, the only use of numbers that is precise and accurate. 
The measurement of continuous dimensions, such as time and space, is not 
precise and accurate in the same sense.’ Simple numbers obtained during 
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quantitative substantiation were themselves quite useful for further 
analysis; other statistical methods, however, were also used. 
5.3 Execution of the Research Strategy 
5.3.1 Data Collection 
Wherever possible, more than one interviewee per company was identified and the 
interviews were conducted separately.  
 Jones (1985:48) states that an interview is ‘a complicated, shifting, social 
process occurring between two individual human beings that can never be exactly 
replicated.’ The following approaches were used to increase the reliability of the 
content of interviews: 
 Face-to-face interviews were used because interpersonal interaction allows a 
sharp exploration of the concepts and issues under investigation. As such, it 
‘can be the best way of collecting high quality data’ (Mathers et al., 1998:3).  
 The interviewees were briefed on the research at the outset in relatively broad 
terms (Jones, 1985:48). 
 Probing was used to check the meanings of terms and statements that were not 
understood to ensure that the interviewee was not making a judgement on the 
basis of his or her own preconceptions (Jones, 1985:45-53). 
 Respondents were encouraged to elaborate on their responses to increase the 
accuracy of those responses (Huber & Power, 1985). 
5.3.2 Data Recording  
The interviews were tape recorded and transcribed.19  
Even though not all the data that researchers are interested in is of the kind 
their respondents find threatening and difficult to reveal (Walker, 1985:45-53), it was 
anticipated that respondents would be a bit hesitant to talk about the decision process 
for decisions that had gone awry, particularly if they were being tape recorded. In 
order to minimise this risk, the following measures were taken: 
                                                 
19 The transcripts were prepared by using unedited quotes, so even the quotes of interviewees used in 
the following chapters are unedited. 
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1. A respondent’s acceptance letter was signed. This specified the limitations on 
the researcher’s use of the information, including quotations. This contributed 
to interviewees feeling that they were answering questions on their own terms 
(Jones, 1985:49). 
2. The earlier questions were straightforward and non-controversial. Walker 
(1985:45-53) observes that most people quickly forget about a tape recorder in 
that situation.  
3. The respondents could refuse to be recorded. (All interviewees agreed to be 
recorded.) 
 A complete transcript of each interview was prepared and sent to the 
interviewees so they could check its accuracy. Recording enables the interviewer to 
remain attentive and focused during the interview (rather than scribble notes or 
struggle to remember what to ask). In preparing a transcript, the researcher absorbs all 
the contents in a slow and tedious way. This brings the researcher very close to the 
meaning of the spoken words. The only major disadvantage is the amount of time 
needed to produce complete transcriptions. 
5.3.3 Data Analysis20 
5.3.3(a) Qualitative Data Analysis  
After the transcripts were prepared for each interviewee, a separate document for each 
decision taken in a company was prepared. All transcripts, including the subsets on 
individual decisions, were then analysed and coded using the qualitative data analysis 
software NVivo®. The approach to coding used no more than eight themes or 
concepts and about eight to 10 codes per theme or concept.21 Miles and Huberman 
(1994:58) observe that codes can be developed at different times during analysis; 
some get created and get used at the start and others follow. This flexibility in coding 
is based on the logic of Andreski (cited in Fielding & Fielding, 1987:20): ‘[N]o 
amount of sophistication in model building can compensate for the error of leaving 
out even a one essential variable’. Miles and Huberman (1994:67) have suggested that 
one way of retaining mindfulness in coding is the marginal remark. NVivo® (by its 
                                                 
20 This is voluminous and contains confidential material, so available only on request. 
21 This approach to coding draws on the experience of Bazeley and Richards (2000:116): ‘Most 
projects end up with around 10 major groupings, or trees—sometimes less and rarely much more.’  
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‘DataBite’ facility) proved to be very useful for writing down thoughts related to 
some statement or a particular decision. 
 Consistency in coding documents is essential. Otherwise the researcher can 
skew the results and make them non-replicable (Krippendorff, 1980:21). For this 
purpose, a set of rules for coding were developed (see Box 5.1).  
Eisenhardt (1989) considers that each sample case is analogous to an 
experiment and that multiple cases are analogous to multiple experiments. According 
to her, cross-case analysis forces the investigator ‘to go beyond initial impressions, 
especially through the use of structured and diverse lenses on the data’, thus 
improving the likelihood of accuracy and reliable theory (p. 541). She explains that 
this is a two-part process involving (1) refining the definition of the construct and (2) 
building evidence which measures the construct in each case. 
Miles and Huberman (1994:87) suggest that ‘extracting and clustering the 
segments in which a theme appears, as we do with conventional coding and pattern 
coding…are a much better way to look across a data set within a single or multiple 
cases.’ NVivo® is well suited for this purpose. Through the conduct of the 
interviews, preliminary ideas about concepts and relationships developed. Miles and 
Huberman (1994:246) state that ‘[t]he human mind finds patterns so quickly and 
easily that it needs no how-to advice.’ But ‘[p]attern finding can be very productive 
when the number of cases and/or data overload is severe’ (1994:246). 
The analysis sought to establish interrelationships among themes or concepts 
and the attributes of the decision (particularly whether a decision was associated with 
a successful outcome). NVivo® provides a data analysis facility that facilitates 
‘stacking comparisons’. This retains case level information but forms a ‘meta-matrix’ 
of variables (Miles and Huberman, 1994:174-176).22 
                                                 
22 In a variable-centred approach, the building blocks are variables and their intercorrelations rather 
than cases. The details of any specific case recede behind the broad patterns found across a variety of 
cases and little explicit case-to-case comparison is done. By contrast, case-oriented analysis is good at 
finding specific, concrete, historically grounded patterns common to a set of cases. (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994:174) 
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5.3.3(b) How were Flow Charts or ‘Decision Process’ diagrams done? 
Miles and Huberman (1994:260) differentiate between ‘building a chain of evidence’ 
and ‘causal networks.’ They say that the former requires painstaking verification at 
each step and there must be a logical basis for the claim of the relationships. They 
consider that ‘the decision tree approach is stronger on logical order rather than 
narrative order as such’ (p. 186). Following Mintzberg et al. (1976), flow charts or 
‘decision process’ diagrams were prepared to map out critical paths and decision 
points mentioned in the narrative data in a logical manner. This step took the analysis 
to another level: systematic refining and extension of the original (Mintzberg inspired) 
framework based on empirically grounded data. The refining of the data took place as 
the surprises vis-à-vis the original framework were not discarded but taken into 
consideration (Miles & Huberman, 1994:270). 
  The rationale for undertaking this approach was based on ‘enumerative 
induction,’ a process in which one collects a variety of instances all going in the same 
direction to establish appreciable patterns, as had been done by Mintzberg et al. 
(1976). 
 The ‘decision process’ diagrams were constructed with the use of software 
called SmartDraw®. Mintzberg et al. (1976) were able to find a few patterns with 
their 25 diagrams; this study resulted in the development of  about 50 diagrams for 
analysis. The question was: which 50 decisions should be drawn? Initially, it was 
decided that at least one decision (simple or complex) from each company would be 
drawn. However, it was soon realised that drawing simple decisions was not of much 
value.  
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* Note: Biz Plan may or may not have involved Professional Consultants. In such cases, double coding has 
been done. 
5. Sometimes coding has been done in answer to triangulation questions but only when that
particular thing is a new concept. 
6. Care has been taken to avoid double coding for other ‘themes’ as well. For example:
Negotiation/Compromise, (Negotiation)/Persuasion cannot take place without ‘Involvement’ of
the other party. In such cases, double coding has been avoided. That is, passages coded with
Negotiation/Compromise, (Negotiation)/Persuasion are not coded with ‘Involvement’. A ‘Natural
Decision’ may or may not have ‘Involvement’, so they have been coded at the same place when
necessary. Likewise, where ‘deliberation’ has already been coded, ‘second opinion’ has generally
been avoided.  
Box 5.1 Coding Style 
According to Krippendorff (1980:75): 
‘The ‘categories must be exhaustive and mutually exclusive’ is an often stated requirement. It pertains to
the semantics of a data language in that it fixes a relation between the phenomena to be described and the
data representing them. This dual requirement demands that the semantics of a data language partition the
universe of possible recording units into distinct classes and that the members of each class are represented
by a different datum so that the distinctions made in the world are unambiguously represented in the data.’ 
1. Triangulations and repetitions are not coded. For example, if a respondent has talked about hiring
professional consultants and then has talked about it in more than one place, care has been taken
to code it only once and not repetitively to avoid distortion of ‘quantitative’ results. One
professional consultant being coded more than once would quantitatively show more than one
consultant. Similarly, an idea expressed before and then used again is not double-coded. 
2. Sometimes a paragraph (from the transcript) has been used in two separate decision documents
(to give a complete meaning to each). Such portions are coded only if they actually form part of
the decision process (and are not just background to it).  
3. A single (one) code has been used for the same dimension of a line of thought that has spilled into
the following passage. However, for separate dimensions of the same line of thought, separate
coding has been done. For example, if the discussion is about the marketing of a product, pricing
is a separate dimension to identifying means of marketing (i.e., direct selling or online selling or
through distributors).  
4. In the same passage, double coding has generally been avoided (especially for the same
dimension of a line of thought) from the following two groups—‘Deliberation’ and ‘Formal
Planning’—until and unless two or more completely different issues have been discussed in the
same passage. 
a. Deliberation + Planning 
b. Formal Planning + Planning 
c. Business Plan + Formal Planning 
d. Formal Planning + Deliberation 
e. Professional Consultants + Deliberation 
f. Professional Consultants + Formal Planning 
g. Deliberation + Directed Search 
h. Deliberation + Logic 
i. Logic + Planning 
j. Logic + Formal Planning 
k. Logic + Professional Consultants 
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 The approach was to draw at least one complex decision from each company. 
Among the different complex decisions of a company, decisions that showed some 
relation to performance were preferred (i.e., one could make a statement on the 
success, partial success or failure of a decision). The logic of this approach is self-
evident and was driven by the desire to identify patterns related to the style of 
decision process and their success or failure. This led to two types of categories— 
patterns not related to performance (such as those found by Mintzberg et al., 1976) 
and patterns related to performance. The assumption was that if one can do the latter, 
the former is automatically achieved.  
TABLE 5.4 DECISIONS DRAWN WITH THE HELP OF SMARTDRAW® 
 
 
Total 
Drawn with the help of 
SmartDraw® 
Decisions labelled as 
‘Success’  
34 22 
Decisions labelled as 
‘Failure’ 
14 4 
Total 48 26 
 
∗ Total 53 diagrams were drawn with the help of SmartDraw®. 
∗ The other 27 diagrams included decisions labelled as ‘partial success’ and a mix of other 
simple and complex decisions. 
∗ Fewer ‘Failure’ diagrams were made as they were either ad hoc or opportunistic, so the only 
pattern that could be seen was a very simplistic straightforward diagram without deliberation 
or formal analysis and almost no iterations. Once a couple of them were drawn, some complex 
looking decisions were deliberately drawn.  
5.3.3(c) Content Analysis  
Krippendorff (1980:112) suggests that ‘[t]he ability to correlate information obtained 
from content analysis with data obtained from other techniques makes content 
analysis part of the large system of methodology in the social sciences.’ He says that 
in order for content analysis to be of any meaning rather than just a quantitative 
identification of specified characteristics within a text, one should endeavour to relate 
the classification, categorisation and frequency counts of these specified 
characteristics to some phenomena, which is necessary if the results of content 
analysis are to be empirically meaningful (1980:23). Krippendorff (1980) suggests 
that any content analysis must be performed relative to, and justified in terms of, the 
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context of the data. In particular, he argues that it should be ‘predictive of something 
that is observable in principle…to help conceptualize that portion of the reality that 
gave rise to the analysed text’ (p. 23). 
 These suggestions led to a decision to go beyond using visible 
(graphic/diagrammatic) patterns to identify differences between successful and 
unsuccessful decisions. The approach had three aspects: 
 To search for a clear distinction (based on methods other than 
diagrammatic patterns) between successful and unsuccessful decisions. 
The analysis focused on only those decisions for which performance 
(success/failure) could be clearly established based on criteria identified by 
the venture prior to the decision.23 For example, a company X applying for 
an IPO would have taken out a press release about its market valuation 
expectations, the amount it wants to raise and the timing.  
 To search for a distinction between companies that can clearly be stated to 
have a very good start and the companies that had a very difficult start. 
(Companies for which a clear-cut judgement was not feasible were not 
taken into account.) This was based on the discussion about the ‘initial 
start’ of the company with the founders, where ‘initial start’ was discussed 
usually from the conception of the idea to raising the first external funds. If 
there were no external funds raised, it was up to the time when the 
‘business concept’ stabilised. 
 To search for a clear distinction between companies that can clearly be 
stated to be performing well and those that are ‘stuck in the middle’. 
(Again, companies for which a clear-cut judgement was not feasible were 
not taken into account.) This approach extended the study from one level 
of analysis (i.e., decisions as the unit of analysis) to another level (i.e., 
company), thus introducing a degree of multi-level analysis.24  
                                                 
23 At this stage, those decisions that had earlier been labelled as partial success were not included. I 
decided this even though I had already made a few ‘decision process’ diagrams of such decisions.  
24 This is similar to the concept of building macro theory upon a micro basis (Fielding & Fielding, 
1986:16) 
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Indications of distinct patterns of decision-making emerged from the cross-
case analysis. Content analysis was used as a tool to deepen the analysis, as suggested 
by Miles and Huberman (1994:254). To sharpen the analysis, cases were chosen 
based on the strategies—using terminology used by Miles and Huberman (1994:28)—
‘stratified purposeful’, ‘maximum variation’ and ‘criterion based’ sampling.  
 Krippendorff (1980:27) argues that a clear framework is essential for content 
analysis: ‘Only if the target of a content analysis is unambiguously stated can one 
judge whether the content analysis is completed and specify the kind of evidence 
eventually needed to validate the results.’ He suggests formulating an analytical 
construct (1980:99): ‘Analytical constructs may also be characterised as a theory 
about a context that is operationalized in such a way that its independent variables are 
capable of representing all possible data and its dependent variables represent what 
the content analyst wishes to infer, predict, or learn about the context of his data.’  
 In this study, the independent variables for the content analysis were based on 
the decision process framework. The cross-case analysis indicated relationships with 
the dependent variables (e.g., the performance of the decision).  
 For a process to be replicable, the rules that govern it must be explicit and 
equally applicable to all units of analysis (Krippendorff, 1980:21). The rules for 
coding (discussed above) were followed strictly. This facilitated the analysis using 
NVivo® and provided confidence in the findings. 
5.3.3(d) Statistical Analysis  
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was the preferred statistical test in the majority of 
cases because it calculates the differences between the means of two or more groups 
(compared with t-tests, which compare the means of two groups only).25 ANOVA 
enables the researcher to ‘analyse the total variation of our data into components that 
may be attributed to various ‘sources’ or ‘causes’ of variation’ (Gupta, 2000:1010).26 
The reason for using ANOVA was the nature of the data;  the means of the factors 
                                                 
25 
Hhttp://www.georgetown.edu/departments/psychology/researchmethods/statistics/inferential/anova.htmH
, accessed 21 September 2006).  
26 Refer to Keppel and Zedeck (1989) for a detailed discussion on ANOVA. 
 97
                             
 
were more useful for analysis. (This aspect will become clear when the results of the 
statistical analysis are discussed in chapters 7, 8, 9, and 11.) 
 On some occasions, REML (residual maximum likelihood) and Wald tests 
were used to test whether an effect existed. This was due to the unbalanced nature of 
the data with respect to factors (categories).27 
 The generic model for the analysis can be stated as: 
yij = μ + αi + βj + εij 
where 
yij = response to ith type (i = 1, 2, … n) and jth type (j = 1, 2, … n) 
μ = mean effect 
αi = effect of ith type 
βj = effect of jth type 
εij = residual  
Note: α and β are qualitative variables or factors. Given that they are not continuous, it is appropriate to 
use ANOVA rather than regression. (ANOVA is a special case of regression.) 
5.4 Triangulation: Confirming the Path for Others to Reach the Same Destination 
Fielding and Fielding (1986:24-25) suggest that ‘the role of triangulation is to 
increase the researcher’s confidence so that findings may be better imparted to the 
audience and to lessen recourse to the assertion of privileged insight.’  Four types of 
triangulation—data triangulation, investigator triangulation, methodological 
                                                 
27 According to Smyth and Verbyla (1996): 
Residual maximum likelihood estimation (REML) is often preferred to maximum likelihood 
estimation as a method of estimating covariance parameters in linear models because it takes 
account of the loss of degrees of freedom in estimating the mean and produces unbiased estimating 
equations for the variance parameters. 
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triangulation and theory triangulation—suggested by Denzin (cited in Fielding & 
Fielding, 1986) and used in this study are discussed below. 
5.4.1 Data Triangulation 
This was done at two levels. Firstly, extensive use was made of secondary data to 
check the primary data. This was to used to assess rationalisation by the interviewees, 
which is an important issue regarding the validity and reliability of the data.  
Secondly, when interviewing more than one person, a few common questions 
were used. When there was only one interviewee in a company, a couple of questions 
that had already been asked early in the interview would be repeated. 
Fielding and Fielding (1980:31) suggest that the important feature of 
triangulation is not the simple combination of different kinds of data but the attempt 
to relate them so as to counteract the threats to validity identified in each.  
5.4.2 Investigator Triangulation  
Investigator triangulation is where more than one person examines the same situation. 
In this case, the key criterion for validity and reproducibility is associated with the 
style of coding (because all three different methods of analysis are contingent on it). 
In order to increase the reliability of coding and the data generated from it, a major 
effort was made to make the coding reproducible through the rules for coding. 
Reproducibility was tested in two ways, as suggested by Krippendorff (1980:131): 
 Intra-observer inconsistencies: Coding by the researcher was checked by the 
researcher about a month after the final version of coding. A very high degree 
of consistency was found.  
 Inter-observer inconsistencies: An MBA student and a senior academic 
researcher were given the coding rules and asked to review the researcher’s 
coding of several cases.28 Neither of the two had prior in-depth knowledge of 
the companies. In that way, their assessment was based on the interview 
                                                 
28 Ideally, each of the observers should have done the coding themselves. However, it takes a lot of 
effort to learn the software (NVivo®) and the coding style. Given their time constraints, it was decided 
to take this path. Even though this is methodologically less rigorous, it assesses the acceptability of 
conceptual themes and coding style.  
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transcript and the coding rules. The former checked about 15 per cent of the 
data and the latter about five per cent. In both the cases, they selected the 
decisions randomly. There was a very high degree of consistency with the 
concepts or themes the researcher had coded, being ~92 per cent and ~94 per 
cent respectively.29  
5.4.3 Methodological Triangulation 
There are two ways of achieving methodological triangulation. The ‘within-method’ 
approach is when the same method is used on different occasions. The ‘between-
method’ approach is when different methods are applied to the same subject.  
 The analytical strategy used was similar to the between-method approach 
because three different methods (qualitative analysis, decision process diagrams and 
quantitative substantiation) were employed. Webb et al. (cited in Krippendorff, 
1980:52) suggests that multiple methods should be used without prior knowledge as 
to which one is the best or more valid. If there is a high correlation among their 
results, it indicates that they are assessing the same underlying phenomena.  
5.4.4 Theory Triangulation  
Theory triangulation is examining a situation from the standpoint of competing 
theories. This was not relevant to this research because it was an exploratory study.  
5.5 Study Limitations 
Apart from financial resources to support the fieldwork, a limitation was the difficulty 
in getting appointments with the interviewees. A good deal of time and effort had to 
be expended in convincing interviewees to be interviewed and arranging 
appointments. Almost all interviewees were prepared to allocate only one to one and 
half hours to the interview. In some companies, only a single interviewee was 
available.  
                                                 
29 Miller and Freisen (1977) and Yin and Heald (1975) note that two-thirds agreement is adequate 
internal consistency much as the Spearman-Brown reliability coefficient of 0.67 might be considered 
adequate for questionnaire research.  
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 Lyles and Mitroff (1980) and Nutt (2000) observe that the story uncovered 
from informants to create a description of each decision may not fully correspond to 
actual events. The self-reporter’s preference for rational explanation in our society 
makes it easier to communicate in that way. Nutt (2000:184) quotes March as 
observing that ‘decision makers may act about things that they can not talk about and 
talk about things that they can not do.’ These urges could then prompt an informant to 
resort to a story that becomes more rational and tidy than the real decision. However, 
some distortions would tend to show up through the various triangulation methods as 
variations in what informants say (Nutt, 2000).  
One potential limitation was that the events recalled would be simplified, 
where important detail would be stripped out because of social desirability. Sensitive 
information may also limit what is said (Nutt, 2000). Even though varied approaches 
(such as the use of multiple sources of data collection) were used to minimise this 
effect, it is practically not possible to eliminate all of it.  
5.6 Ethical Issues 
In carrying out research involving people, thought must be given to ethical concerns that 
may arise through the study. Ethical research aims to not harm or mislead participants 
and to protect their identities and the data they provide (Salkind, 1997). This is the 
utilitarian approach discussed by Miles and Huberman (1994:289-290), where the focus 
is on the effects of specific actions for the researcher and participants and the wider 
community. Universal rules of ethics and benefits to the participants were not expressly 
considered except that harm was avoided and the participants were not coerced. 
Interviewees were given a copy of their interview transcript.  
The ANU Human Ethics Committee approved the research design before any 
research was executed. Before each interview, the informant signed a consent form 
(See Appendix D) that informed them of what research was being done and what their 
rights were (Salkind, 1997). The aim was to ensure that they were fully aware of the 
research and that they could control their participation in the research. 
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5.7 Study Highlights 
A key aspect of the research design is the micro unit of analysis (i.e., a decision). 
While Chandler and Lyon (2001) and Davidsson and Wiklund (2001) have discussed 
different levels of analysis used by researchers in the field of entrepreneurship, none 
has specifically highlighted the importance of the decision as a unit of analysis. Given 
their comprehensive coverage of the literature, it is reasonable to conclude that either 
no published study in entrepreneurship has used the decision as the unit of analysis or 
such studies are very rare.  
 Again, both Chandler and Lyon (2001) and Davidsson and Wiklund (2001) 
have highlighted the importance of multi-level analysis. They have encouraged 
researchers to go beyond the ‘individual’ and ‘firm’ level analysis.  
Other highlights of the research design can be seen in Table 5.5. They reflect a 
series of careful decisions made in order to develop a research design and strategy. 
These decisions were based on the advice and experience of other researchers of 
either new venture formation or decision-making or both as well as on what was 
needed in the study (Davidsson and Wiklund, 2001).  
TABLE 5.5 THIS RESEARCH VIS-À-VIS THE TREND OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
  
 Characteristics Observation by Chandler 
and Lyon (2001) 
Does this 
research have it? 
1 A clearly specified 
research model 
Too few studies clearly specify 
this. 
Yes 
2 Unit of analysis 35% Individual, 4% Group or 
Team, 2% Innovation or Project, 
~50% Firm level, 9% Industry or 
Macro-level. So, Decision level- 
0%. 
Yes (Unit of 
analysis is a 
secision) 
3 Qualitative methods Only 18% of the studies 
employed qualitative methods. 
Yes 
4 Qualitative + 
quantitative analysis 
Only 18.5% of those who 
employed qualitative methods. 
Yes 
5 Multiple data sources Multiple data source studies 
remain the exception. 
Yes 
6 Validation procedures 
beyond face validity 
Only 26% of studies have this. Yes 
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The Decision Process: Qualitative Analysis 
 
 
 
Tom Landry: Setting a goal is not the main thing. It is deciding how you will go about 
achieving it and staying with that plan. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                             
 
In Chapter 4, a preliminary working framework was developed largely from the 
literature on decision-making but also from carefully drawn relevant research in the 
entrepreneurship field. In this chapter, the new framework—the result of revisions of 
the framework in light of empirical data from the case studies—will be discussed. 
Various elements of the decision process will be discussed at length through the 
provision of examples from the case studies and from relevant empirical studies 
reported in the literature. This will lead to a better understanding of the decision 
process.  
 Once each element of the decision process has been discussed, it will be useful 
to discuss the complete decision process (making use of the new empirically-
grounded framework). The final step will be to look for patterns (if any) in the 
decision processes, as was attempted by Mintzberg et al. (1976). However, before 
starting a detailed discussion on the decision process framework, it is important to 
know what changes the working framework went through following the analysis of 
the empirical data.  
6.1 An Empirically Derived Generic Decision-Making Model                                                   
for New Ventures 
In this section, the discussion will be on the changes that were made to the original 
working model (discussed in Chapter 4) to derive the empirically validated model. 
(Refer to Figure 6.1.)1 As discussed in the chapter on research methodology (see 
‘Research Design’ in Chapter 5), it was expected (and desirable) that the working 
model would change because it was developed using the available literature only and 
was meant to be a guide for the data collection. The discussion in this first section will 
be more theoretical and outline only the changes made to the working model 
(discussed in Chapter 4). In the following section, the elements of this model will be 
discussed in more detail and examples will be provided from the case studies. The 
major changes are related to: developing decision options; the style of decision-
making; the authorisation of the decision made; and decision implementation.  
                                                 
1 Appendix E outlines the other two stages of evolution of the working model before this version was 
finalised and became stable.  
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Figure 6.1 Empirically Grounded Generic Model for the Decision-making Process in New Ventures 
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It is quite obvious that contriving completely new options or modifying common 
approaches will involve deliberation (expert advice or an entrepreneur’s own 
experience) or formal analysis. In the graphical model (refer to Figure 6.1), the 
element of deliberation or formal analysis is shown through the addition of an extra 
backward loop before a loop to ‘contrive’ is made. Alternatively, a loop from 
‘common approach’ to ‘contrive’ could be made directly based on the assumption that 
‘contrive’ involves a thought process. While the former approach would clearly 
demonstrate whether deliberation, formal analysis or both were used to contrive an 
It was also found that adding an extra step in the model using the ‘common 
approach’ would help get a clear understanding about the later step—i.e., ‘contrive’— 
when both steps were involved. This would clarify whether the contrived option was 
completely new or modified. This wasn’t possible with the working model. (Refer to 
Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4.) 
It was found that decision options were identified by decision-makers using 
‘common approaches’ and that these were used more frequently than expected. A 
‘common approach’ is a preferred way of doing a thing in a particular situation and is 
well-established. There can be one or more common approaches for a particular 
situation. Decision-makers can select one common approach (if there are many) and 
either use it as it is or adapt it to their need. On occasions where no common approach 
is available, decision-makers can contrive single or multiple options for their own 
purpose and one of them (if there is more than one) can be selected.  
In the original model, deliberation and formal analysis were proposed as two separate 
activities that decision-makers undertake to ‘diagnose’—a term used by Mintzberg et 
al. (1976)—a potential opportunity or problem. On the basis of this diagnosis, a 
decision-maker would ‘design’ options. The multiple options would be diagnosed in 
detail to come up with a suitable option. In that case, ‘search’ and ‘screen’—terms 
used by Mintzberg et al. (1976)—are actually part of the diagnosis. These 
assumptions arrived at in the original working model held, although they were 
extended; in other words, the ‘contrive’ and ‘selection’ phases were elaborated.   
6.1.1 Developing Decision Options 
                             
 
                             
 
option, the latter approach would make drawing a decision process easier. (Refer to 
options 1 and 2 respectively in Figure 6.2.)  
Common
Approaches:
Multiple OptionsDeliberation
Contrive:
Single Option
 
Figure 6.2 The Operation of the Graphical Model (Example A) 
Note: 
         Option 1 (The loop starts from ‘Common Approaches’). 
       Option 2 (The loop starts from ‘Common Approaches’). 
 
  Making a choice from multiple options could be based on deliberation, formal 
analysis or intuition. While an element of intuition or guesswork will always exist, to 
differentiate between intuition and complete guesswork, the term ‘ad hoc’ is used for 
the latter.1 The specific nature of making a choice can be shown pictorially in 
different ways (based on the preference of the researcher).2  
                                                 
1b‘Ad hoc decision-making’ is a broader term. It also includes decisions that a novice decision-maker 
would consider logical and meaningful but an experienced person would not (Moore, 1995). The 
problem with such decisions is that the decision-maker, despite his or her lack of knowledge, has not 
used an expert or a knowledgeable person in that area and made a decision on superficial knowledge 
(without making a sincere effort to understand that domain). But because they have made an effort, 
even though superficial, and have tried to make sense out of that in a logical manner, the decision-
making cannot be said to be completely intuitive or made on gut feeling or guesswork—although, of 
course, there will be an element of this. This is elaborated further in this chapter and in Chapter 7 by 
way of examples. 
2 Pictorially, one can show the element of deliberation or formal analysis by adding an extra backward 
loop (refer to Figure 6.1) from the ‘multiple options’ to either ‘deliberation’ or ‘formal analysis’ before 
linking it to ‘single option’. One could also make a loop from ‘multiple option’ to ‘single option’ based 
on the assumption that there would be some thought process in the selection. (Refer to Figure 6.1.) 
When the choice has been made by an ad hoc means, one would need to show it explicitly with the help 
of an ‘ad hoc’ path connecting line. 
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6.1.2 Style of Decision-making 
Another factor that is of critical importance is the level of involvement of all 
stakeholders in the decision process. This depends on the political nature of the 
decision and the obviousness of the decision (solution). For example, a decision may 
be important but there may be only one preferred way of doing it, so even without the 
involvement of all stakeholders it is decided to go in that direction. However, 
operationalising the construct of ‘involvement’ proved to be difficult using a 
retrospective interview method. It was difficult to obtain information on the micro-
level involvement detailed in the working model, even though it could be determined 
whether the stakeholders participated and to what extent. 
Most of the ‘other’ categories discussed in the working model—edict, 
persuasion/bargaining, managed procrastination, forced upon, natural choice, and 
consensus—were empirically observed in one or more case studies.  However, the 
categories in the working model were found to be inadequate to capture all the styles 
of decision-making. Therefore, other categories emerged—opportunistic, decision in 
frustration, compromise, and retaliatory decisions3. These were grouped into four 
major categories (refer to Figure 6.1).  
6.1.3 Decision Authorisation 
The working model was based on an assumption that, because in new ventures the 
entrepreneur or entrepreneurial team make decisions, adoption would be direct once a 
decision was made. However, it was observed that a few decisions had to be approved 
by the board (which normally does not get involved with day-to-day decision-
making), especially when there were significant external investors. In that case, for 
the purpose of model generalisation, it was imperative to add ‘authorisation.’ 
                                                                                                                                            
 
3 ‘Retaliatory decisions’ are decisions that are in response to an unfavourable decision taken by another 
negotiating party or discussant. ‘Decision in frustration’ is a decision that a decision maker is forced to 
make because of an unfavourable business environment or because there is one single feasible option 
and that option is not the desired one.  
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6.1.4. Decision Implementation 
In some instances, it was found that the observation by Majone and Wildavasky (cited 
in Moore, 1995) that formulation should actually be seen as part of implementation 
was found to be more applicable vis-à-vis the argument that implementation follows 
formulation. In other instances, it was found that some decision processes depicted in 
the flow chart (as per the model) were either decision-formulation or decision-
implementation only. In that case, action (as shown in the working model) following 
the selection of an option lost its relevance. This will be discussed at length later in 
the chapter and examples will be provided to explain it. 
Because it became evident that, in some instances, formulation and 
implementation were not two separate phases but ones that blended into one another 
(and due to the highly iterative nature of a decision-process), it was decided to do 
away with the three phases: concept development, decision formulation and decision 
implementation.   
6.1.5 Other Observations 
1. Acknowledging the fact that judgement/intuition can never be completely 
eliminated in the majority of decisions and that one can feel its presence 
throughout a decision process, it was included in the decision process.4 
2. The prior experience of decision-makers, particularly if relevant to the 
decision, was seen to play a critical role in decision-making. If relevant 
experience were absent, the use of relevant expert advice seemed to have a 
significant effect on the decision process. Prior experience must also be 
included in the model.  
 The model is iterative. At any stage the decision process can revert to any 
previous stage. Because the model was made for a practical purpose, a conscious 
attempt was made to simplify its use. For example, a decision that involves ‘formal 
analysis’ followed by  ‘deliberation’ can be shown in two ways. This resulted in a 
loop to a node after ‘contrive’ or directly from the node between ‘common approach’ 
                                                 
4 This observation confirms the claim of McMullen and Shepherd (2006:134): ‘Whether 
entrepreneurial action occurs, however, depends on how much one must rely on one’s judgment, which 
in turn, depends on the degree of uncertainty experienced in the decision of whether to act.’  
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and ‘deliberation’ (see Figure 6.3). The latter option (and many like that) was created 
to make the model user friendly. 
Deliberation
Formal Analysis
Common Approaches:
Multiple Options
Common Approaches:
Single Option
Contrive: Multiple
Options
Contrive: Single
Option
 
Figure 6.3 The Operation of the Graphical Model (Example B) 
6.2 Elements of the Decision Process 
 The theoretical basis for the inclusion of various elements in the generic 
decision process model (see Figure 6.1) was discussed in both Chapter 4 and an 
earlier section of this chapter. In this section, each element of the decision process— 
recognition, deliberation, formal analysis, common approaches, contrive, select and 
authorisation—is discussed in further detail using case study examples.  
6.2.1 Recognition 
In the decision process, recognition can either be of a problem or an opportunity. 
However, in the field of entrepreneurship, problems with ‘opportunity recognition’ 
has gained the most attention in the research. This might be expected and is in 
keeping with the Schumpeterian concept. Following this tradition, Gaglio (2004:534) 
defines ‘opportunity’ as ‘the chance to introduce innovative (rather than imitative) 
goods, services, or processes to an industry or economic marketplace.’ Others (e.g., 
Hill et al., 1999) define opportunity as the chance to start a business. However, it 
would be useful to broaden this definition because in a new venture there may be 
opportunities of several levels and kinds about which decisions have to be made. For 
example, there are opportunities to hire a prominent person, buy machinery cheaply or 
find a good location for a new office et cetera.  
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 Singh et al. (1999) suggest that an ‘idea’ is a stepping stone that leads to an 
opportunity. For them, ‘opportunity recognition is a process rather than a one time 
‘eureka’ experience.’ Singh et al. (1999), however, differentiate between an idea and 
an opportunity: ‘Some people come up with initial new venture ideas. After some 
additional thought and/or evaluation, they may recognize that their ideas are potential 
new venture opportunities. With even further thought and consideration one may then 
decide to start a new venture.’ For the purpose of this research, an idea is the same as 
a potential opportunity. The thinking process refines that idea (which may include 
determining whether the idea is a potential opportunity) and helps choose a potential 
opportunity from several (if there are several). As mentioned previously, an 
opportunity is not limited to starting a new venture; one comes across several 
opportunities even after a new venture has been set up. 
 In the approach taken here, recognition includes ‘opportunity recognition’ and 
‘problem recognition.’ But what facilitates the recognition of a problem or 
opportunity? Domain knowledge, experience, social networks, search activities, 
unexpected occurrences, an unfavourable environment and even serendipity are some 
of the likely explanations for the recognition of a problem or opportunity.   
6.2.1(a) Domain Knowledge 
 Fiet et al. (2005) suggest that entrepreneurs cannot rely only on generic 
information to succeed. They have to combine specific information with general 
information in order to enjoy competitive advantage. Alvarez and Busenitz (2001) had 
earlier suggested that it is primarily the generic knowledge of entrepreneurs that allow 
them to recognise an opportunity created by specialists. It is often the synthesis of 
specialised and generalised information that leads to the recognition of a potential 
opportunity. For example, Dr Bernard Flynn (Iliad Chemicals) said: 
It was kind of self-evident from the activity—i.e., the compounds that we 
were making in the anti-cancer area—that there would be potential 
commercial significance because they are significantly more potent than a 
number of other systems that were considered to be viable candidates 
clinically, based on invitro data that we had at that time. So that seemed to 
suggest that there was a commercial potential to that. Obviously in the 
area of drug discovery, biological activity of any compound, if it exists, 
then it is self-evident that it has a commercial potential. 
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 Dr Wayne Millen (Epitan) recounted a similar sort of argument when he 
licensed drug molecules that had potential to prevent skin burn related diseases: 
Now, skin cancer is the world’s most prolific cancer, and I saw the 
potential for that, particularly living in Australia because this is the skin 
cancer capital of the world, and I at that stage was living in Perth, which is 
skin cancer capital of Australia. So I am sitting in a country at the top of 
the tree and in a state and in a city that just understood skin cancer. 
 
 From the above examples, it can be concluded that it is generic knowledge that 
a breakthrough drug candidate in a disease area with a reasonable market size is a 
potential opportunity. However, it is the specific knowledge related to the lead 
molecule that prompts entrepreneurial action.  
6.2.1(b) Experience  
Following the belief of the Austrian school of thought in entrepreneurship that it is the 
possession of information appropriate to a particular opportunity that leads to 
opportunity discovery and entrepreneurship, Shane (2000) argues that all people 
possessing that information are equally likely to be an entrepreneur. Quoting Busenitz 
and Barney, Shane (2000:450) further observes that ‘no individual-level attributes or 
behaviours have been found to generate significant differences between entrepreneurs 
and other members of society that are robust, consistent across different samples, or 
explain much variance.’ However, one attribute related to an individual that does 
seem to have caught the attention of researchers as facilitating opportunity recognition 
(and decision-making in general) is experience. Vesper has shown that work 
experience was a true factor upon which founders recognised business opportunities 
(Corbett, 2005). Ardichvili et al. (2003) theorise that individuals who have certain 
types of existing knowledge have a better likelihood of recognising opportunities than 
those who do not have such knowledge.5 Beckman (2006:742) makes the observation 
that ‘the idea generation cannot be separated from the experience of a firm’s founder.’ 
Most of the ventures in this research (with a few exceptions) were formed around an 
area where at least one of the founders was either knowledgeable enough to 
                                                 
5 A closely related construct of experience is education. Arenius and Clercq (2005) state that 
individuals’ educational level will positively affect the likelihood of perceiving opportunities because 
highly educated individuals have a broader knowledge base and possibly bigger social networks to 
draw upon. This construct of education was not considered separately because most of the founders in 
biotechnology are in any case highly educated (typically having a PhD). 
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understand the science or was associated with the development of it. For example, Mr. 
Mohan explained the idea of the software that led to start of Helix Genomics: 
It was during Dr Prasad’s MSc project. He was doing the genome 
analysis. He found that all the tools that were available on the Internet 
were not sufficient to further his research. Also Rajnikant was also having 
a lot of problems in using the online Internet software in computational 
biology. I think that spark was from our MSc projects. We found that there 
was a lot of communication gap between sequence biology and structural 
biology. There was also a lot of communication gap happening in the 
formats that people follow across the world. So individual scientists are 
following their own formats. There is a lot of scope for integration and 
also there is a lot of scope for building intelligent software. 
 
 It is not only during the start of the company that entrepreneurs prefer options 
related to their experience. Even for late stage decisions, experience plays an 
important role in not only recognition but also acceptance of an opportunity. Dr Alan 
Robertson said this about two projects that Pharmaxis acquired: 
Bill and Brett [the founding principal scientists] are interested in 
autoimmune diseases, which is why the company is founded. There is an 
allergic and an inflammatory autoimmune component to asthma, the 
inflammatory disease of the lung. Both cystic fibrosis and bronchitis are 
involved in the inflammation of the lung. Although they are not 
autoimmune diseases but they were in scientific interest of these fellows. 
6.2.1(c) Social Networks 
Hill et al. (1997) suggest that one particularly important source of new venture ideas 
and entrepreneurial opportunities may be entrepreneurs’ social networks. Singh et al. 
(1999) extend the idea by commenting that people within the entrepreneurs’ social 
network can help expand the boundaries of their rationality by expanding their 
knowledge and information levels. This can lead to the identification of more ideas 
and the recognition of more opportunities. Similarly, Mr B. Chandrasekhar explained 
the deal of his company (Bigtec) with KooPrime (Singapore) in this way: 
There were personal friends of mine and they had contacts with NUS. 
Subsequently when we met them, they talked about KooPrime that it has 
been spun out from there. We started to talk to them and it seemed to 
match our needs. That was the good reason to partner. 
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 Thus, social networks not only lead to the identification of an opportunity but 
also facilitate the realisation of a potential opportunity.6 When talking about how 
Company A got a deal from Company B, Dr X said: 
I suppose that Dr Y (from Company A) was doing some consulting work 
with Company B and he knew some people who were quite high in 
pharmaceutical R&D and we got to meet some people when they were 
here. They were travelling to Australia and we got the blessings from one 
of the guys who is quite high up. It was interesting, as the guy who was 
Project Manager for Company B for the deal was one of my old 
colleagues from Company C. I worked with him quite closely when I was 
in Company C. He worked in US and I worked in France. He came to stay 
with us and we worked together. I think that helps—i.e., if you know 
people personally. It probably helped us as a small company in Australia. 
 
 There are several other examples from the case studies where social networks 
played a constructive role in opportunity recognition and opportunity realisation. 
6.2.1(d) Search – Active, Directed or Both 
Lily Taylor has rightly observed that ‘Doors of opportunity don’t open, they unlock; it 
is up to you to turn the knob.’7 Opportunities don’t generally fall in one’s lap by 
themselves; they have to be actively searched. Lee et al. (2001) also suggest that 
proactiveness is a crucial organisational process because it entails a forward-looking 
perspective.8 Dr Jenny Harry described how Proteome Systems was able to get many 
deals: 
As the company progressed, we thought and looked around and spoke to 
people and identified the areas in which there was a great need in the 
world and where proteomics probably was a good technology to apply to 
that problem. 
 
The actions of active searches are generally more favourable when the search is more 
directed. For example, a directed search by Norwood Abbey resulted in the TAP deal 
and Peplin’s focused search led to the deal with Allergan. 
                                                 
6 Social networks are a function of management’s previous industry and technical expertise, as was 
shown by McGee and Dowling (cited in Autio, 1999:339) in their research. 
7 Hhttp://quotations.home.worldnet.att.net/opportunity.htmlH, accessed 12 September 2006. 
8 Lee et al. (2001) state: ‘Being a pioneer by anticipating and pursuing new opportunities and 
participating in emerging markets is a hallmark of entrepreneurship.’ 
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6.2.1(e) Serendipity 
Vesper, cited in Corbett (2005), notes that, in a study of nearly 100 founders, many 
these individuals cited serendipity as the main reason for finding the opportunity that 
eventually became their business. However, Vesper went on to show that work 
experience was the true factor in these founders recognising business opportunities. 
This may be true in many cases but not always. When talking about their spin-off 
company, Norwood Immunologics, Mr Bernie Romanin said that the spin-off was 
very different from Norwood Abbey’s core business—drug delivery—and was the 
result of serendipity: 
Very different! And that’s why we have actually put it into a separate 
entity because it was so different. It was serendipity. We were looking at 
potential drug targets that required a drug delivery…that could be a drug 
delivery opportunity. We identified this particular class of drugs, GNRH 
analogues, which are the cornerstone of immunology. That took us to 
some very interesting research that was being done here at Monash. 
Researchers were looking for somebody to help commercialise the 
research as well as continue to fund the research. We looked at the project 
and said that this is much more than a drug delivery opportunity. 
 
 But it must be noted that even though serendipity may have led to the 
recognition of this opportunity, Norwood Abbey still carefully evaluated it before 
finally committing itself.9  
6.2.1(f) Unexpected 
Problems and opportunities that were not expected may be recognised. Problems 
usually arise unexpectedly. There may be some expected problems; in those cases, 
decision-makers would normally have thought of something to deal with them. 
Unexpected problems lead to major disturbances and changes of strategy. Professor 
Chris Parish (Biotron) described the delays in his project due to unforeseen technical 
problems related to one of the widely used instruments: 
                                                 
9 The business opportunity of immunology for Norwood Abbey occurred in a serendipitous way as the 
company was in the business of drug delivery, not drug discovery (which is a very different business.) 
However, the recognition of the potential of GNRH in immunology was the result of the dedicated 
research of Professor Richard Boyd of Monash University. 
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We were using mass spectrometry. At that point of time, it was quite 
feasible to expect that mass spec would become in use in pathology 
companies within a certain amount of time. That has not happened for 
various reasons… So, we had technical problems. We have not been 
aware that we had much bigger problem than what we had thought of. It 
has turned out that one of the overseas companies had run into a similar 
problem with their protein based mass spec… But based on what we knew 
about mass spec at that time, I think our choice was fair enough. It is just 
that since then we had realised that mass spectrometers are not as reliable 
as the manufacturers claim. And others have found the same thing.  
 
 Similarly, Stephen Goodall talked about his experience of raising initial 
funding for CBio: 
The thing that knocked us around the most was that sales [of the 
prospectus] started about August 2001 and then September 11, 2001 
somebody crashed a plane and all the financial world closed. And this 
made a big hole in the ground and we took about a year to close that up. 
 
 Both problems and opportunities may be unexpected. Opportunities may occur 
due to some success that the company has achieved or it may be just pure luck or 
chance. When talking about chance, Professor Barrie Finnin (Acrux) said: 
What actually happened—and I think in all these stories there are things 
that are chance or just good luck. I had a friend who was in the investment 
community. At that time when we were going through this issue of how 
we were going to fund this… I actually went for a football with him. At 
the football, I was telling him the story where we were at and what he 
thought and what could be done. He said that he has got a very good 
friend and has just done exactly what I was talking about with another 
company called Starpharma, and so he proposed to set up a lunch with 
him. So I went and had lunch with this chap, who happened to be Ross 
Dobinson, who is now the director of Acrux. He was then at that stage 
working in a merchant bank but had previously worked with stockbrokers. 
So he knew all about the investment baking. Over the lunch I explained to 
him what the situation was and what we had. He then said that the best 
thing to do for us is to set up a start-up and raise this money through this 
initial round with high net worth individuals. 
 
Similarly, Dr Andrew Wilks (Cytopia) described the initial deal and subsequent 
takeover of Myometrix, which was quite fortuitous: 
They approached the Ludwig Institute for some inhibitors for one of our 
enzymes. [People at] Ludwig said, ‘Well, you better talk to Cytopia as 
they have the patents.’ They talked to us and realised that they couldn’t 
actually go anywhere without our patents. We realised that they had 
access to a big market, which is cardiovascular disease. So it seemed very 
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obvious that we could work together to develop that market. We spent a 
long time testing the patents and the proof of principle of the patents with 
our molecules and became satisfied that it was good. So we then decided 
to merge with the company. 
 
 Lotus Labs, on the other hand, had an unexpected offer from one of its clients, 
Actavis, for a buyout. However, this was only after they had successfully completed 
some projects for Actavis (as they did for their other clients). Mr Sudhir Pai 
explained: 
Actavis started as one of our clients. They visited our facility and they 
started giving us some trials. They realised that we are good. They were in 
an acquisition spree. They have acquired 31 companies in the last four 
years. They have huge requirement for bioequivalence studies...so they 
thought that it would be good to take over and do all their studies here. It 
would be kind of integration for them. It would save them a lot of money 
in their trial costs as well. 
 
 Strand Genomics also had its share of luck due to its hard earned success. 
Professor Vijay Chandru explained: 
By the end of the year we had about 20 per cent of market share for Asia-
Pacific. We used some pricing strategies. We set up benchmark against the 
competitor whose software was the leading software in the market and 
played some pricing game. That’s how we managed to get in. Two things 
happened as we started getting visibility in the market. We found a 
Japanese pharma consulting company in informatics area. They noticed us 
and approached us. They were interested in product that we were selling 
for microarrays and in technology that we were developing for ADME and 
toxicity… Medibic actually invested in Strand and took 10 per cent equity 
position and a board seat. In that process they valued Strand at about 75 
per cent premium to what series A valuation had been. 10 
6.2.1(g) Unfavourable Environment 
An unfavourable environment may be either due to the generic business environment 
or be specific to a company. This can also lead to the recognition of a problem. Dr 
Wayne Millen reasoned about the change in conditions or timing for an IPO for 
Epitan because of the Sydney Olympics: 
                                                 
10 It is, however, noted that this unexpected event had its genesis in a social network because one of 
their scientific advisory board members knew one of the business development people at Medibic’s US 
office. 
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Well, it was for August 2000, whatever date it was. In September, the 
Olympic Games were on. Everybody was just out of town. The financial 
people just went for the games. All the money was spent on Olympic 
Games. If you look into the companies listing of any nature between July 
and December, there were almost none. I then produced a supplementary 
prospectus, which said the same thing. And we listed on February. So 
there was six months delay. The stockbrokers didn’t get interested. As 
simple as that! 
 
Another company was forced to go for an IPO as the CEO failed to convince its 
biggest shareholder. He said: 
So it was really our main investor saying, ‘It’s time; you have grown 
enough, so get out.’ So that’s basically what triggered the event. We 
needed the cash, so we went to the market to get it, which is what happens 
to most Aussie biotechs. 
6.2.1(h) Summary – Recognition 
From the above discussion, one can conclude that recognition can occur in many 
different ways. A prior success or even prior failure can lead to the recognition of 
something new. Likewise, deliberation and formal analysis can lead to the recognition 
of a problem or opportunity. In fact, recognition can take place at any time in the 
decision process; there have been many examples of this in this research.11 
 Long and McMullan (cited in Gaglio, 2004) suggest that in order to realise the 
potential of an opportunity, a significant amount of preparation is required. The 
opportunity is elaborated and evaluated before a decision is made whether to proceed. 
During this ‘strategic elaboration stage’, the opportunity may be honed and modified 
to better fit the market and to maximise profit potential. Not only an opportunity but 
also any potential issue or problem is elaborated. Some decisions are not evaluated 
much and may not even require detailed evaluation. They may primarily involve 
intuition or guesswork (‘not much thinking’) for decision-making. Such cases will be 
discussed in later chapters. The aim is to show a general model of the decision 
                                                 
11 These suggested ways are different from where they actually get the ideas. Hartman et al. (1994) 
identify many sources of ideas: observing customers, observing products, observing competitors, 
imagination, reading trade journals, reading government documents or reflecting on mistakes et cetera.  
The list of factors leading to recognition that is suggested here is more broad-based and is 
related to why and how one gets an idea rather than by what methods one gets an idea (of a problem or 
an opportunity). 
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process. How often deliberation and formal analysis are used in entrepreneurial 
decision-making is left for discussion in later chapters. 
6.2.2 Deliberation and Formal Analysis 
Mintzberg et al. (1976) write that ‘design’ (associated with evaluating and refining a 
problem or an opportunity) is the most important element of the decision process yet 
is the least understood. Many researchers have looked into the various styles of 
planning (discussed in Chapter 3) to understand how people evaluate their problems 
or potential opportunities. As discussed in Chapter 3, there is usually some level of 
logic or rationality involved in any particular decision, although the concept of 
rationality is closer to ‘bounded’ rationality. This logic or rationality associated with a 
particular decision is basically derived from the decision-maker’s interpretation of the 
problem or opportunity and his or her approach to that situation. Decision-makers 
may follow a logical and rational process within the framework of their knowledge 
and their understanding of the problem or opportunity (i.e., their ‘personalised’ 
rationality).12 Such a process may involve deliberation and formal analysis. 
6.2.2(a) Deliberation 
As stated in Chapter 3, deliberation is a method where decision-makers rely on their 
own knowledge13 and/or that of advisers or experts. Based on this definition, 
deliberation will be used almost throughout the decision process. However, the 
quality of such deliberation varies widely. It is also the quality of deliberation that is 
important and that contributes to the result of any decision. However, the focus in this 
chapter will be on the various types of deliberation. (Which type has what sort of 
outcome will be the subject of the following chapters.) Some types of deliberations 
identified are: active and conscious thinking; careful thinking; creative thinking; 
discussions; and planning. 
o Active and conscious thinking by decision-makers about what decisions need 
to be made, what the important dimensions of a particular decision are and 
                                                 
12 ‘Personalised’ in this case doesn’t mean that it is of one person; it can be the shared thinking of a 
group of decision-makers. 
13 It is noted that the experience can be of various types: directly relevant to the decision, indirectly 
relevant to the decision or generic in nature et cetera.  
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what trouble spots there are (if any) is very important generally and even more 
so at critical times. For example, Dr Igor Gonda said that due to the not-so-
favourable market in 2003, Acrux decided to postpone its IPO: 
We then came to conclusion that we would not be able to raise the amount 
of money we wanted and we wouldn’t be able to raise at the price we 
wanted. It was impossible. We also knew that there were valuable events 
coming to the company and in order to convince the market there will be 
good justification then to raise the money that we wanted. So we said, 
‘Look, we are not starving. We have cash in the bank and we have cash 
from QIC.’ So there was no reason to do a bad IPO and raise less money 
than what we need and raise it at a price that we didn’t like. 
 
Awareness based on the decision-makers’ and others’ knowledge of an 
area is vital. For example, Dr Gautham Nadig (Metahelix) described their 
understanding of GMO crops as they started their business when there was a 
public outcry against GMO crops worldwide (especially in India): 
Yes, there was a huge cry against genetically modified foods because 
people were not aware of what it actually was. They thought that it was a 
monster waiting to wipe out plant species. Obviously as scientist you 
know what the reality is because you work with them. And you know 
what are the issues related to safety. Science doesn’t beat common sense. 
Though the government had not yet deregulated transgenics, we know it 
would come. There was no other option. It is just a matter of time. When 
we started the company, there was still no crop out there in the market. 
The trials were underway. Fairly soon, by the end of 2001, it got released. 
 
 In the above examples, the decision-makers had a very clear idea of 
what they were doing and why they were doing it. This understanding was not 
based on any extensive analysis, planning or discussions with experts. Their 
decisions were based on their own understanding derived from active and 
conscious thinking. Of course, their assumption might still have been wrong 
and affected the decision. 
o Careful thinking by decision-makers about key aspects of a decision is another 
form of deliberation. Dr Brett Charlton, when talking about Pharmaxis 
acquiring rights to technology leading to an asthma diagnostic, said: 
It is the earliest to market. So it is quicker to market and revenues are 
useful. But probably revenue is not the primary driver. The technology is 
related to the therapeutic, which is following behind. You are gaining 
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information that is useful. So for the development of diagnostic, you are 
establishing a network, which is going to be the same network...which is 
going to be the same network you need for development of a therapeutic. 
You are going through a process, which is the same process, as you have 
to go through for a therapeutic. And at the end of the day you will have 
something that will generate revenues. It is not just to generate revenues; 
we looked at all other value gained at various levels. 
 
o Creative thinking by decision-makers can also lead to an interesting 
opportunity or can avoid problems. In the following example, Dr Gautham 
Nadig explained the reason Metahelix started a seed business, which was very 
different from their initial idea of conducting contract research (in agri-
biotechnology) and developing intellectual property to be licensed to seed 
companies: 
Nobody suggested [starting a seed company]. It was just our 
understanding of what is critical to biotechnology, especially agri-
biotechnology. If you didn’t have a seed business, you will be at the mercy 
of seed companies and it would be very difficult to sell your technology. 
So we said that at least for the time our biotech products come to market, 
which is about five to six years, and if we had a seed company that had a 
small market share of key crops, it would be an ideal to introduce our 
biotech products into them and that can grow our seed business 
substantially. On the other hand, since we had a seed company and we are 
giving the seed company a lot of traits, competitors will also be interested 
in these traits because they would see in it a definitive competitive 
advantage and a bunch of these companies will also come and partner with 
us for the technology. That was the hypothesis, which is now really 
happening. 
 
o Discussions can have many positive effects if they lead to an increase in the 
required information that is key not only to discovering ideas but also to 
exploiting them (Fiet et al., 2005; Kaish & Gilad, 1991; Shane, 2000). The 
discussion can be among decision-makers themselves in a brainstorming 
session. For example, Dr Villoo Patell explained that her decision to spin off 
companies came after Avesthagen’s management team discussed it endlessly 
internally. The idea of creating a seed business by Metahelix was also the 
result of internal discussions. Jay Hetzel, while talking about the decision by 
Genetic Solutions to make a product called SureTRAK, said: 
In a small company you share ideas and you interchange them. I know that 
the methods of making it happen was basically something I designed, but 
who suggested this idea of DNA based meat traceability…I think it was 
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just something that we were throwing the ideas around for a while, but I 
guess as managing director at that time, I decided that this will be what we 
develop. 
 
Discussions with people who are actually going to implement the decision can 
be very fruitful. Dr Michelle Miller, discussing the capital raising of 
December 2004 for Biotron, said: 
Michael and I spent quite a lot of time [at the] end of last year going to the 
brokers talking to them…especially the brokers that we know and trust, 
not many of them…but couple of opinions that we do value, who have 
known us for a while and who are sensible. Really, their advice to us was 
to do a shareholder plan. 
 
Discussions with your potential clients can also be quite useful. Mr Mohan of 
Helix Genomics explained how discussions early on with their potential 
clients helped improve their product: 
We have picked up couple of universities in India and UK and also some 
of the friendly companies. It is always good to go to a friendly company... 
They will at least be interested as we have approached them. They will at 
least try the product and sincerely give back their comment. This we have 
done both for industry as well as academia. All the algorithms that we 
have written, all the modules that we have developed…everything was 
tested. 
 
o Planning as part of deliberation is not same as the concept of formal planning 
in traditional management literature. Here it is more related to thinking for the 
future (on what, why and how you do or shall do) and usually involves 
internal people. This can be a mental schema or something simple and tangible 
like general budgeting (not the type of long-range budgeting done by 
government bodies or large companies). 
Dr Gerard Davis (Genetic Solutions) explained why they established their US 
office in Denver: 
The reason we were in Denver in Colorado is that…if you plot where the 
major feedlots are in the United States, where cattle are fed…and you then 
plot where the major breed societies are, so all the breeding 
organisations…then Denver is right in the middle of them…. There would 
be a dozen of them within a day’s drive, the breeding organisations. Most 
of them are in Denver. So [Denver is] quite central for the breeding sector. 
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In terms of feeding companies…again within a day’s drive there is a large 
proportion of them… 
 
Dr Wolf Hanisch (CBio) described the way they make decisions about clinical 
trials: 
It is as simple as putting a project together. Everything that needs to be 
done… Here is a clinical trial, we need material for that, and we just work 
backwards. 
 
When Dr Alan Robertson talks about the thinking behind the IPO of 
Pharmaxis, it is very easy to see their forward thinking: 
We listed the company publicly in November 2003 and we raised $25 
million. The company had grown to a certain level. We still had about $8 
million in the bank then, so we didn’t actually need the money as such. 
From the financial projections, there was still 18 or 24 months of cash 
available, but you can’t go seeking money when you have got no money 
in the drawer. People will just not invest and you will be on your knees 
and you then pick it up at a much cheaper price. The company had got to a 
certain level and we needed to go to the next level. We need a substantial 
amount of funding. There was a lot of clinical work that needed to be 
done. We listed at a valuation of $50 million after the money was in. 
 
Planning also helps make better informed and faster decisions whenever there 
is a crisis. For example, CBio was in a difficult position when BresaGen went 
into voluntary administration soon after signing a contract with CBio to 
manufacture their lead compound (which was to be used for clinical trials). 
Earlier planning helped them to make a fast decision to acquire BresaGen. Dr 
Wolf Hanisch said: 
We had budgeted over the next two years to spend $6 million on a similar 
kind of facility as we were in phase II and looking forward for phase III. 
So it was purely an insurance policy. So we then moved our money 
forward in the budget. We acquired the control of BresaGen. 
 
In many cases, it is difficult to distinguish between planning and other 
deliberation methods simply on the basis of retrospective interviews. Greater 
refinement in research methodology may lead to clearer distinctions among 
various types of deliberation.  
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6.2.2(b) Formal Analysis 
An empirical study by Smith et al. (1988) has revealed that the comprehensiveness of 
decisions (as defined in Chapter 2) is positively related to performance among 
entrepreneurs and managers. For the purposes of this research, formal analysis is 
considered to encompass a formal business plan, a formal approach to planning and 
the use of professional external consultants.  
Business Plans and Formal Planning: The majority of the new ventures in the sample 
had a formal business plan. Putting together an information memorandum to obtain 
financing or writing a prospectus for the purpose of an IPO are standard procedures.  
 Formal planning for the purpose of this research was the use of formal 
methods to evaluate or discern an opportunity or a problem. For example, Mr Bernie 
Romanin explained how Norwood Abbey goes about managing regulatory issues in a 
very systematic and structured way: 
We were an Australian company; we were required to have a US based 
representative. So we contracted with somebody who had a lot of 
regulatory and clinical experience…just to validate the path we were 
going down. And then we were preparing our submission because FDA 
submission… Our philosophy was to try and answer as many questions as 
you could before you go in because it is a lot quicker than having to 
answer pages and pages of questions after you have submitted. So second 
thing we did was that we identified with FDA on submission. So whilst 
we were preparing our submission, we employed them for a number of 
months with the sole objective of helping us identify, in their words, ‘what 
the potholes were’ and ‘where the dark alleys were.’ So we would then be 
able to ensure that we had data whatever we needed for submission. So 
that when FDA looked at it…with FDA they have a checklist and they just 
go along…look at something and tick…. Oops! Not there—a question… 
And as it turned out, we got a few questions from FDA, but they were all 
relatively easy. What we also did was that we went to FDA before we did 
trials, so that we had FDA review our protocol. They commented on the 
protocol…made some suggestions. We incorporated those suggestions so 
that when we went in we could show that ‘You asked us to do this and we 
did what you asked us to do.’ So there was a lot of consultation. 
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 BioDiem conducted detailed and comprehensive planning before they licensed 
in the potential drug candidates.14 Professor Robert Borland explained: 
A number of issues [were looked into]. Is there a gap in the market? Are 
there lots of competing products in the marketplace? How good are they? 
Second one is the nature of the product—how good the nature of research 
strikes you. Thirdly, wherever possible that the products have been into 
humans…proof of concept, if you may say. Those would be the key 
issues. The next one would then be: how strong is the patent protection? 
How powerful is it? The nature of the deal that you can strike… Can the 
company acquire the product rather than just the licence of the product? 
Preferably it has to be that it belongs to you. Primarily it would also be the 
developers of the product—the scientist, their standing in the international 
community. We looked into a lot of products across a range of institutions. 
It wasn’t that these were the first products. You do a lot of studies. We use 
a lot of expertise over here or overseas to take their opinion. I think those 
were the sort of key issues. 
 
Professional consultants holding complementary knowledge can be very useful in 
providing specific knowledge to help on certain issues (Helms & Renfrow, 1994; 
Ottesen, 2005). In fact, they can also be used to check any unwarranted optimism and 
bring in a reality perspective (Courtney & Lovallo, 2004). For example, several case 
study companies (such as Acrux, Epitan and Evogenix etc.) used executive search 
firms to suggest suitable candidates to hire. Similarly, using patent attorneys is very 
common in the biotechnology arena. New ventures (such as Iliad Chemicals and 
Norwood Abbey etc.) hired consultants for market analysis. It is also not uncommon 
for new ventures in biotechnology (such as Acrux, BioDiem and Peplin etc.) to hire 
consultants to facilitate deal making. Other instances when new biotechnology 
ventures hire professional consultants are while raising funds and conducting a 
valuation of the company. 
 But there can be other reasons to hire professional consultants. Dr Keats 
Nelms (Phenomix) said: 
And actually we hired McKinsey to come and do our market analysis. It’s 
a very expensive venture but it is a kind of stamp of approval at the kind 
of depth venture capital look at before they put in a significant amount of 
money. 
 
                                                 
14 Of course, there have been many instances of the use of deliberation to come to a conclusion on 
many sub-decisions that were part of this comprehensive planning. 
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Rightly, then, Yaniv and Milyavsky (2006:1) observed: 
The rationale for soliciting advice is straightforward. Real life decisions 
are often not self contained. The range of possible options for choice and 
their descriptions are often not fully specified.  
 
Decision-makers solicit advice to gain information, help them frame their decisions, 
refine their preferences and create options beyond those available to them at the 
moment. At times, people may seek advice for other reasons, such as self-affirmation 
or for sharing responsibility due to concerns about accountability to others (Kennedy, 
Kleinmuntz & Peecher, 1997). 
6.2.2(c) Summary – Deliberation and Formal Analysis 
There is some level of rationality when a decision is made. This rationality may be the 
outcome of any of the more or less formal methods discussed above. The informal 
ways discussed in deliberation are similar to the heuristic approach described by 
Miller et al. (1960:164-166)15: 
When subjects are put under pressure to find a concept in the smallest 
number of questions, they may try to keep track of the entire set of 
hypotheses through which they are really searching. The important thing 
to note, however, is that there are many different heuristic plans a subject 
may use. All involve the risk of failure, but some are more risky than 
others… Each person has his own style, his own tricks, his own heuristic 
Plan for discovering the concept. Some people tackle the problem 
                                                 
15 Many researchers (Busenitz, 1999; Busenitz & Lau, 1996; Manimala, 1992; Nutt, 1977; Schwenk, 
1984) have studied heuristics. Almost all of them consider that heuristics are very commonly used in 
decision-making, especially by entrepreneurs. Schwenk (1984) has shown the application of heuristics 
in various stages of the decision-making process. This is not unexpected. Gavetti et al. (2005) explain 
it: 
 The managers we consider discover new positions neither by reasoning from first principles of 
economics nor by undertaking unguided local search. Rather, when faced with a new and complex 
setting, managers identify the features of the setting that seem most pertinent, think back through 
their experiences in other settings with similar features, and recall the broad policies that worked 
well in those settings. These broad policies then form the starting point for a local search process.  
 Because heuristics represents a quite informal way (Nutt, 1977) of thinking and planning, 
many researchers, such as Busenitz (1999), call it ‘non-rational decision-making.’ However, while I 
agree on the informality associated with heuristics, I tend to disagree that it is non-rational. Of course, 
it is non-rational according to the traditional definition of rationality. However, given how I have dealt 
with the concept of rationality in this research, heuristics may be quite logical and rational. 
Nonetheless, there are subtle differences between applying heuristics, applying biases or preconceived 
notions that don’t have any basis and simply using gut feeling. The primary difference between the first 
two is based upon relevant experience. 
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verbally, symbolically; others want to manipulate the objects, to group 
them perceptually this way and that; a few can alternate between the 
abstract and the perceptual strategies. Most people devise rather elaborate 
mnemonic Plans for remembering which objects are in which class, 
positive or negative. 
 
 Thus, it can be seen that deliberation and formal analysis both aim to develop 
a better understanding of the relevant issue. But deliberation and formal analysis also 
help in generating options for a decision. These options can be common approaches 
that are normally used, or a common approach can be modified for the specific 
situation, or a completely new approach can be identified.  
6.2.3 Generating Options 
 Simon’s satisficing theory suggests that individuals search for a solution to a 
problem and, rather than consider all the alternatives in a total solution set, simply 
accept the first satisfactory alternative (Fiet et al., 2005). Such behaviour may not 
necessarily be optimal or even acceptable (Fiet et al., 2005) in the case of important 
and high stakes decisions. In fact, Russo and Schoemaker (2002:60) emphatically 
state that without good alternatives to choose from, it is impossible to make a good 
decision. In such cases, decision-makers would rely on a variety of information 
gathering activities depending on their resources. Alexander (1979) suggests the 
following two not necessarily mutually exclusive views on the generation of 
alternatives: 
The development of alternatives as a process of search and discovery: the 
solution to the problem is there. This is termed here the common 
approach. 
 
The development of alternatives as a process of design or creation to a 
significant extent—i.e., solutions do not pre-exist but have to be generated by 
conceiving, designing, or creating new ideas, or processes. This approach is 
termed contriving. This would combine high levels of both creativity and search, 
where the latter might range from formal systematic search, through informal 
search, down to passive search based mainly on participants’ memories and 
experience. 
 By having more than one choice at a time, decision-makers are able to make a 
better-informed decision. It also lessens the time taken if choices are assessed 
simultaneously rather than sequentially. Having multiple options may also give one 
more confidence and leverage to negotiate better deals. Dr Villoo Morawala Patell 
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spoke about how Avesthagen talks to different clients at any given point in time so as 
to spread the risks: 
First, it was Suven, Dr Reddy’s, Glenmark, and Ranbaxy. While we were 
doing cell line projects with these four companies, we also went and 
tapped other companies like Nicholas, Cipla and others. 
 
 Explaining the breadth of business development activities of Phenomix, Dr 
Keats Nelms said: 
Well, not just US. We have gone to Europe to talk to companies. We 
talked to…there are quite a few fairly large pharma companies based in 
France and Spain and Italy. They were not the ones that you usually hear 
about but they have got a lot of money because they sell these generic 
drugs or ‘me too’ drugs or they have got one drug that they specialise in. 
They may not be marketed in US, but they make a lot of money, so they 
have got a lot of money for research. So we talked to quite a few in 
France. We talked to one in Spain. Oh! Where else? England. Everything 
is multinational now. Most of the major ones are based in US, so that’s 
fine…we focus there. 
6.2.3(a) Common Approach 
The term ‘common approach’ is used for that approach or choice that is widely used 
in a given type of situation. For example, a new venture going for listing early in the 
stage to raise capital is very common in Australia but is not common (and is in fact 
rare) in India.16 ‘Common approach’ has a broad meaning. It means the usual way a 
decision is implemented (i.e., the method taken). It also means common 
options/choices/solutions that would lead to a decision. Despite the fact that each of 
us uses common approaches widely, this style of generating options has attracted the 
interest of few researchers.  
 Common choices or solutions are readily available answers to a question. For 
example, when it comes to partnering or selling their products, most of the new 
biotechnology companies decide to set up a base in the USA because more than 60 
per cent of the world’s biotechnology market is there. Many firms in this study 
(BioDiem, Genetic Solutions, Norwood Abbey, Proteome Systems and VRI 
Biomedical etc.) have taken this approach. Even though Genera Biosystems had no 
                                                 
16 However, it may have to do with different business models that companies follow. In India, most 
biotech companies are either bioinformatics companies or CROs/clinical trial companies whereas most 
companies in Australia are either drug discovery or technology development companies. 
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presence in the USA (at least when the fieldwork interviews were conducted), the 
CEO, Dr Karl Poetter, said: 
No matter what market you are dealing with, 65 per cent of the market is 
going to be Europe or US... Doesn’t matter what you are talking about. 
People who put the money down, who buy your product…65 per cent of 
them are going to be European or American. So if you guide your business 
plan for Japan, China, Thailand, Singapore and India…you are dealing 
with just 35 per cent of the world market, even though they have lot of 
people. 
 
 Even the choices of preferred partners in a given area may be the same for 
companies in a given area. This may be because of the specific nature of a product; it 
is of interest to only a few companies and so there may be limited and common 
options for partnering in that specific area. For example, Dr Marc Wilkins commented 
on the choice of potential partners for an instrument that Proteome Systems 
developed: 
But what we have been doing were some interactions for a long time with 
different scientific instrumentation companies. There are relatively few in 
this area that you can have discussions with. It is pretty simple. You can 
talk with BioRad. You can talk with Brooker. You can talk with 
Amersham. You can talk with Shimadzu Biotech. There are only about 
five or six companies. It was a small space. 
 
 Similarly, Mr Bernie Romanin, while talking about potential partners for one 
of Norwood Abbey’s products, an old molecule in new drug delivery system, said: 
It is a pretty simple one. The number of companies who had the 
compound or the drug was limited. There was only about four to five. 
 
Similar to common choices is a common method, which is a general method by which 
a decision is implemented. For example, there is a very well established way one goes 
about marketing in a biotechnology company. Dr Igor Gonda (Acrux) described the 
process very succinctly: 
Well, business development is a multi-strat activity in any good company. 
Firstly, scientists who go out in the conference create interest in the 
technology and the product early on. So a lot of early development 
contacts come from scientific presentations and this kind of develops 
appetite globally for your technology and products. It also builds your 
reputation. This is very important. Then you have business development 
people who usually get introduction by the scientists as well as 
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introduction through their own knowledge and their own contacts. They 
will approach business development departments or they will be 
introduced to the business development departments. They will then go 
and introduce them to technology and products and say, ‘We will like to 
discuss with you if you are interested in licensing the technology for 
specific products or using the technology for a range of products in the 
company.’ And then on top of it if you don’t have the resources—and in 
the early days we didn’t have resources in the company—we will also hire 
consultants, particularly for United States. Those consultants will be 
identifying opportunities and in some cases they will actually go and 
travel to seek potential partners. Then you go to business development 
conferences and again you do the same thing. And when a potential 
partner will express an interest, you will then go and talk about what you 
really want through the collaboration and find out what is that they want 
out of the collaboration. Clearly it is very important that you have got 
multiple parties interested in the same product and same technology so 
that there is some sort of competitive tension. That is a much better 
position than having a single potential licensee for your product. You then 
negotiate on the term sheets. And when you are done with term sheet, you 
go on to negotiate for full commercial agreement. It is a pretty 
straightforward path. 
 
 In most other companies, the generic approach to business development is 
similar to the one Dr Igor Gonda outlined. What may differ is how it is actually put 
into practice and under what conditions. One can find some general pattern in many 
other areas of decision-making (such as approaching VC funds).  
 There may be a ‘single’ common approach to some issues but in other areas 
there may be multiple options available. A decision-maker may go ahead with a 
common approach or may choose to modify it.  
6.2.3(b) Contrive 
A common approach may lead to a contrived solution. For example, for an IPO 
decision, hiring underwriters is a standard approach. But how one hires an underwriter 
can be specific to a company. Some firms may specifically use the services of their 
networks, such as Peplin. Mr Michael Mullins said: 
Of the 40-odd investors that we had brought in our private equity round, 
probably 16 to 20 of them were from Morgan. So they wanted to make 
their dollar. So it was a matter of loyalty back to the people who had given 
us private equity. We did it together through Morgan’s. 
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The above is an example of a single common approach leading to a single contrived 
solution. But there can be multiple contrived solutions as well. For example, 
quotations may be sought from several underwriters. Every single negotiation process 
will be unique, leading to multiple contrived choices, of which one has to be chosen.  
The above examples are of cases where common approaches have led to contrived 
options. But there may be instances where decision-makers directly develop contrived 
options (choices that are not common). For example, Dr Villoo Morawala Patell 
discussed how Avesthagen put in place the structure of a joint venture with Cipla (a 
leading Pharma company in India): 
So it is going into a joint venture. The first two products are going to be 
ready in 2006. So we formed a joint venture with Cipla. It is called 
‘Avestha Biotherapeutics’, which is a 50.1 and 49.9 per cent division. It 
has to be announced. We both are putting equal amount of money and that 
is solely for manufacturing. We have 50.1 per cent. So the structure is like 
this. Cipla funds Avesthagen. It funds R&D up to cell line expressions. 
After that, that line is licensed to Avestha Biotherapeutics for some 
nominal success fees. Then Avestha Biotherapeutics is the owner. Then 
the manufacturing goes on. The product is sold to Cipla. So Avestha 
Biotherapeutics makes a neat profit. Cipla markets it and pays 12.5 per 
cent royalty to Avesthagen Headquarters for their know-how and also our 
management. 
 
 Similarly, Dr Wayne Millen (Epitan) discussed his decision to transform his 
small biotechnology company to a mini pharmaceutical company specialising in 
dermatology: 
Biotechnology companies spend money. They consume investors’ money 
on the hope that they will produce a result that will be beneficial to the 
original investors. Investors in Australia and everywhere deep down want 
to see money coming in and not going out. And with that as background, 
you have to ask the question: where do we have to go with Melanotan? 
Well, we wanted to be a product to get money in. It is most likely that we 
will end up having an alliance in Europe or in America with a major 
company. Even if we do it ourselves, how can we market this drug if it is 
as big as I am suggesting? I am hoping… We don’t have enough people 
selling on this road to dermatologists. We can’t do it. That means we will 
license in some ways… or in alliance with other companies overseas. We 
want to keep the Australian and New Zealand market purely for ourselves 
because we think we can handle it. But what does that mean? It means that 
we need to have a structure. We have to have marketing people and sales 
people who are actively selling to pharmacy and dermatologists and so… 
And what does that mean? What business are we in? We are in the 
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business of dermatology. We are not just in R&D or clinical trials or a 
simple biotechnology company. We are a little embryonic pharmaceutical 
company majoring in dermatology and this is a niche area that we have 
identified. We are the only company listed in ASX which focuses entirely 
on dermatology. So what we are saying? We are saying, ‘Let’s get ready 
for the launch of Melanotan by having this division called Epipharm. 
Expand.’ We are not going to wait for Melanotan; we are going to get 
ready for Melanotan. And we have now got distributors around Australia 
selling these other drugs and we are getting more… And we are getting a 
cash flow in. So we are doing several other things. We are showing our 
investors that we can generate cash. We are showing them that we are a 
dermatology company and we are showing them that we are already ready 
for Melanotan. When Melanotan gets registered on Friday night, we will 
be ready on Monday morning to sell it. And not wait. Distributors, 
salesman, representatives… So this is what we are doing. We are planning 
ahead. One day we would be a pharmaceutical company in the main with 
other projects. 
6.2.4 Decision End Point 
Alexander (1979) argues that decision-makers narrow down the options (if many) and 
evaluate them by applying criteria of differing degrees of formalisation.17 Nutt 
(1998a, 2000, 2002) explored how decision-makers evaluate alternatives to make 
strategic choices. He proposed four types of evaluation: analytical, subjective, 
judgement and bargaining. ‘Choice’ is essentially similar to the decision end point in 
this research. It generally marks the final phase of the decision process. It is here a 
go/no-go choice is made. (This choice is different from choice of options). This final 
go/no-go choice is dependent on many variables. As discussed below, for many 
strategic type decisions a formal authorisation will be required. The way this has been 
shown in the framework also typifies the decision (to some extent), as has been done 
by Nutt (1998a, 2000, 2002). Thus, one can naturally understand some of the 
characteristics of the decision. Nutt (1998a, 2000, 2002) used only these four 
categories to characterise decisions and was not interested in the decision process per 
se. For the present study, the classification of decision end points is essentially part of 
                                                 
17 Alexander (1979) also discusses ‘blending’, when more extreme options are subtly changed to 
narrow the range of alternatives into the domain of the acceptable. In some cases, alternatives are 
eliminated almost intuitively, applying informal selection criteria. As a result of these factors, he says, 
we do not observe a process of unconstrained alternatives development generating a broad range of 
options for formal evaluation.  
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the decision process. For example, whether a decision is analytical or not will be 
reflected in the decision process by the use of deliberation and formal analysis. 
However, identifying types of decision end points based on their characteristics may 
prove to be important, as some kind of decisions will be more positively related to the 
performance while other may not (Nutt, 1998a, 2000, 2002).  
6.2.4(a) Natural Choice and Trust Decisions 
When one option is the preferred option by all or most of the decision-makers and 
each one of them has given their consent for it, it becomes a natural choice. When one 
option is the only feasible or suitable option in a given situation, it also becomes a 
natural choice. For example, Mr Michael Mullins spoke about the decision for Peplin 
to go to the market soon after the first private equity funding: 
Probably there was private equity money around and we could have got it 
but probably at not a huge increase in value than what we bought in at… 
There was hardly anybody with any bandwidth in the VC area that could 
talk to us. Then there was an IPO market that loved biotech. So it wasn’t 
really a difficult decision. 
 
Similarly, Dr Alan Robertson talked about Pharmaxis’s decisions to license-in two 
projects and to give them preference vis-à-vis the ongoing project: 
We have got a basket of things. We are all working together on common 
purpose, which is to make the company successful and not to push an 
individual project…And the investor here, when we raised $9.35 million, 
indicated that they would like most of their money spent on developing 
Aridol and Bronchitol. So there is no point in time when you say, ‘We will 
now make this No.1 focus.’ We were running respiratory diseases and 
autoimmune disease in parallel fashion. But the nature of research itself is 
ahead of the other… and the more close you are to the market, the more 
valuable you are. Obviously, then, that is the place where you put most of 
your financials and capital resource. 
 
Trust decisions are those that become the natural choice because of high-level faith 
among the decision-makers (and the facilitator, if any). Dr Gautham Nadig (of 
Metahelix) said that their decision to take seed money from Mr Raghavan was purely 
based on trust: 
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The credibility of Raghavan, Infosys and Marti Subramaniam, we didn’t 
have to go anywhere else. It was instant.18 
6.2.4(b) Opportunistic Decisions and Unexpected Good Luck 
There may be occasions when one comes across a really good opportunity that is 
usually not expected and decides in favour of it. For example, Dr Andrew Wilks said 
that Chemicon (a reagent company) approached Cytopia with a proposal to sell 
reagents that were under Cytopia’s patents for JAK kinases. This was not an area of 
direct interest for Cytopia, so they took this opportunity to make it a bigger deal for 
them and allowed Chemicon to do even the legal policing. Similarly, a CEO explains 
how they got the contract to make a product called X from Company A, their partner 
on another product called Y: 
We only got going on the Y programme and they came back and said that 
we needed an earlier product… So they said that there is another product 
that you can build, that you can finish more quickly. And the X was the 
product that we felt the need for… We ended up doing the deal for X. 
 
Opportunistic decisions may not always work out in long run and may be even 
harmful to the company. For example, the deal of Proteome Systems with Charles 
River Laboratories to set up a joint venture CRO in the USA had some benefits for 
Proteome Systems, but in the long run it did not work well. The opportunity that 
seemed large initially did not turn out to be that large. Later, when Charles River 
broke the joint venture, it had a very negative impact on the listing of Proteome 
Systems.  
Quite similar to opportunistic decisions is unexpected good luck. The difference 
between the two is that an opportunistic decision is unexpected, not part of the 
original plan and expectations, whereas unexpected good luck is where something 
was expected but one doesn’t expect its fulfilment so easily. For example, Dr 
Gautham Nadig said that Metahelix was quite lucky in its first round of funding, 
usually the toughest thing for a biotechnology start-up: 
The next thing was to seek funding. We went to an agency for funding and 
they almost agreed to fund us. We didn’t take that up for some reasons and 
                                                 
18 Mr Raghavan was one of the founders of Infosys, one of the biggest IT companies in India. Professor 
Marti Subramaniam is in Stern Business School and on the board of directors of Infosys. Dr Suri 
Venkatachalan, one of the founders of Metahelix, also knows him through a family connection.  
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then eventually we were advised to meet N.S. Raghavan. We met him and 
we got the money the easiest way. I don’t think anybody will ever get 
money like that. We never signed an agreement until after six months of 
drawing money. It was based on trust and relationship. Typically VCs do a 
whole bunch of arguments before they give you money. We did after a 
few months. 
6.2.4(c) Easy Decisions 
Easy decisions are those decisions for which not too much is at stake. An easy 
decision will also not involve (major) extra expenditures. An opportunistic decision 
can also be an easy decision. An example is the deal of Cytopia with Chemicon 
discussed earlier. The deal of Proteome Systems with Shimadzu for Xcise, also 
discussed earlier, is best labelled as opportunistic as there are costs associated for both 
parties. Another example of an easy decision could be Evogenix’s deal with 
BresaGen, in relation to which Dr Greg Coia said: 
This other technology that we had we could come up with a protein that 
would be used to find a binder. The only problem was that the amount that 
we could make was very low. So what we required was somebody with a 
technology that would be able to make these things at a very high level. 
BresaGen at that time could produce proteins. That’s why we approached 
them. That was not something we were working heavily on. It was just an 
experimental basis to see if this company could actually make at high 
levels. If they could, then we would develop that technology a little bit 
further. But we were going down this protein improvement path more than 
this high-level expression. 
6.2.4(d) Need Based Decisions 
Need based decisions are basically adaptive decisions to overcome a problem. For 
example, CBio was in a peculiar situation when BresaGen went into voluntary 
administration soon after signing a contract with them to manufacture protein that 
CBio had to take to clinical trials. Dr Wolf Hanisch explained: 
Couple of days after we signed the contract, they went into voluntary 
administration. Their board recognised that beyond six months they could 
not meet their obligations, so they went into administration there and then. 
So, from our perspective, we couldn’t afford to let them go under because 
then that would cost us another year. We had budgeted over the next two 
years to spend $6 million on a similar kind of facility as we were in phase 
II and looking forward for phase III. So it was purely an insurance policy. 
So we then moved our money forward in the budget. 
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 The above decision was important because otherwise it would have meant 
looking for another partner or building the facility, and both those outcomes would 
have delayed the clinical trials for which all the preparations were already made. 
Similarly, Mr C. Devender Reddy of Genotex International had a shortage of funds 
when his idea to sell extracts of Aloe vera did not take off and his other products 
(reagents) were not performing well. He then came up with an idea: 
I wanted to sell [Aloe vera] as raw material, but that raw material is not 
selling in India as no-one is using aloe vera. People say so many things but 
no-one is using, so I thought to make some products (like shaving cream, 
shampoo, face wash, cream etc.) by using that gel and started to market. I 
do not have any regrets. 
6.2.4(e) Negotiation and Compromise 
Negotiation and compromise almost always seem to go hand in hand. Whenever there 
is a difference in expectation about a decision between two individuals or parties, it is 
quite obvious that each will try to negotiate to get the best deal. Each party then has to 
find an amicable solution, which will partially fulfil the needs of both parties. This 
concept is close to the idea of bargaining, as used by Nutt (1998a, 2000, 2002). The 
compromise solution will generally be a win-win situation for both parties, but that 
doesn’t mean that the agreement reached will always be in the middle ground; one 
party may get a better deal. This may happen more often than expected.  
 Dr Keith Williams (Proteome Systems) had to lower his expectations about his 
deal with Shimadzu: 
We offered Shimadzu this [the complete platform]. We said that we can 
build proteomics effectively at that stage, although it was very poorly 
conceived at that stage. And it is going to cost that much. And they said, 
‘Nah, nah, nah…it’s too expensive.’ So we said, ‘Fine.’ We ended up with 
ChiP, which was very innovative programme. It was a three-year 
programme. So we cut a deal on ChiP initially.  
 
In the above example, there were negotiations and Dr Keith Williams had to 
compromise on his expectations (but maybe not too much) for the agreement to make 
ChiP. Dr Keats Nelms talked about the difficult negotiation process with VCs and the 
compromises that had to be made: 
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They start trying to devalue what you are doing, so that they get more of 
your company for less of money. So that negotiation process can get very 
difficult. All these things were very difficult. So they take compromises 
and a lot of work. I think that entire process is very difficult… And there 
is difference between investors. One investor thinks that he deserves more 
(share of the) company than the other and one wants a board seat that 
didn’t get a board seat. So it’s very personality and ego driven at that 
point. And, again at the end of the day, everyone believes that the 
company is worthwhile doing, they keep that in focus and ultimately get to 
resolution. 
6.2.4(f) Persuasion 
When there is no natural consensus, reaching a decision end point may require 
persuasion. The difference between persuasion and negotiation and compromise is 
that in the former usually there is nothing that is compromised. The individuals are 
influenced by dialogue to approve an option or approach which they were not in 
favour of before.19 For example, it was through persuasion that Ocimum Biosolutions 
(a new venture) got contract work from Dow Agro, outbidding a formidable rival, 
Accenture. Dr Anuradha Acharya said: 
We were bidding against Accenture. Accenture said that they will send 
two people for six months to do the initial study of the process and then 
they will do. We gave them a better price and timeline compared to what 
Accenture was giving them. They took a chance with us. 
6.2.4(g) Ad hoc Decisions 
A decision taken without working through the essential modalities and without 
knowing the important facts is termed an ad hoc decision. Instantaneous decisions 
based primarily on instinct and of an intuitive or guesswork nature will be ad hoc 
decisions. Many opportunistic decisions, as discussed earlier, are also instantaneous 
and intuitive in nature. Hence, opportunistic and ad hoc decisions are very similar. In 
practice, an opportunistic decision is based on an informed choice20 on at least the 
important variables. On the other hand, ad hoc decisions are more guesswork (i.e., 
without any relevant experience) or based on, at best, partial knowledge of even the 
most important factors associated with the decision. For example, diversification of 
business into an area where it lacks proper experience or knowledge can be 
                                                 
19 This is similar to an idea by Nutt (1998b). 
20 Informed choice may be due to experience or real-time information etc. 
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dangerous. It can be fatal if even the basic preparation is not done. But with some 
good luck, it may work as well.  
6.2.4(h) Forced Upon by Business Environment  
There will be instances where a decision is made not by choice but because of the 
unfavourable business environment. In a way, it can be said to be forced upon the 
enterprise. The theoretical difference between this category and need based decisions 
is primarily that, in this case, one has to make that decision and there is no other 
alternative, which is not the case with the latter type. For example, Dr Wayne Millen 
initially delayed the IPO of Epitan because of an unfavourable market due to the 
Sydney Olympics. However, later he could no longer postpone even though there was 
a continuing slump in the market. He said: 
The people who had put their money in my company [during private 
equity raising] had only put it in on the basis that there would be an IPO… 
So by that time…and we need to move forward…our investors were 
getting a bit edgy. So we ended up listing, not for money but for their exit. 
We needed to spread the shareholding. We only had 20 or 30 shareholders 
in mezzanine, but you need 400. So we raised only $1.8 million at the 
float just to get 400. We didn’t care about money, as long as we got the 
spread so that our first investors could exit, if they wanted to. 
6.2.4(i) Conflict 
Conflict can come when there is a genuine divergence in interest among the parties or 
politics amongst the actors. The former can be often resolved by negotiations or 
persuasion. However, if left unresolved, it can be very damaging. The latter is 
generally damaging and difficult to resolve. For instance, VRI Biomedical suffered 
due to a conflict among its board members that led to two groups with very different 
interests and opinions. The company suffered until one group completely won and 
forced most members of the other group to leave the board. 
6.2.4(j) Edict 
There were very few examples of edict decisions (Nutt, 1998b) among the case 
studies. This is surprising because the literature on entrepreneurship depicts 
entrepreneurs as ‘control freaks’ and the sole decision-maker (at least in the initial 
days). But the reason for the rare occurrence of edict type decisions is not hard to find. 
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Biotechnology new ventures require huge capital investments, so per force the 
entrepreneur or the entrepreneurial team (in the majority of the cases) has to look for 
capital investments. Any private equity investment means an increase in the number 
of people with major stakes. This makes edict decisions (at least for important issues) 
almost impossible without the fear of a crippling conflict.  
6.2.4(k) Procrastination or Managed Procrastination 
Procrastination or managed procrastination was not observed very often in the case 
studies. The reason for this almost certainly lies in the fact that politics is generally 
minimal in a small venture because there is usually a small group of decision-makers 
and a new venture can lose too much if decisions are not made in time. However, 
there may be instances where it is actually in the interest of the new venture to 
observe a ‘wait and watch’ policy. For example, a drug discovery company’s 
valuation increases as they are able to successfully take their lead molecule to 
different phases of clinical trials. It makes sense for them to try to keep raising 
successive rounds of funds in order to do clinical trials, which are hugely expensive. 
So a drug discovery company will generally try to delay a partnership (with a big 
pharmaceutical company) for their lead molecule as long as they can afford. For 
example, Dr Michelle Miller provided the following reasons for delaying a final 
decision on the business development activity of Biotron: 
We are continually doing that. There were several companies whom we 
had to visit a number of times. Some went to CDA, exchanging a lot of 
information. Still this is such a slow process. Sometimes I don’t mind that 
because I don’t know if I really want to do a deal. But when we have 
finally got…wait until phase I/IIa trials, then it is not that we start from 
scratch. Who were these guys? You have been here for years developing 
your relationship with these people. 
 
 Similarly, Dr Andrew Wilks said of Cytopia’s plan for the stage of 
partnership: 
It was a flexible business plan. You can take it to the clinic but not into the 
clinic and you could partner at that stage. Or you could take it to the clinic 
at much greater expense and add value to your new drug. We projected 
that we would certainly develop our drugs to the point where they were 
clinical entities. We projected further that if the effect was good, we can 
raise more money and take it even further. 
 139
                             
 
6.2.5 Authorisation (and Involvement) 
Generally in a new venture (at least informally), the authorisation will occur at the 
same time as the choice is made. This is again because there is usually a small group 
of decision-makers and politics is generally minimal due to continuous interaction 
among the key decision-makers (which includes major investors). But there usually 
will be a formal ratification at least of decisions that are crucial, if not all decisions.  
 There will also be instances when either there are too many private investors 
or the company has publicly listed (which is quite often the case in Australia). In 
those circumstances, the final choice, at least on decisions of an important nature, will 
generally be made by involving key decision-makers, including majority 
shareholders. Formal ratification of the decision will still be a must. Involving key 
decision-makers at least while making the final choice avoids the feeling of 
marginalisation that may well be one of the sources of conflict or politics. This, 
however, doesn’t mean that there won’t be differences of opinion; it only means that 
this approach will resolve such differences more amicably. 
 For most decisions of an operational nature (such as contracting with a 
hospital for clinical trials), authorisation at the board level may not be needed, but it 
definitely is a good idea to involve people who are associated with that decision. Such 
involvement helps achieve a higher degree of agreement and better implementation. 
6.2.6 Decision Facilitators 
Some of the decision facilitators that have been mentioned previously are: relevant 
experience, using expert advice, networks21, and involving key people. Other 
common decision facilitators are: 
                                                
Having resources: Resources can be the skill set of the company, available time to 
make a decision and sufficient capital. For example, it was the availability of cash that 
facilitated the decision by the board of Acrux to not list the company in an 
unfavourable market environment and wait for an opportune time. Similarly, 
 
21 The network has been shown to be useful for recognition, but it is in general useful to get the 
information that is required throughout the decision process. (For the purpose of this research, the 
benefits of networks in getting needed resources or capable people are included in ‘recognition of 
opportunities’). 
 140
                             
 
Pharmaxis decided to go for an IPO when they had sufficient cash in the bank and 
thus could negotiate better terms with underwriters. They had also achieved a few 
credible milestones.  
Having customers and revenues prior to the start or in the very initial stages: Early 
cash flow is a significant asset for a new venture. Plantic Technologies (a Melbourne 
based company making eco-friendly plastic) already had Cadbury’s as an assured 
customer during pilot testing of the technology. Similarly, Strand Genomics had a 
steady stream of revenue that allowed them to develop ambitious products. 
Known Competitive Advantage: This can be due to an above average skill set that a 
company has or an extra advantage that their products or services give and that is easy 
for the customer or investor to see. Dr Keats Nelms (Phenomix) provided the 
following example: 
Well, you know…you contact companies and say…either through people 
you know or through their business development people, ‘Are you 
interested in us?’ And based on people who are in our company, they are 
usually very interested because the expertise we had, the scientific 
background…that the whole company. People knew that we were a smart 
bunch of people, that management team was very good, scientific team 
was very good. So they all were very interested. 
 
 Professor Vijay Chandru mentioned an advantage that Strand Genomics had 
over other companies as a result of which they were able to get third party 
certification as a vendor by Affymetrix: 
Affymetrix puts out software that has to do with their technology and their 
particular probes. When you contact them to become a third party vendor, 
they will give you all of these pieces of software and codes without 
guarantees. Then they ask you to integrate them in your tool. What many 
companies do is just put a wrapper of some sort and plug it into their 
software. What we did was that we tested each of those models carefully, 
and some of them were open source, so we were able to look at the quality 
of source codes. We found that while they were very intricate and clever 
algorithms, they had not been optimised because Affymetrix is not a 
software company. Software is just a support function for their hardware. 
We actually decided to rewrite those algorithms and optimise them. We 
have actually rewritten those softwares in a way that it runs much more 
efficiently. I think that is something that Affymetrix has appreciated. 
Probably not many of the other companies have taken that trouble. 
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Support of influential people: This is of great help in troubled times. For example, Dr 
Z (Company E) had to seek help from the chairman (Dr T) of the company (a very 
renowned scientist). Although Dr Z was the founder of the company, Dr Z had to 
forgo the post of CEO at the insistence of the investors. When the new CEO resigned, 
the investors again tried to install another CEO, who demanded that Dr Z also forgo a 
huge equity share in his favour. Dr Z said: 
I went and met Dr T. I said, ‘Dr T, I am sorry, but I control this company. 
I own almost 73 per cent of the company and I am taking over. This is my 
baby and I am not going to let it be killed. I am going to take over. I am 
appointing myself as CEO and you have to back me.’ He agreed. In the 
next board meeting I was appointed CEO. 
 
 Similarly, Phenomix was able to raise an impressive $US32 million in the first 
round of funding (which is usually very difficult, especially in Australia) because of 
the well-known people involved with the venture: 
So the three advisors were Peter Schultz, who is the head of that institute 
(Genomics Novartis Foundation) and is also the founder of Affymax and 
Affymetrix. He knew a well-known venture capitalist, John Diekman, who 
found Bay City Capital and had been CEO of Affymetrix and a number of 
other different companies. So he was an advisor. The third person was 
Denise Gilbert, who had been CFO of Affymax and had quite a bit of 
financial experience. 
 
Strategic Coherence: This is important to keep a company focussed. It also sometimes 
facilitates decision-making. Dr Wolf Hanisch explained that the reason CBio took 
over the troubled BresaGen was primarily to help them with the bulk manufacture of 
their lead molecule for clinical trials and not for other activities that BresaGen was 
involved with: 
We got rid of the stem cells. We merged it with a company called Cythera, 
which then merged with a company called Nervecell. We cleaned all other 
intellectual property. We just wrote it off the book. Bits and pieces of 
investee companies and bits and pieces of IP that were carried on the book 
as assets or intangibles have disappeared. We now stripped it down to 
basics, which is a contract manufacturing company and contract R&D… 
We bought it strictly for the purpose of manufacturing our materials. 
 
 Even though the benefits of strategic coherence cannot be gainsaid, one must 
be careful that strategic coherence doesn’t become strategic inertia, where one fails to 
change direction even when the direction is proving harmful to the company. 
 142
                             
 
 The above factors are some that were shown to have positive effects on the 
decision process whenever present. These are factors that decision-makers have some 
control over. 
6.3 Does a Decision-Making and Decision Implementation Dichotomy Exist? 
Three types of decision process were found in this empirical study. Some decision 
processes involved only decision-making, some were only decision implementation 
and some had both decision-making and decision implementation. This is, however, 
not to say that there is no element of decision-making in ‘decision implementation’ 
types and vice versa. The difference arises when one aspect clearly overshadows the 
other.  
The difference depends primarily on what one sets as the unit of analysis. For 
this study, a decision is the unit of analysis. But, even within this approach, different 
researchers have different boundaries for what they consider to be a decision. For this 
research, a decision is one that can stand as a discrete and important unit in itself. 
Chapter 5 gave the example of a decision by a company to go to an IPO. This decision 
may include several sub-decisions: for example, the timing of the IPO, deciding 
market cap or choice of underwriters et cetera. If IPO is the unit of analysis, these 
several sub-decisions get subsumed in the bigger decision process of the IPO. But, in 
making these sub-decisions, one is also implementing the decision made earlier—i.e., 
to go for an IPO. In this research, the approach followed is that of Mintzberg et al. 
(1976) and takes the overall ‘going to the IPO’ as the decision. Decision-making then 
becomes very enmeshed with decision implementation. If one took each of these sub-
decisions as a unit of analysis, things would be different. For example, deciding the 
timing of the IPO is basically decision-making.  
6.3.1 Decision-making  
There will be many occasions when making a decision will dominate its 
implementation in a decision process. A few examples will show this.  
CBio taking over BresaGen: Initially, CBio had contracted BresaGen to be the bulk 
manufacturer of the lead molecule they required for phase II clinical trials. While they 
did this, they had earmarked a budget to build such a facility in-house by the time 
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they started phase III clinical trials. However, soon after the contract, BresaGen went 
into voluntary administration and could not honour the contract. This meant that CBio 
either had to look for another manufacturer or build the in-house capability early. The 
latter would have significantly delayed the trials for which all the preparation was 
done and the former was not looking feasible as other manufacturers either were not 
TGA approved or were non-committal on the required timelines. The other option 
was to invest in BresaGen to bring it out of voluntary administration and at the same 
time become majority shareholders. This option looked feasible as it was within 
budget. They made a decision in favour of it. Of course, they had to involve the board 
of BresaGen to reach a decision point. Some researchers may consider this stage as an 
implementation of their decision made to get majority control of BresaGen. A 
decision process that involves two different parties will naturally involve a discussion 
between them. Even in this case, the decision would not have been actually made had 
the dialogue between the two parties not led to the recognition that CBio’s budget was 
adequate to gain a majority share. This dialogue could very well be part of this 
decision-making. In the researcher’s view, the implementation part of this decision is 
related to how CBio fulfilled the objectives vis-à-vis BresaGen. Both the companies 
being small, this wasn’t too complicated once they reached the stage of decision-
making. They had thought about such issues.  
Biotron’s December 2004 capital raising: Out of several options to raise money, 
Biotron decided to raise money by a share purchase plan. In this case, once the board 
made the decision, the implementation of it wasn’t too complicated.  
Cytopia acquires Myometrix: Initially Myometrix licensed some patents from Cytopia 
because those patents were important for them to make progress in their research on 
the development of a lead molecule for cardiovascular related diseases. Later the 
opportunity came for Cytopia to acquire Myometrix about the time when they were 
about to raise money and were also looking for a US presence. The opportunity 
seemed more attractive because of the important area of research that Myometrix was 
in—i.e., cardiovascular diseases. After the due diligence by the two parties, an 
agreement was reached. The implementation details were also discussed. However, in 
this case, decision-making overshadowed the real merger (i.e., the implementation). 
The reason is simple: implementing a merger where the merged entity is a small 
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group of people (i.e., four to five people) is not a huge task, but reaching an 
agreement (i.e., making a decision) is because this small group controls valued IP.  
Genotypic Technology’s decision to follow a ‘mixed’ model: When faced with a 
shortage of working capital due to the lack of interest on the part of VCs, Genotypic 
Technology decided to provide services in order to get cash for the development of its 
products. This is a common approach that companies take when facing a lack of 
funds. In this case, deciding what to do is taken as the decision unit for analysis. This 
makes it look like an only decision-making type. However, it could be argued in this 
case that the decision will have a significant implementation component. What needs 
to be clarified is the appropriate boundary for a decision unit. If the implementation is 
included in this case, it will include why and how they put different services and even 
how they implemented these services. In itself, this can be a sufficiently large 
decision unit for micro-level analysis.  
Metahelix’s decision to start a seed business: Metahelix decided to start its own seed 
business because its contract research for seed companies was not taking off and it 
was necessary for it to generate revenues for its own R&D. Like other companies, it 
had various other options (including VC funding) to choose from. It came up with an 
interesting choice—to start its own seed business. It started a company called 
Dhaanya Seeds as a 100 per cent subsidiary of Metahelix. It had a unique rationale 
(discussed in the section on ‘Deliberation’ in this chapter). However, its decision-
making involved not only the choice but also the implementation of the choice. Dr 
Gautham Nadig explained: 
We started a small-scale breeding program when we started Metahelix. 
Our strategy was to license in material from various sources in the 
country—various companies, breeders and public sources et cetera. Then 
we had to ramp up our breeding program to recreate these products. Right 
now we have a very large breeding program when we have a phenomenal 
amount of materials for testing and evaluation every year. And we have a 
sales and marketing team deployed all over India. We have the seed 
production organised in a lot of places. We have a running engine. Once 
our biotech product is approved, these seeds will carry the traits. 
 
In this case, the boundary for the decision unit was around the decision whether 
to start the seed business. This decision will have a large component of 
implementation. But if that is included, the decision unit becomes so big that it 
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becomes an analysis at firm level—i.e., analysis of the evolution of Dhaanya Seeds. 
By delineating the boundary around the start of Dhaanya seeds, the decision unit 
becomes a manageable unit of analysis at the micro level. The latter statement by Dr 
Gautham Nadig simply reflects the robustness of decision-making; that is, they 
thought of how to implement the decision while they made a decision.  
6.3.2 Decision Implementation 
In new ventures, the business environment effectively prescribes many decisions. The 
decision-makers are required to carefully implement such decisions. In highly 
competitive environments, good execution may be as important as the strategic 
choices managers make (Rousseau, 2006). For example, a decision to look for 
partners usually after the lead molecule of a drug discovery company has reached 
phase III clinical trials is almost standard for a small biotechnology company. This is 
because it takes huge resources to do phase III clinical trials, complete FDA 
procedures and finally market a product across the globe. This is usually beyond the 
capability of a small biotechnology company. Similarly, drug discovery companies 
have to conduct clinical trials. They do not need to decide whether to do it; they have 
to focus on its implementation. During that implementation they have to make many 
sub-decisions. In the following section, some of these decisions are discussed in 
detail. 
Helix Genomics hiring patent attorneys: Once Helix Genomics decided to obtain 
worldwide patents for their software, the search was on to find a credible patent 
attorney. It is almost a standard feature that biotechnology firms hire professional 
patent attorneys (if they do not have one in-house) to take care of their patent 
applications. To hire patent attorneys is hardly a decision to be made. Helix Genomics 
started looking for a patent attorney suitable to their requirement—less expensive and 
specialised in the life sciences. During their search, they met patent attorneys from 
two different firms—Reedsmith (for USA) and Boehmart and Boehmart (for Europe). 
Upon discussion with them, they found them to be suitable and hired them. So it is the 
implementation of the decision (i.e., how to hire a suitable patent attorney) that is 
more important here. 
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IPO of BioDiem: Senior management of BioDiem did not have to make a decision to 
go for an IPO. It has been a general trend in Australia to have the company listed as 
early as possible. Investors of BioDiem wanted the same. However, BioDiem’s 
partner for their flu vaccine (Merck) had decided to end the collaboration during that 
time. At the insistence of their shareholders, they had no choice but to initiate the 
process for an IPO. In order not to take any chances, they hired two different 
underwriters—one to manage retail investors and the other to manage institutional 
investors. The former was the same company that managed its first round of 
investment, which involved investments by a number of wealthy investors. They 
decided the time, valuation and share price et cetera in consultation with their 
underwriters. However, on further assessment, the underwriters concluded that their 
assessment of the valuation of the company was high and it would not be possible to 
get the investors interested at that price. This was primarily due to the end of the 
collaboration with Merck, notwithstanding BioDiem’s other achievements. So 
BioDiem, in consultation with the underwriters, had to revise their expectations (as 
postponing the IPO was not an option for them) before they went for an IPO. In this 
case, as one would notice, several sub-decisions were taken while implementing the 
IPO decision. 
Peplin’s search for a partner: Peplin’s search for a partner began quite early. They 
did not have to make a decision for the stage of partnership. Mr Michael Mullins said, 
‘Partnering with a pharmaceutical company was always the plan because we just 
didn’t have enough capital resources.’ However, what was important was how they 
searched for a suitable partner. To a large extent, even implementation in this case is a 
standard procedure and they did not need to decide on that front. To a certain extent, 
these procedures are almost the same across most companies: attend conferences, 
employ professional consultants for deal making, initiate contacts with select 
companies in their area, sign confidentiality statements and conduct several rounds of 
talks et cetera. Peplin did these things. What differentiates one company from the 
other is the management of the implementation. The difference lies in the sub-
decisions associated with implementation (e.g., how they hire professional 
consultants, who they hire, who they choose to target and on what basis etc.). These 
processes are unique to individual companies.  
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 Mr Gary Redlich initially started to think of prospective companies that they 
could target for partnership. Soon he hired Burrill and Co. (based in San Francisco) as 
a consultant. The consultant helped him to narrow down the initial choice of 15 
companies to five companies. Later, after further discussions and evaluation, that 
reduced to three companies. This led to a concerted effort on just three companies. 
Finally, the deal was struck with Allergan.  
6.3.3 Decision-making and Implementation 
Decision-making and implementation usually go hand in hand, as can be seen from 
the above discussion. The decision process types outlined here are based on what is 
dominant: decision-making or implementation. When decision-making and 
implementation are equally important to a decision process, it is better to 
acknowledge that as a ‘decision-making and implementation’ type.  A few such 
decisions are discussed below. 
Phenomix’s ‘initial’ organisational structure: The importance of an early 
organisational structure was clearly evident to the founders of Phenomix. Dr Keats 
Nelms explained: 
We had that pretty much mapped out before we went out to raise money. 
Steve was going to be chief technology officer. Chris was going to be 
chief scientist and I was going to be director of operations and everything 
else here in Australia. The first step…it was thought that as soon as we 
could, we would hire a CEO. So that structure was already there. All we 
need was someone to come in and help grow the business. So we had 
science covered but we needed someone to come in and help build the 
business. 
 
 It was then that they began their search for a CEO. They had about five to six 
potential candidates from either their own networks or from an executive search firm. 
All the major investors along with the founders interviewed the potential candidates. 
It was then that Dr Laura Shawer was finally chosen as the CEO.  
 In this decision process, both decision-making (to hire a CEO to build a robust 
organisational structure) and the implementation of it are important. It may be argued 
that the CEO is a standard post in all companies. However, the founders themselves 
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coming to such a conclusion (i.e., hiring an outsider as a CEO) is unique. Dr Keats 
Nelms said:  
Everyone agreed. I mean, none of us wanted to be CEO. We knew that it 
was not going to be appropriate. It was not going to be what the company 
needed. So from that point of view we were lucky because none of us had 
ego problems about someone saying that ‘I want to be CEO’ when they 
shouldn’t be. 
 
Helix Genomics’s development of their product: The idea to develop software 
originated from the drawbacks that the founders of the company identified in the 
software they used in projects. But the decision about which type of software to 
develop did not emerge in the first instance. They refined the idea for their product 
continuously for four successive years before they developed their Biological 
Operating Software. Mr. Mohan said: 
Initially there was no idea. Initially it was only that there were a lot of 
requirements in the domain, so we were studying that. In 1998-99, we 
thought that there has to be an operating system for biology. There has to 
be novel and comprehensive software that can do any ‘query analysis’ in 
biotech. Then 1999, 2000, 2001 and, to a large extent, 2002 has been for 
development. Also, these years, we have also been studying different 
software and different companies. 
 
 The development of a product is usually a decision unit that involve decision-
making (i.e., what product) and decision implementation (i.e., how to make that 
product). Together, they make one unit of analysis because the product will change as 
it is designed. In other words, decision-making and decision implementation overlap. 
 Hence, decision-making and decision implementation are not always two 
distinct activities independent of one another. It depends on the decision and the 
decision process as to whether one can clearly distinguish between them and identify 
them as independent activities. But by identifying which activity is the dominant 
activity, it may be appropriate to distinguish between them. Nevertheless, particular 
care has to be taken in putting boundaries around the decision unit for analysis. 
   6.4 Patterns of Decision-Making: Lessons Learnt 
Following Mintzberg et al. (1976), decision process diagrams of more than 50 
decision processes were constructed. After clarifying the decision unit, a careful 
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qualitative analysis was carried out to identify the elements of the decision process in 
that decision unit. A flowchart of the decision process was then drawn.  
 Decision processes were categorised based on the three types: decision-
making only; decision implementation only; and decision-making and 
implementation. Decision processes for each type were then superimposed in order to 
identify patterns and to identify any marked differences among the three types. This 
approach did not generate any clear generic patterns or lead to identifying any marked 
difference among the three types. 
 Complex decisions were compared with those that were relatively simple (i.e., 
less variable). The former had more iterations, which is not surprising. Decisions that 
had encountered unexpected difficulties or some problems were different from those 
that did not face any such obstructions. In the former, there were more iterations and 
in the latter there were markedly fewer, even for the complex decisions.  
 The analysis did not generate any common patterns, and hence did not 
generate ‘typical’ patterns that could be called entrepreneurial decision-making styles 
or patterns. This led to a reassessment of the types of decision processes that 
Mintzberg et al. (1976) had identified. While they were able to generate seven groups 
out of 25 decision processes, it is likely that they would have come across many more 
groups had they studied more decision processes. They also mentioned that the 25 
decision processes could be represented in terms of seven basic models ‘with minor 
additions which do not appear to be common’ (1976:268). The fact is that there is a 
great deal of variation among individual decisions and possibly a large number of 
groups or models of decision-making processes. This level of variance greatly reduces 
the analytical value of visual process diagrams. Consequently, the analysis moved 
from the generation of patterns and types to an analysis of difference between 
successful decisions and failed decisions. This analysis will be discussed in Chapter 7.  
 However, this attempt to make diagrams of decision processes was not without 
gains. It led to a greater understanding of their use and limitations: 
• It can be difficult at times to pictorially show decisions that have taken a 
long time to evolve. The true depiction of that process can be very tricky 
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and is many times not possible. For example, it can be very difficult to 
show the marketing strategy of a company that has taken a long time to 
evolve (due to a new market, novel products, etc.). Sometimes even the 
initial idea on which a company was formed may have evolved in 
stages— something very difficult to show convincingly by a decision 
process diagram. 
• Closely related to the above point is the difficulty of showing a decision 
process in such a way that by looking at the diagram one can differentiate 
between whether it was a one-time decision or an evolving decision. 
• Sometimes it is very difficult to construct the boundary of a decision unit. 
Two different decisions may be so closely intertwined that it becomes 
difficult to represent them individually or even in a combined way. For 
example, Company F raised $13.2mn, but their decision process to raise 
this amount was closely related to their decision process to appoint a new 
Chairman.  
• It is also difficult to show ingenuity or smartness (on the part of decision-
makers) that is related to some decision processes. To represent such ingenuity 
without losing the essence of it is a challenge. 
• Quite closely related to the above point is the problem of bringing forth the 
quality of certain elements (such as deliberation or formal analysis) that may 
be key to the outcome. 
 Decision process diagrams can at best provide an overview of the decision 
process of a particular decision because the decision process is constructed by making 
use of major decision points as the signposts and then giving them the shape of the 
decision process.  
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Confusion and controversy related to the true nature of entrepreneurial decision-
making was one of the main motivations for this research. The controversy is 
primarily related to the nature of evaluation during the decision process. It is the 
nature of evaluation that has been used by researchers to characterise decision-making 
by entrepreneurs. In Chapter 6, elements of generic decision processes were identified 
and discussed. An attempt was made to find which combination of these elements 
(i.e., which patterns of decision-making) were more prevalent and, thus, could be 
called an entrepreneurial style of decision-making. This attempt, based on 
diagrammatic methods, did not identify any clear patterns within this sample of 
decisions. 
 This preliminary analysis cannot produce a basis for concluding that there is 
not an entrepreneurial style of decision-making in the sample firms without making 
another serious attempt to analyse the evaluation style of entrepreneurs. It is even 
more important to assess whether the evaluation style has an important role to play in 
determining whether a decision made by an entrepreneur will be successful. This 
chapter is concerned with the analysis of evaluation styles and the relationship 
between these styles and the outcomes of the relevant decision. The approach 
involves segregating successful and unsuccessful decisions and then comparing their 
characteristics across the main elements related to evaluation and selection in the 
decision process.1 Through this analysis, doubts regarding the nature of 
entrepreneurial decision-making are also resolved. A further attempt will be made to 
find any diagrammatic patterns, based on the performance of decisions taken by 
entrepreneurs or entrepreneurial teams. 
7.1 How Do Entrepreneurs Evaluate: Deliberation or Formal Analysis or Both? 
This section is concerned with three questions: 
 How often do entrepreneurs evaluate their decisions?  
 Does more evaluation have any effect on the outcome of decisions? 
 What means do entrepreneurs use most frequently to evaluate their decisions? 
                                                 
1 Refer to section 4.2 in Chapter 4 to understand the basis of the classification of decisions as 
‘successful’ or ‘unsuccessful’.  
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These questions are approached through the analysis of 48 decisions made by 
the entrepreneurs in the case study firms. This analysis is developed through four 
stages: 
 types of deliberation (7.1.1) 
 the use of formal analysis (7.1.2) 
 the creation and assessment of options (7.1.3) 
 styles of decision-making (7.1.4). 
7.1.1 Deliberation 
In Chapter 6, various types of deliberation were identified. These can be categorised 
into three groups (see Table 7.1): 
 deliberation styles; 
 non-deliberative styles; and 
 aspects that will facilitate deliberation styles.  
The sub-elements within each category type are almost self-explanatory and are 
those that one uses in day-to-day life. They have also been explained in detail (along 
with examples) in Chapter 6. 
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TABLE 7.1 HOW FREQUENTLY DO ENTREPRENEURS DELIBERATE? 
  Successful Unsuccessful 
   (Number of Decisions= 34)  (Number of Decisions= 14) 
Deliberation Styles     
Deliberation2 42* (1.235)** 6 (0.429) 
Logic 24 (0.706) 8 (0.571) 
Planning 14 (0.412) 0 
Expert advice 7 (0.206) 0 
Internal expert advice 2 (0.059) 1 (0.071) 
Total 89 (2.618) 15 (1.071) 
      
Deliberation Facilitators     
Involvement of experts across functions 2 (0.059) 0 (10) 
Knowing one’s limitations/partner/technical 
environment 11 (0.324) 2 (0.143) 
Prior relevant experience 3 (0.088) 0 (0) 
Decision facilitator 9 (0.147) 1 (0.071) 
Symbiotic 3 (0.088) 1 (0.071) 
Total 28 (0.824) 4 (0.286) 
      
Non-Deliberative Styles     
Convictions 6 (0.177) 5 (0.357) 
Deliberation-partial 0 (0) 1 (0.071) 
Not directed search 0 (0) 0 (0) 
No experience 1 (0.029) 9 (0.643) 
No expert advice 1 (0.029) 8 (0.571) 
Very broad idea 0 (0) 2 (0.143) 
Total 8 (0.235) 25 (1.786) 
 
Note:* The number (not within brackets) indicates the total number of that particular sub-element 
found in either category (i.e., ‘Successful’ or ‘Unsuccessful’). ** Because the number of decisions 
assessed within each category is different, it is more prudent to compare the average incidence of sub-
elements in each category. The same method (and logic) has been used in the following tables. Also 
refer to the Coding Style discussed in Chapter 5. 
7.1.1(a) Deliberation Styles and Deliberation Facilitators 
The data in Table 7.1 summarises the analysis of 48 decisions: 34 successful and 14 
unsuccessful. The table shows the frequency of occurrence of each type of 
deliberation as an aggregate number of occurrences and as a frequency per decision. 
The table shows marked differences in deliberation styles between successful and 
unsuccessful decisions. Successful decisions are deliberated more than twice as 
                                                 
2 ‘Deliberation’ is used to denote active and conscious thinking, careful thinking, creative thinking and 
discussions. It doesn’t include logic and ‘knowing thy area’. The former approaches are considered to 
be more proactive whereas the latter approaches are more passive. 
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frequently as unsuccessful decisions. Decisions that are discussed more have much 
higher chances of being successful. Similarly, decisions that are planned (even though 
informally) are more likely to be successful.  
 Entrepreneurs used simple logic very often in the decision process; typically 
this occurred when either rapid decisions were to be made or things were quite 
obvious. Here is an example. 
 Mr Michael Mullins explained Peplin’s decision first to go for an ADR 
(American depositary receipt) raising and then not to proceed: 
The idea was that there may be international investors who would be 
interested in the company. If we are using ADRs, then we can create a 
market for our stocks offshore, which potentially could see people value 
our stock like it was listed in NASDAQ rather than the ASX in a hope to 
improve the valuation. We thought that we would be able to raise more 
money with less dilution. Then a few other things like the Iraq war started. 
We felt, after looking at other companies, that this will not achieve an 
outcome that we expected. So it ceased to be a priority for us. 
 
  It may not be wise to make such important decisions based purely on logic, 
especially if one doesn’t have relevant experience. For example, it is hard to know 
what the response would have been had they listed Peplin on NASDAQ without 
having listed first in the home country. This consideration suggests that logic can be 
an adequate approach if experts in the area use it. For example, the stock of Peplin not 
only had a good debut on its listing in the ASX but continued to rise even though their 
product was not then advanced in the development process. Mr Michael Mullins 
explained: 
We were targeting at a price of $0.50, but on the advice of our brokers we 
went out at $0.40 and at the end of the day we were at $0.50. We pitched 
at somewhat lower. The logic was that if you got to the market at $0.40 
and at the end of the day you are $0.30, then it is very hard to get back to 
$0.40 and beyond that. If you go out at $0.40 and it gets $0.50 and moves 
up, then it is good. That’s what happened to us. 
 
Important decisions made only on the basis of logic can have serious 
implications, especially if the context is new for the decision-maker and there is no 
expert advice from people who know the context. For example, Dr Richard Fry’s 
decision to clone horses may seem quite logical, but he had to face public furore, 
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especially from those who loved horseracing and saw that the selective cloning of 
race-winners might destroy the charm of the game. He said of his decision: 
Because they are worth a lot of money and we saw the market for horses 
would be in geldings. Geldings are very good horses whether they be 
racehorses or for any other purpose. Geldings are very good horses, but 
they have got no breeding value because they have been castrated. So we 
saw that there could be a niche market for cloning. 
 
  Other aspects that facilitate the deliberation process are also found more often 
in successful decisions compared to unsuccessful decisions (see Table 7.1). Simply 
knowing about one’s limitations, the technology environment, the prospective partner 
or about anything else that may affect a decision is likely to be fruitful. For example, 
Dr Alan Robertson said that they decided to publicly list Pharmaxis even though they 
had sufficient money in the bank, and this was based on their understanding of the 
capital market: 
We didn’t need it then, but we knew that we will need it in the future. And 
there are funding cycles. There are times when you can raise money… 
there is an investor interest in your sector. 
 
  However, this prior knowledge should be directly related to the specific 
decision. Care should be taken that knowledge about those aspects of a decision that 
are well understood is not extended to other aspects that are not understood. For 
example, the CEO of Company A talked about their decision to build platform 
technologies for research in area X: 
We also knew that in those early days of 1999 there didn’t exist sufficient 
technology in the world to do this at the level that was going to be 
required and so as the company whose founders were very well renowned 
for their technology expertise and innovation in this area, we decided that 
we need to capitalise on that rather than other companies do it… There are 
things called core facilities in the world where most universities in the 
world doing biomedical research will have…you will expect that those 
core facilities, those who have been involved in lot of genomics or some 
of those types of services will have actually adopted this technology. It 
was very natural progression. It was a trend, if one could say. 
 
 In this case, the senior management team of Company A knew about the 
technological trends and the core facilities used in the research area. While they were 
quite well versed on the technological front, however, they did not know the market 
dynamics and they generalised to wider markets their experience as scientists in the 
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use of their technology. Indeed, their technology was superior and saved time. 
Academics in other core facilities could afford delays but not huge costs because of 
budgetary constraints that are typical of the academic set-up. In short, they 
generalised their relevant experience, related to the technology, to market contexts in 
which they were not experienced. 
 Decision facilitators can help make choices. A decision facilitator may occur 
as a result of an event that makes a choice easier. For example, Dr Igor Gonda 
explained that Acrux favoured going to an IPO in 2003 but they were not getting the 
desired valuation. They then decided against listing because Acrux had sufficient 
money and a cooperative VC to back them. As such, there was no reason to do a bad 
public offering. The support of the VC facilitated that decision. Later in 2003 they 
again decided to start the process for an IPO. In this case, achieving certain milestones 
facilitated this decision. Dr Gonda said: 
I think there were a number of key milestones. From the point of external 
perception, the key milestones were commercial agreements. We got three 
commercial agreements done. We got Lilly deal done. We got the two 
commercial deals with Vivus. They certainly were the triggers. We also 
were making good progress in getting license deals in Australia. This 
eventually ended up in two deals with CSL. So we knew that there was in 
interest in Australia. Multiple companies were interested in the product. 
Commercial deals at that time were the main kind of validation that we 
believed the market will recognise and that investors will gain confidence. 
 
 Similarly, certain options get a more favourable treatment because they are in 
keeping with the previous ‘already decided’ strategies or they generate clear win-win 
situations for the parties involved or both. For example, Cryosite entered into 
partnership with ATCC because that was in keeping with their earlier business and 
both the involved parties had something for themselves.3 Mr Gordon Milliken said: 
Because being a semi-government organisation in America, they are not 
very good in dealing with the rest of the world. So they provide extremely 
                                                 
3 ATCC is a global non-profit bio-resource centre. Their mission is to acquire, authenticate, preserve, 
develop and distribute biological materials, information, technology, intellectual property and standards 
for the advancement, validation and application of scientific knowledge. (Hwww.atcc.orgH)  
Cryosite is an Australian biotechnology company meeting the growing demand for secure off-site, 
ultra-low temperature and cryogenic storage. (Hwww.cryosite.com.auH) 
 ATCC licenses/sells its culture cells to laboratories around the world. This requires getting clearance 
of the local Quarantine department and logistics to handle the transport and maintenance of the cell 
cultures. It is for this reason that ATCC seeks local distributors. 
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core service to individual clients. And also Australia has got some very 
stringent quarantine restrictions in the world. They couldn’t deal with the 
Australian quarantine system. We can deal with them. ATCC, as part of 
their business plan, has appointed distributors around the world. To solve 
their problem, they decided to set up a network of distributors and we 
were the third last ones to join as their distributors.  
7.1.1(b) Non-Deliberative Styles  
Some styles of deliberations are more frequently associated with unsuccessful 
decisions (see Table 7.1). Some of the more common types of deliberation styles are 
discussed in this section. 
 Decisions that are based on convictions (and/or partial deliberation) are more 
likely to fail. ‘Conviction’ was used at an average of 0.357/decision in the 
‘unsuccessful’ category and only 0.177/decision in the ‘successful’ category. For 
example, one of the respondents who based his decision on his (and his group 
members’) convictions said: 
We decided that we have the best idea for some of the issues that we 
needed to address, some of the questions that we were asking related to 
biological programmes. What we knew was we were going to 
revolutionise our area, and that was enough because I just figured that you 
can do all the work you like, it’s all bullshit because none of us know 
where it is going. Now that’s what an entrepreneurial business has to do, I 
think. And I guess our conviction was that the IP that we developed and 
articulating that into products was going to help transform things, but we 
had no real idea about how much money it is going to make at that stage. 
 
Without doubt, the result of the above decision was a disaster. While one can 
sympathise with decision-makers that it is difficult to assess markets for a new 
product, an entrepreneur can get a feel of the market by talking to potential customers 
regarding various product dimensions. If a large-scale market assessment cannot be 
taken, one can do a small study. Helix Genomics is an example of a deliberative 
approach. Mr Mohan said: 
There is a lot of test marketing, validation and core group identification 
that took place in this first year. We have picked up a couple of 
universities in India and UK and also some of the friendly companies. It is 
always good to go to a friendly company. They will at least be interested, 
as we have approached. Yes, we do a lot of foot-printing. What is the 
current man-hour going at the director level? We take interventions at 
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various levels, like director, manager, programmer et cetera. We calculate 
accordingly and fix certain standards in comparison with the IT industry. 
 
 Similarly, being attentive to the current business environment can provide 
insights that inform decisions. Mr Gary Redlich (Peplin) talked about a market related 
issue for a skin cancer treatment product: 
Then there were questions about whether or not it is possible to change 
dermatologists that treat skin cancers from the treatment paradigms of 
abrasion using liquid nitrogen and scalpels for these cancers rather than 
treating it with a topical cream drug. For that respect it was fortunate that a 
topical immunomodulator called Aldara owned by another pharmaceutical 
company and developed for genital warts showed some efficacy in skin 
cancers…was proceeding through clinical trials and ultimate registration. 
So we had both the dermatology industry and FDA being prepared for a 
much more potent drug by this earlier but less potent drug called Aldara. 
That was a relief to see that starting to happen and to me the uptake of 
sales in Aldara proving that the market really wanted a less invasive 
treatment for skin cancer than that it was getting. 
 
The frequency of unsuccessful decisions is high where the issue is complex or 
the decision-makers have little or no relevant prior experience and do not take expert 
advice or do thorough planning/formal analysis by themselves (see Table 7.1). A 
majority of the decisions in the case study firms that failed had these characteristics. 
7.1.2 Formal Analysis 
How often do entrepreneurs use formal analysis for decision-making, and what is the 
impact of these decision-making processes on decision outcomes? These two issues 
are discussed in this section.  
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TABLE 7.2 HOW FREQUENTLY DO ENTREPRENEURS USE FORMAL ANALYSIS? 
  Successful Unsuccessful 
Formal Analysis   (Number of Decisions= 34)  (Number of Decisions= 14) 
Business Plan  5 (0.118) 0 (0) 
Formal planning 3 (0.088) 0 (0) 
Professional consultants 16 (0.412) 2 (0.143) 
Total 24 (0.706) 2 (0.143) 
      
Lack of Formal Analysis4      
Limited analysis 1 (0.029) 1 (0.071) 
No planning 1 (0.029) 5 (0.357) 
Total 2 (0.059) 6 (0.429) 
 
7.1.2(a) Formal Analysis  
Approaches to decision-making are considered to be types of formal analysis if they 
involve making business plans5; using formal planning methods; and using 
professional consultants.  
 Table 7.2 summarises data for the frequency of formal analysis used in 48 
decisions. It shows that formal analysis approaches were frequently used (about 26 
times in 48 decisions) by the entrepreneurs, but not as frequently as ‘deliberation’. In 
fact, even the professional consultants that are often hired are used more for the 
purpose of deliberation—that is, giving expert advice—than conducting a formal 
study. Formal analysis was used about five times as often in successful decisions as in 
failed decisions (see Table 7.2). 
 Professional consultants are often used for legal opinions related to IP. During 
the process of an IPO, they are also hired for various purposes—for example, as 
external auditors or underwriters. Some may even use their services to write a robust 
initial business plan so that it gives confidence to investors. They are also used for 
advising on deal making and for facilitating deals. Professional consultants may also 
                                                 
4 The difference between ‘limited analysis’ and ‘no planning’ is subtle. ‘Limited analysis’ is where an 
issue was analysed but the effort was low relative to the complexity and significance of the issue. ‘No 
planning’ is used when an issue required some evaluation but nothing was done.  
5 There is not much incidence of writing a business plan, but one must not jump to any conclusions 
based on this. This is primarily because here an assessment is being done of a decision, and business 
plans are not written for every decision. The reporting of business plans is also related to 
decisions/incidents that may have triggered the writing of business plans (like initial funding). In 
Chapter 8, business plans are discussed and their relevance evaluated. 
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be hired to advise on operational issues such as clinical trials. In short, professionals 
are quite often used to provide advice that helps in making a decision or 
implementing it in the right manner.  
  Formal planning methods were rarely used to come to a decision-point but, 
when used, were associated with successful decision-making. For example, after 
Norwood Abbey signed a deal with Ferndale, it conducted focus groups to get a 
detailed understanding of its target market. This approach found a potential market 
that was better than the initial target market. Mr Bernie Romanin (Norwood Abbey) 
said: 
When we went out there and did some focus groups…we did some market 
research and some positioning. That’s when the market segmentation was 
done in terms of who is the target market…. Is it doctor or nurse? …all 
these sorts of things…. So we did a number of focus groups across the US 
to determine what would be the key factors. So in the end it turned out that 
the biggest opportunities were in areas where Ferndale did not have an 
active field force. So we took that ourselves, and that’s where the business 
really is. 
 
 Situations, however, arise when planning or formal planning cannot provide 
all the answers (or cannot reduce significant uncertainty). For example, Dr Wolf 
Hanisch (CBio) commented on the turn of events soon after he had signed a contract 
with BresaGen: 
We knew that they were running into trouble at that point of time but 
firmly believed that they would not be in trouble for another six to eight 
months, so that makes about three batches. A couple of days after we 
signed the contract, they went into voluntary administration. Their board 
recognised that beyond six months they could not meet their obligations, 
so they went into administration there and then. 
 
 Planning cannot remove risk, particularly in circumstances of uncertainty, but 
it can help to identify and assess the key areas of risk and uncertainty. 
7.1.2(b) Lack of Formal Analysis  
Faced with complex and important decisions, comprehensive analysis and formal 
methods help to understand the situation better, as can the advice of an expert or a 
professional consultant (particularly when there is no in-house expertise on the issue). 
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This analysis shows that failure to do any of these in such situations is likely to 
increase the probability of an unsuccessful decision.  
 Table 7.2 shows that, among the 48 decisions, eight were characterised by an 
absence of formal analysis in situations where careful deliberation might be expected. 
Of the eight, six (75%) were in unsuccessful decisions.  
7.1.3 How Innovative Are Entrepreneurs in Considering and Creating Options? 
Do entrepreneurs typically identify and assess a range of options before they make a 
decision? It is likely to be preferable to have many options, but it is also important 
that one assess these options simultaneously so that an informed choice can be made 
in what is often a limited time. The data presented in Table 7.3 shows that successful 
decisions were more likely to be those where there were more options to choose 
from—that is, decision-makers at a point in time were looking for multiple options. In 
34 successful decisions there were 11 cases when more than one option was 
considered; that was only the case twice with unsuccessful decisions. For example, in 
talking about Phenomix’s impressive first round of fundraising, Dr Keats Nelms said: 
We presented to probably 20 different VC firms in California. Ultimately, 
Sofennova Ventures led the investment around including Bay City 
Capital, CM Capital, Rothschild as well as few others. So we ended up 
with a consortium of really strong VC firms. 
 
 Similarly, Dr Keith Williams said that he was pursuing a number of 
prospective partners before Proteome Systems signed a deal with Shimadzu: 
We talked at that time with Hewlett Packard; we talked with BioRad; we 
talked with Brooker; we talked with Applied Biosystems; we talked with 
Perceptive, who were subsequently acquired by IBI; we talked with 
Thermo Finnigan…we talked with everyone. 
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TABLE 7.3 GENERATING AND CONSIDERING OPTIONS 
  Successful Unsuccessful 
  (Number of Decisions= 34) (Number of Decisions= 14)
Looking for multiple options 
simultaneously 11 (0.324) 2 (0.143) 
      
Contrive 6 (0.177) 0 (0) 
      
Common Approach     
Common approaches 13 (0.382) 5 (0.357) 
Rule of Thumb 1 (0.029) 0 (0) 
Total 14 (0.412) 5 (0.357) 
 
As shown in Table 7.3 entrepreneurs often pursue a variety of options at any given 
time. Multiple options were also considered more in successful than in unsuccessful 
decisions. But how innovative are the entrepreneurs in identifying options or 
approaches? As summarised in Table 7.3, the analysis shows that entrepreneurs 
usually rely on approaches that are common (traditional) to an industry when it comes 
to decision-making or decision implementation. The analysis suggests that in many 
cases entrepreneurs don’t really make a choice; they follow the standard procedures. 
They often take a common approach, with the view that ‘it is the way things are 
done’. This approach may give them and other stakeholders a sense of security (the 
perception of reduced uncertainty). For example, trying to get VC funding in the early 
stages of a venture is a standard approach (at least in biotechnology). The approach to 
get VC funding is almost always the same. Mr David MacInnes (Plantic 
Technologies) explained the approach: 
Normally what happens is that you put together an information 
memorandum, and that information memorandum is used as a basis for 
discussions for raising capital. Then if a group is interested, they will then 
put down a term sheet. That term sheet will include all the terms and 
conditions of investing in the company. And part of that is due diligence 
as well. It is quite a detailed process. If you satisfy all the due diligence 
questions, they commit to give you the money. So we went down that 
route. 
 
 Similarly, it is almost a standard practice in Australia to go for public listing 
after a couple of private equity rounds. For example, Dr Igor Gonda (Acrux) gave this 
generic view of the IPO process: 
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Well, you invite a number of potential advisors who have the experience 
of doing a number of IPOs with companies in their sector. You tell them 
who you are, what is the stuff you are developing, who are the people et 
cetera. After this you say that you want to do an IPO and tell them about 
the parameters that you are looking at. You then ask them to tell if they 
would be interested and how will they take and what it would cost. You 
then wait for proposal and then build a syndicate with the leader of the 
syndicate. So that’s the process. Then there is a due diligence process. 
You hire the consultants and build the IPO material. 
 
 Likewise, there appear to be relatively standard practices for how to approach 
prospective pharmaceutical companies (which can be a prospective partner).  The 
extent to which these entrepreneurs resort to standard approaches is surprising. 
Standard approaches may be appropriate for standard situations. Charismatic, capable 
and experienced entrepreneurs can often manage when non-standard challenges arise. 
But complex challenges require complex deliberation. 
7.1.4 ‘Selection’ Styles of Entrepreneurs 
The different types of ‘selection’ styles were discussed in Chapter 6 (where they were 
termed decision end points) and are listed in Table 7.4. In this section, these styles are 
grouped into two categories: 
• styles that are generally seen to be constructive in nature and considered; and 
• styles that are generally not seen to be constructive or well considered.  
 The analysis assesses whether there is a relationship between the outcome of a 
decision and the selection styles that characterised the decision-making.   
 The decision-making process in the 48 decisions involved 98 instances of 
specific decision-making styles. Some decisions were characterised by one decision 
style (e.g., an opportunistic response to new circumstances or a decision forced by an 
investor) while other more complex decisions involved a combination of styles. 
Overall, the constructive selection styles are more often observed with successful 
decisions, and the less constructive and considered selection styles are more often 
observed with unsuccessful decisions. In fact, in unsuccessful decisions, these latter 
styles are more than three times as frequent as in successful decisions; constructive 
styles were more prevalent (about four times more frequent compared with risky 
styles).  
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TABLE 7.4 ‘SELECTION’ STYLES OF ENTREPRENEURS 
  Successful Unsuccessful 
  (Number of Decisions= 34) (Number of Decisions= 14) 
Select - Constructive and Considered     
Natural Decision 12 (0.353) 5 (0.357) 
Opportunistic 12 (0.353) 2 (0.143) 
Negotiation 11 (0.324) 1 (0.071) 
Persuasion 5 (0.147) 0 (0) 
Easy Decisions 5 (0.147) 3 (0.214) 
Involvement 8 (0.235) 1 (0.071) 
Unexpected Good luck 6 (0.177) 0 (0) 
Compromise 2 (0.059) 2 (0.143) 
Need based- Business forced 4 (0.118) 0 (0.071) 
Trust decisions 1 (0.029) 0 (0) 
Total 66 (1.941) 14 (1.0) 
      
Select - Not Constructive or Considered     
Ad hoc 1 (0.029) 2 (0.143) 
Conflict 5 (0.147) 2 (0.143) 
Politics 1 (0.029) 0 (0) 
Business environment forced upon 0 (0) 3 (0.214) 
Deliberate risk taking 0 (0) 1 (0.071) 
Forced Upon 0 (0) 3 (0.214) 
Total 7 (0.206) 11 (0.786) 
 
 Ad hoc decisions were an exception rather than the rule; opportunistic and 
easy decisions are far more common. (The subtle difference among them is discussed 
in Chapter 6.)  
 It is surprising to note that the average incidence of conflict is similar in both 
successful and unsuccessful decisions, although the numbers here were too small to 
be analysed. However, it should be noted that conflict often did have a serious 
negative impact on the company, even if it was eventually resolved and a particular 
decision process could turn out to be a success.6 Conflicts in the decision process may 
be due to politics within the company or a variety of reasons, including different 
viewpoints. 
 The average incidence of natural decisions is similar in both successful and 
unsuccessful decisions; there was an average frequency of about 35 per cent. This is 
in part because the definition for a natural decision (see Chapter 6) is very broad. A 
                                                 
6 There were usually divergent viewpoints on a subject, but conflict was due more to vastly different 
viewpoints arising out of different interests. It takes more time and effort to resolve conflicting 
viewpoints than diverging viewpoints. 
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natural decision can be a deliberated or a non-deliberated decision. It can be a simple 
decision that does not need the involvement of all stakeholders or it may be a complex 
decision that involves all the decision-makers. It might also have to be formally 
authorised. It can also be an opportunistic decision. It simply means that there is a 
high degree of consensus on that decision and it is the preferred option. However, it 
should be noted that there is a relatively high degree of involvement of the key 
decision-makers in successful decisions compared with failed decisions. The picture 
gets clearer when the natural decision is associated with involvement. Almost all the 
instances of involvement were associated with natural decisions and almost all of 
them led to a successful outcome. Most of those decisions with involvement were 
complex and strategic decisions that had a significant impact on the respective 
venture. Examples include the first round private equity funding for Phenomix; the 
IPO of Acrux; the licensing of the Aridol and Bronchitol projects by Pharmaxis; and 
an early IPO decision for Peplin et cetera. A natural decision with the involvement of 
all the stakeholders doesn’t guarantee a successful outcome, but it does seem to 
facilitate the decision process. 
 Negotiation and persuasion are more often seen in successful decisions. In 
those cases, there was more discussion and thinking on issues related to a decision 
among the stakeholders and decision-makers.  
 Similarly, forced decisions generally have a negative outcome. Few instances 
of these were identified. It is generally believed that founder entrepreneurs dominate 
the new venture, and so it might be expected that they individually take most of the 
decisions. However, this is not the case in biotechnology ventures because 
entrepreneurial teams (and not an individual entrepreneur) usually form them. As 
such, the involvement of most members is common. In view of this, it is not 
surprising to find that edict type decisions are also not common. 
7.2 Are There Any Patterns to be Seen? 
7.2.1 Visual (Diagrammatic) Patterns 
A further attempt was made (see Chapter 6) to identify patterns of decision-making 
through diagrammatic analyses, in this case based on the performance of the decision. 
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Diagrams of the decision-making process in cases of successful decisions were 
grouped, as were similar diagrams for unsuccessful decisions. No generic 
diagrammatic patterns were found through this method. An alternative approach was 
tried by: first dividing the patterns in the different types of processes that were 
discussed in Chapter 6 (decision-making; decision implementation; and decision-
making and implementation) and then separating decisions that were successful and 
unsuccessful. This led to six categories. Unfortunately, it still was not possible to 
convincingly say that there were generic diagrammatic patterns for each group. This 
approach to analysis based on diagrammatic patterns (as used by Mintzberg et al., 
1976) was consequently abandoned. 
7.2.2 Non-Visual Patterns (Statistical Analysis) 
Nevertheless, the data in Table 7.1, Table 7.2, and Table 7.4 suggest that there were 
clear distinctions between successful and unsuccessful decisions. Successful decisions 
appeared to be more thoroughly deliberated or analysed and associated with positive 
styles of decision end points or selection. This suggests that entrepreneurial decision-
making, at least in these cases, was not a unique style of decision-making, as is often 
assumed.  
 Residual maximum-likelihood (REML) was chosen as the statistical analysis 
method because the data was unbalanced with respect to the positive versus negative 
elements of the decision process. For the model, there were four positive categories 
(deliberation, deliberation facilitators, formal analysis, and select—constructive and 
considered), and only three negative categories (non-deliberative styles, lack of 
formal analysis, and select—not constructive and considered). Table 7.5 summarises 
the outcome of the REML analysis. It indicates that there is a significant interaction 
between the approach to decision-making and the successfulness of the decision (p= 
0.007).  
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TABLE 7.5 DOES THE APPROACH TAKEN DETERMINE THE OUTCOME? 
Fixed term Wald Statistics d.f. Wald/d.f. Chi pr 
Decision Process Elements (DPE) 4.60 2 2.30 0.10 
Result (Success/Failure) 0.24 1 0.24 0.625 
Approach (+/-) 1.68 1 1.68 0.195 
Result.Approach 7.26 1 7.26 0.007 
 
TABLE 7.6 TABLE OF PREDICTED MEANS OF APPROACH.OUTCOME 
 
  Positive Approach Negative Approach 
Success 1.454 0.167 
Failure 0.557 1.000 
 
 The predicted means of the interaction between approach and outcome is 
given in Table 7.6. The average SED (standard error of difference) is 0.4559. Table 
7.6 shows that there is a significant relationship between the decision-making process 
and the successfulness of the decision and that the greater the use of positive 
approaches to decision-making, the higher the likelihood (about 1.454/0.557= 2.61 
times) of a successful decision. Similarly, the greater the use of negative approaches 
to decision-making, the higher the likelihood of failure (about 1.0/0.167= 5.99 times). 
7.3 Discussion7 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the vast majority of researchers in the field of 
entrepreneurship define an entrepreneurial style of decision-making with words like 
‘ad hoc’, ‘opportunistic’, ‘intuitive’ and ‘judgmental’. The use of these words for 
entrepreneurial decision-making is so common that they are seen as trademarks for 
entrepreneurship.  
 Chapter 3 outlined how the rational approach to decision-making had been 
criticised for not adequately taking into account bounded rationality and emergent 
strategies. One researcher argued that top executives rarely use a ‘rational’ decision-
making analysis and that their approach would come closer to ‘what people call 
‘intuition’’ (Mowen, 1993:230). Mowen (1993) further added that other researchers 
have found the same phenomenon: the higher up one goes in the organisation, the 
more decision-making appears to be intuitive rather than rational. It is therefore not a 
                                                 
7 The extent to which these findings can be generalised outside of the biotech sector is discussed in 
Chapter 10. 
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surprise that entrepreneurial decision-making is considered to be intuitive. This is 
because during the early stages of a new venture, founders, along with the initial 
senior managers, are the top executives responsible for decision-making. 
 Mowen (1993:216) writes that researchers may be quite right about the 
decision-making styles of top executives because ‘rationality does not necessarily lead 
us to any particular conclusion; rather, it is the key to avoiding logical errors for 
reasoning.’ He quotes an unnamed authority on decision theory who observed that 
rationality ‘dictates what cannot be concluded, not what can’ (p. 216). Mowen (1993) 
explains that once the options reach top executives, they have been so analysed that 
the bad options have already been filtered out. Those that are left have so little cost-
benefit difference that, at that point, judgment and wisdom are what is required.  
 This explanation is not relevant to the case of decision-making in new 
ventures. This is because top executives in new ventures do not have the same 
filtering process to depend upon. The results presented here and in Chapter 6 show 
not only that careful deliberation had a major role on the decision-making of these 
entrepreneurs but that such an approach was positively related with successful 
decisions. 
 Russo and Schoemaker (2002:102) have also observed that ‘[m]anaging 
uncertainty doesn’t mean accepting vague projections, making wishy-washy 
recommendations, or abandoning planning… The challenge for decision-makers is 
not to eliminate all surprises, but to anticipate—and prepare for—them.’ They caution 
that the successes of intuitive choice are exaggerated and its risks greatly 
underappreciated. Fiet et al. (2005) also propose that entrepreneurs should avoid 
defining subjective probabilities for problems about which they do not already 
possess prior knowledge. The risk is greater when the decision is important and 
complex and has to be made in an uncertain environment. Such decisions should be 
evaluated systematically to increase an understanding of the options (Russo & 
Schoemaker, 2002:142). It is not surprising that this analysis finds that successful 
decisions have a relatively higher frequency of deliberation and formal analysis.  
 Systematic evaluation need not be exhaustive. In fact, most of the time, new 
ventures have resource and time constraints on decision-making. They then have to 
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rely on simple probes and improvisation techniques (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998:47). 
Real-time communication is very useful because it lessens the time constraint (Brown 
& Eisenhardt, 1998; Eisenhardt, 1989). Managed effectively, obtaining real-time 
information is less expensive than the traditional formal means of information 
gathering. Entrepreneurs rely on their social networks and other simple and quick 
methods (such as conferences, exhibitions and trade journals etc.) to get information. 
They also often make use of professional consultants for many complex assessments 
and when their own understanding in a particular area is limited. They also seek to 
employ (full-time or part-time) industry experts with current knowledge in the 
required domain area as soon as the need arises and they have the resources to do so. 
This also gives them quick information. So the observation made by Brown and 
Eisenhardt (1998:33) that ‘[i]n the managerial situation, improvisation is about 
extensive, real-time communication in the context of a limited structure with a few 
sharply defined responsibilities, strict priorities, and targeted deadlines’ is very 
appropriate. 
 Formal analysis can be quite time consuming and even expensive. Because of 
this, it should be used for complex and important decisions, ‘especially those that are 
now-or-never and can’t be reversed or substantially revised later’ (Russo & 
Schoemaker, 2002:157). For example, in some arenas, such as those related to 
investments in emerging technologies, early stage R&D and entry into new foreign 
markets, uncertainty will be sizable. Therefore, it is suggested that decision-makers 
commit to planning even though some uncertainty will always remain (Russo & 
Schoemaker, 2002:66). 
 It is also equally important to generate a variety of options to choose from. 
Eisenhardt (1989) found from her empirical study that successful entrepreneurs 
looked for several options simultaneously that greatly hastened the decision-making 
process. Russo and Schoemaker (2002:60) observe that ‘without good alternatives to 
choose from, it is impossible to make a good decision.’ It is the understanding of the 
full range of options early in the decision-making process that puts one on a stronger 
footing in later stages (Russo & Schoemaker, 2002:70-71).  
 Once the alternatives are generated, they should be evaluated, which can be 
done by deliberation, formal analysis or both. Nutt’s (1998a) empirical results also 
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demonstrate that success and adoption rates are higher for quantitative and qualitative 
assessments than for subjective assessments. An expert’s advice and prior relevant 
experience can quicken that evaluation. Russo and Schoemaker (2002:157-158) 
suggest that even formal decision weighting models can be built quickly by using 
one’s judgment (particularly if it is based on prior knowledge and not just gut feeling) 
to assign the importance of weights. They add that ‘thinking first and then guessing is 
better than blind guessing’ (p. 88). They further suggest that if one resorts to 
judgement as a decision tool, it is a good idea to improve on it by using the judgement 
of many people.   
 This study shows that ad hoc decision-making is unusual, if not a rarity. 
Entrepreneurs are more likely to involve other stakeholders and decision-makers. This 
is more often the case when it is an important and complex decision, and it is also 
more often the case in successful decisions. Apart from that, involvement (especially 
of board members) most often leads to a natural decision because, according to Coch 
and French (cited in Nutt, 1998b), people react more favourably and become more 
committed when they participate in the decision process.  
 Entrepreneurs also involve key players related to a decision with persuasion 
and negotiation. Persuasion is often accompanied by a more formal means of analysis, 
including the support of professional consultants and experts, to back up claims  
(Nutt, 1998b). Similarly, negotiations are also used to come to a decision. Both 
persuasion and negotiation were associated more with important and complex 
decisions and were more likely to occur in successful decisions. This may be because 
they generate positive feelings of involvement; stakeholders feel ‘listened to’ and 
develop a greater understanding, which leads to their accepting the decision. 
 Quite contrary to the image of entrepreneurs as dominating individuals, edict 
type decisions were not observed. Similarly, decision-making processes dominated by 
politics were not observed much in the new ventures. It perhaps because of this that 
the elaborate ‘micro-politics’ of the decision-process, as outlined by Narayanan and 
Fahey (1982), were not observed. Whenever there was politics, it had a detrimental 
effect on the health of the new venture. The absence of politics, however, does not 
mean that there are no divergent viewpoints. There may well be divergent viewpoints, 
but they can often be resolved by involving people. 
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 One important aspect of the decision process, especially when the context is 
dynamic and complex, is real-time learning and correcting. This calls for a real-time 
evaluation of the outcome. This leads to iterations that feed into the decision process 
continuously until the desired results related to a decision are arrived at. 
Adaptiveness, in conjunction with approaches to decision-making that produce 
successful decisions, seems to be ideal. Brown and Eisenhardt (1998:12, 34) explain it 
in the following way: 
The edge of chaos captures the complicated, uncontrolled, unpredictable 
but yet adaptive (in technical terms, self-organized) behaviour that occurs 
when there is some structure but not very much…. The chaos trap arises 
when managers go too far and demonize structure as the anathema that 
stifles freedom, flexibility, and innovation. 
 
In summary, good decision processes are the best hope for good decision 
outcomes (Russo & Schoemaker, 2002:161). Mowen (1993:233), quoting other 
researchers in judgement and decision-making, makes a similar observation: 
Intuition is fine for small decisions—where to buy groceries, how to 
organize your filing cabinet…but…you can develop procedures that will 
make your decision better than your own unaided intuition. If you follow 
sound procedures, you will have a better chance of achieving your goals 
than if you just make a choice because it ‘feels right.’ 
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Start-up characteristics not only determine start-up performance (Reuber & Fischer, 
1999) but also lay the foundation for a stable business which can be expected to grow 
(Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998). The initial strategy and structure of a venture affect 
performance over the longer term, according to many authors, because organisations 
usually tend to change only incrementally or to remain unchanged rather than to 
change radically (Reuber & Fischer, 1999). One of the most important decisions that 
the entrepreneurial team takes is to start a new venture. Along with the decision to 
start a new venture are two very closely associated decisions: what will be the 
business, and how to raise funds for it. 
 In this chapter, the ‘initial start’ is analysed as one single major decision1 and 
the decision process is related to the experience of the entrepreneurial team. This is 
because in the very early stages (pre founding and just after founding) the 
entrepreneurial team is a key resource and asset for a new venture, on which to a very 
great extent success or failure is based. 
 The differences (if any) are assessed between decision processes where people 
with relevant experience were involved and those where people without any relevant 
experience were involved. This will highlight the importance (if any) of ‘relevant’ 
experience for decision-making and implementing. This should be seen as an 
extension to the previous chapter. This chapter begins with a review of prior studies 
that directly address the issue of experience and decision-making. It then presents and 
analyses the relationships between experience and decision-making in the case study 
ventures. 
8.1 Prior Research on the Role of Experience 
In Chapter 7, it was shown that deliberation is frequently used in the decision process, 
even in a new venture context. This is perhaps due to the need for real-time 
information gathering in making a choice. Gavetti et al. (2005) says that 
                                                 
1 In this research, the ‘initial start’ decision is considered to have ended once the new venture has got 
the first round of external funding because, in some ways, this can be taken as the approval of the 
business concept. In a few cases, the external funding was either not sought or could not be raised. In 
that case, a near stability in business concept was taken as the end of the ‘initial start.’ 
 The ‘initial start’ is not actually a decision; not even by the definition used in this thesis. It is a 
conglomerate of several decisions. For the purpose of this study, ‘initial start’ is one decision process to 
study various elements of the decision process that were associated with the whole process.  
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entrepreneurs’ reasoning for choices is based neither on first principles of economics 
nor on unguided search. Rather, it is based on thinking back through their experiences 
and reflecting on them.2  
 Mitchell (1997) has argued that experience is central to the entrepreneurial 
process. Frederickson (cited in Hambrick and Mason, 1984) found that the decision 
processes of experienced managers differed markedly from those used by 
inexperienced managers because experience allows managers to test and finetune a 
cognitive model that produces more successful decisions. It appears that experts’ 
recall of information is less biased and they focus more than novices on 
inconsistencies in the ‘stimulus material’ (Fiske et al., 1983). Novices tend to organise 
knowledge around literal objects and surface features explicit in a given problem 
statement. Experts, on the other hand, have a process schema derived from knowledge 
of the subject matter (Lord & Maher, 1990). Chi et al. (cited in Lord & Maher, 1990) 
argue that experts achieve a high level of competence because their organised body of 
conceptual and procedural knowledge can be accessed and integrated with superior 
monitoring and self-regulatory skills. It is these traits of an experienced decision-
maker that are likely to help address uncertainties related to a decision (due to the 
many contextual factors, which were discussed in chapters 2 and 3). Mowen 
(1993:37) says that ‘with experience comes the ability, even under circumstances of 
extreme uncertainty and risk, to make high-stakes decisions in your personal and 
particularly in your professional life—judgement calls that will measure up to the 
highest standards of competence and withstand the test of time.’  Mowen gives 
several examples to make his point. One example is provided in Box 8.1. 
 Experience as generally perceived not only is a function of time duration but 
also depends on the type of experience (e.g., function). Hitt et al. (1982) and Hitt and 
Ireland (1985, 1986) found relationships between the importance placed on certain 
functions (distinctive competencies), strategy and performance. Smith and White 
(1987) found a relationship between a firm’s strategy and the career specialisation of 
top executives. For example, the study by Hambrick and Mason (1984) also supported 
                                                 
2 Understanding the effect of ‘experience’ has had a profound effect on management science. Rumelt et 
al. (1991) earlier observed that the ‘experience curve’ was the first wedge driven in the split that 
widened between the study of management process and the study of competitive action and market 
outcomes. In fact, the logic of experience-based competition was not imported from economics but was 
developed within strategic management and exported to economics. 
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the viewpoint that executives’ experience and functional knowledge moderate the 
relationship between objective criteria and strategic evaluation. According to Aldrich 
(cited in Politis, 2005), people tend to start businesses in industries in which they were 
previously employed because their employment experience allows them to take 
advantage of information about the exploitation of opportunities gathered from their 
previous employment. Politis (2005:406), quoting Shane and Shepherd et al., says that 
this may be because ‘entrepreneurs often face uncertainty about the value of the goods 
and services that they plan to produce, [so] it seems fair to assume that also industry-
specific experience can have a strong influence on their development of 
entrepreneurial knowledge.’ Deakins and Freel (1998) emphasise that entrepreneurs 
start enterprises in sectors where they have some contacts and existing expertise. This 
is especially the case in the biotechnology industry. It is also important to be aware 
that this is often the case because biotechnology is a very technology intensive 
business which is beyond the scope of most entrepreneurs unless they are expert in the 
domain area involved. 
Box 8.1 An Example of an Experience-based Decision 
Mowen (1993:242): 
‘A couple of years ago, I interviewed a number of executives in independent oil firms that had made it 
through the great oil bust of the 1980s. What I found was a group of mature, older individuals. They 
averaged well over twenty years each in the oil business. They had seen the good times and the bad. 
Previous experience had taught them that booms are followed by busts. They had learned that the worst 
thing an ‘oilman’ can do is highly leverage his company. Those who lost it all when the boom ended 
were most frequently the less experienced who had seen only the good times of the exploding oil prices 
of the 1970s. They took on massive debt loads in order to expand with the times, and when the plunge 
occurred, they crashed and burned.’ 
 
 In a high technology new venture it is not only industry specific technology 
experience that matters but also management experience. Prior management 
experience, according to Shane, and Lorraine and Dussault (cited in Politis, 
2005:404), ‘provides entrepreneurs skills that are needed for coping with the liabilities 
of newness, such as selling, negotiating, leading, planning, decision-making, problem 
solving, organizing, and communicating.’ And it is all the better if that management 
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experience is in the industry concerned. Lorraine et al. (1992) showed empirically that 
both previous management experience and previous industry experience were 
significantly and positively related to performance in each of the five industries they 
studied. A wonderful example is ‘Parable of the Kitchen Spindle,’ which was first 
published in the Harvard Business Review in 1962 but is cited by Russo and 
Schoemaker (2002) to explain the advantage of relevant experience. The example is 
about how a restaurant manager tries to solve a problem by talking to experts in 
different fields (such as anthropology, sociology and business administration etc.) but 
actually finds a simple workable solution from an employee who had worked in 
restaurants all his life.  
 Cooper, et al. (cited in Politis & Gabrielsson, 2005) had individually come to 
the conclusion that a variety of experiences in different functional areas was an 
indicator of better new venture performance. Gavetti et al. (2005) reach a similar 
conclusion. The rationale for this can be deduced from the observation by Dearborn 
and Simon (1958) that ‘executives define problems largely in terms of the goals and 
tasks in their respective functional areas.’ This implicitly means that a wider breadth 
of experience will lead to a more holistic understanding of an issue. 
 It is reasonable to assume that an entrepreneur or an entrepreneurial team with 
varied experience in a range of functional areas will have a better chance of survival. 
The link between type of experience and performance is explored in the following 
chapter. However, in this chapter, the analysis focuses on whether there is an 
observable difference in the decision process in a venture having access to a diverse 
set of skills (especially business skills, as technology skills are taken to be given in a 
biotechnology company).  
8.2 Are ‘Experience’ and ‘Expertise’ the Same? 
According to Reuber (1997), ‘experience’ is a broader construct than ‘expertise’. For 
example, a person may have had an experience of a start-up but have an expertise 
only in managing technical projects and not in raising funds for a start-up. Reuber 
argues that there are various definitions of ‘expertise’ based on two distinct views: 
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o A cognitive-based view defines expertise as the ‘possession of an organized 
body of conceptual and procedural knowledge than can be readily accessed 
and used with superior monitoring and self-regulation skills.’  
o A performance-based view defines expertise as the ‘ability, acquired by 
practice, to perform qualitatively well in a particular task domain.’  
Reuber (1997), however, draws attention to the fact that these two views of 
expertise are not inconsistent. She explains that ‘the first definition emphasises and 
measures cognitive attributes, presuming that they lead to superior performance, 
whereas the second definition emphasises and measures performance, presuming that 
it is a consequence of cognitive attributes’ (p. 51). 
Expertise, then, is related to excellence gained in a narrow task-specific 
domain that is acquired by in-depth experience in that particular domain (Mitchell, 
1997; Reuber, 1997).  
8.3 What is More Useful for a Start-up: Experience or Expertise? 
Most new ventures have only one or a few key managers at their core and relatively 
few levels of internal hierarchy (Mintzberg & Waters, 1982). The potential for 
individual characteristics to influence firm behaviour is therefore especially great in 
new ventures (Forbes, 2005). On the basis of these observations, it is reasonable to 
think that it will be more valuable for the entrepreneurial team (composed of a small 
number of people) to have experience on various tasks rather than in-depth expertise 
in a few (Reuber & Fischer, 1994). This is not to say that experience is more desirable 
than expertise in the core function. In fact, it is desirable to have a wide array of 
experience-based skill sets along with expertise in the core functions (e.g., expertise in 
a technology area which forms the basis of the new venture).3  
 Reuber (1997) says that the most effective managerial skills are specific to 
particular contexts, such as industries and organisations, rather than generalisable 
across contexts. One would expect that a broader set of experiences (even if they are 
specific to a context such as an industry) would be relevant at higher managerial 
                                                 
3 It is, however, important to be aware of the types of expertise that are available externally and what 
capabilities are required internally to know, assess and use this external expertise. 
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levels where there is less structure and more discretion. Indeed, a much broader set 
has been investigated in the entrepreneurship literature (Reuber, 1997). Knowledge of 
particular jobs, organisations and industries is likely to be more consequential for the 
development and demonstration of management expertise than task specific 
knowledge. 
 Chandler and Hanks (1994) have also argued that managerial competence is 
more important than experience. Their characterisation of managerial competence 
seems similar to expertise (as defined by Reuber & Fischer, 1994). Of course, as 
noted above, there is no doubt that expertise will most certainly be more useful than 
just experience (in a given area). However, new ventures are unlikely to have the full 
range of necessary expertise. It is preferable for them to have a breadth of skills with 
expertise in core areas only rather than expertise in a few and not much experience in 
many other areas. 
8.4 Impact of Relevant Experience on the Decision Process –                                     
‘Initial Start’ as the Decision Unit 
 
In any high technology venture (and biotechnology is no exception), the two required 
skill sets can be generically categorised as ‘business’ and ‘technology.’4 Decisions, 
even in new ventures (and especially important ones), are rarely made in isolation. 
Most biotechnology companies (including those in this research) have been started by 
more than one individual. As biotechnology ventures have to source early financing, 
stakeholders and key senior management people (who may not be founders) are in 
place from an early stage. Hence the need to discuss experience (in Chapter 8 and 9) 
                                                 
4 Reuber and Fischer (1994) suggest that expertise in one area may be related to, or required for, 
expertise in another. For example, an entrepreneur requires expertise in strategic planning in order to 
exhibit expertise in financing. It was not possible to sort out these finer details and relationships with 
the data collected, so a broader category was used. 
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in terms of the entrepreneurial team.5 Where there is a single entrepreneur as the only 
key decision-maker, he or she will also be taken as an entrepreneurial team.6   
 Because all the new ventures in this study had at least one individual with 
relevant technology experience (i.e., a technology expert in the domain area of the 
new venture) in the entrepreneurial team, it was assumed that business related skills 
were likely to make the difference.7 Chandler and Hanks (1994:77) have emphasised 
the importance of management and argue (while quoting others) that ‘those who 
finance new ventures consider the ‘quality’ of the management to be a significant 
factor in financing decisions.’ Therefore, in order to operationalise these distinctions, 
entrepreneurial teams were sorted into three categories: having relevant business 
experience; having non-relevant business experience8; and having no business 
experience.9 The differences, if any, in decision process style among these three 
categories are explored in the following section.10 
                                                 
5 Vanaelst et al. (2006) say that entrepreneurial teams are often investigated within a static 
framework—i.e., teams that are founded during the very early stages. They say that the dynamic 
construct of entrepreneurial teams while investigating decisions should consider the new members that 
join the team and are part of decision-making for a particular decision. However, the construct of 
‘entrepreneurial team’ is used here as the one that was set up quite early. This is because this set of 
people, on the basis of their experience, determine who to hire, when to hire and why to hire. The need 
to recognise new team members was operationalised by having the code ‘internal expert advice’ when 
there was the key involvement of a person who had joined later. 
6 Team size would definitely matter, but that is not the direct focus. The two important issues related to 
size are: breadth of experience and ease of communication. The former is manifested directly in this 
research. The second construct, ease of communication, is addressed in the ‘select’ phase of decision 
process (like conflict, involvement, etc.). 
7 Srivastava and Lee (2005) have noted the importance of education of the TMT (top management 
team) and the team size. It is to be noted that people who are well qualified founded most of the 
biotechnology start-ups in this sample. Higher education is taken as given in a biotechnology start-up, 
as has already been stated in Chapter 6.  
8 Cooper et al. (1994) and Kor (2003) have shown that industry-specific experience makes a lot of 
difference to the new venture in terms of survival and growth. 
9 Vanaelst et al. (2006), quoting several researchers, say that ‘when new ventures apply for early stage 
venture capital funds, the question of a well-balanced team with sufficient business experience is often 
raised by the potential investors to evaluate a project.’ 
 Berry (1996) concludes that in the small high-tech ventures where the skills of the technical 
entrepreneur are balanced and complemented with those of managers from other functional areas, a 
multidisciplinary approach to the formulation of corporate strategy is apparent and the concerned entity 
is more market-led. 
10 The initial start of 27 new ventures was discussed in detail. Of these 27, nine ventures had relevant 
business experience in their entrepreneurial team; 12 had no business experience; and six had business 
experience skill sets, but the experience was not in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry. 
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8.5 Effect of ‘Relevant’ Experience on the Decision Process 
The question of whether relevant experience makes any difference to the decision 
process will be explored in this section. This is explored through an examination of 
the difference in ‘average’ counts for entrepreneurial teams with different experience 
on each of the elements of the decision process: deliberation styles; non-deliberative 
styles; deliberation facilitators; formal analysis; lack of formal analysis; select— 
constructive and considered; and select—risky and not considered.    
8.5.1 Deliberation Styles 
An entrepreneurial team that has relevant business experience uses deliberation styles 
twice as often as teams that have no business experience or have no relevant business 
experience (see Table 8.1).  
TABLE 8.1 PRIOR BUSINESS EXPERIENCE AND DELIBERATION STYLES IN DECISION-
MAKING 
Æ Prior Experience Relevant  No   Non-relevant  
Æ Number of Entrepreneurial Teams 9 12 6 
Deliberation Styles       
Deliberation11 22 (2.444) 11 (0.917) 6 (1.00) 
Logic 11 (1.222) 7 (0.583) 5 (0.833) 
Planning 5 (0.556) 2 (0.167) 5 (0.833) 
Expert Advise 4 (0.444) 7 (0.583) 0 
Internal expert advice 5 (0.556) 2 (0.167) 0 
Directed search 1 (0.111) 1 (0.083) 0 
Total 48 (5.333) 30 (2.50) 16 (2.667) 
 
Note: The first number in each column (not within brackets) indicates the total number of that 
particular sub-element found in various categories (i.e., ‘Relevant,’ ‘No, ’and ‘Non-Relevant’ 
experience). Because the number of decisions assessed within each category is different, it was more 
prudent to compare the average of incidence of sub-elements in each category. The same method (and 
logic) is used in the following tables. (Refer also to the coding style discussed in Chapter 5.) 
                                                 
11 ‘Deliberation’ is used to denote active and conscious thinking, careful thinking, creative thinking and 
discussions. It doesn’t include logic and knowing thy area. The former approaches are considered to be 
more proactive whereas the latter approaches are more passive. 
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8.5.1(a) Deliberation 
‘Deliberation’ is the style most favoured by all three types of entrepreneurial team. 
However, the intensity (i.e., frequency) of deliberation is highest in entrepreneurial 
teams with relevant business experience. Such teams seem to be thinking and 
discussing more issues more often and in greater depth. Entrepreneurial teams with no 
or no relevant experience have a much lower average frequency of deliberation. Their 
lack of knowledge in business matters may result in their recognising fewer issues to 
deliberate upon.  
 It is interesting to note that most of the deliberation takes place on issues 
related to the development of the product and on fundraising issues. This should not 
be too surprising because biotechnology ventures are generally known to focus on IP 
development; the marketing of end products (especially of therapeutics) is generally 
beyond them due to the huge resources that are required to even be able to complete 
the product development. But even in building value by developing IP, the resources 
needed to keep R&D going is the biggest issue. Deliberations related to the 
development of technology are not related to technological issues per se but features 
that may affect its successful commercialisation. For example, Mr Gary Redlich 
(Peplin) talked about some decisions related to their product: 
For a period of time we were considering the question of whether or not a 
less purified fraction from the plant might be marketable as a 
complementary product across the counter for skin cancer and other 
diseases and it became clear that it will unduly complicate the potential 
licensing program for the single molecule to a pharmaceutical company. 
So we decided to do the safe thing first, which was to license the pure 
molecule first and then think about what we might do with less pure 
fractions when we figured out what the licensing conditions are going to 
be for our first deal. 
 
He further elaborated on another dimension—the cost of the product—which 
could have a major impact on the commercial benefits of their product: 
There were questions all along regarding the cost of goods. How will you 
manufacture something that will always be a plant derived purified 
molecule and not ever be something that can be synthetically 
manufactured? So we spent a lot of time and a lot of effort and money 
resolving the question of production to the point where we were confident 
that we can make and sell this drug at a price that will make it an attractive 
licensing prospect. 
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  However, if the biotechnology venture is selling products or services, it is 
important that they carefully look into different aspects directly related to their 
prospective customers. Simply having a superior technology may not lead to success. 
Dr Marc Wilkins (Proteome Systems) talked about their deliberation effort: 
We did ask ourselves questions. Is it a valuable offering? What is the best 
way to really capture that value? Well, I guess traditionally people will 
look it as: ‘Here are 10 different components; what is the price of all 
these? And you pay the price for what these 10 things are up to.’ Another 
way of looking at it is: ‘OK, the sum of these components in terms of its 
value is greater than the cost of each of the bits and pieces that are added 
up.’ So the question was that how do we make sure that the value is 
appropriately reflected in the price and at the same time having to make 
sure that the customer understands the value and is comfortable with a 
platform that is going to cost a little bit more than just the sum of 10 
different components. 
8.5.1(b) Logic 
Simple logic is also used quite often during the decision process, however at only 
about half the average frequency of deliberation. Yet again, it is entrepreneurial teams 
with relevant business experience that seem to use it more often than those who have 
no or non-relevant business experience (see Table 8.1).  
 It is observed that entrepreneurial teams use simple logic in the decision 
process when the subject matter is a simple choice or the choice is very obvious. 
Simple logic is also used to arrive at a certain option. However, if the option is related 
to an important and complex decision, that should be verified before committing to it. 
Due diligence is essential. Committing to an important decision based only on logic 
can be dangerous. For example, one respondent (who was primarily an academic) 
talked about the reason for collaborations, which seemed quite logical. However, 
alliances based on this simple logic and not due diligence meant that quite a few 
partnerships did not work: 
The reason we are successful in discovery is because we had an excellent 
technology and excellent technologists. And it is also because we have 
excellent scientists, so it is all those things. But we certainly couldn’t have 
been experts and innovators in our field without the technology. So we 
need to continue to innovate and develop new technologies; we can’t 
afford to do all these in-house. So we need to partner around those 
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opportunities. So we are very proactive in seeking potential partnerships 
with companies that are interested to co-develop or fund the development 
of certain technologies that then would have sales and marketing rights. 
 
 On the other hand, Dr Sudhir Pai (an experienced pharma industry 
professional) of Lotus Labs talked about how he accidentally came across an idea for 
a new venture that logically made sense. Due diligence processes were still 
undertaken to confirm it. The decision turned out to be very successful. He said of his 
idea: 
We then also realised that a lot of Indian pharma companies are getting 
into US and European market, which will have requirement to conduct 
something like this [pharmacokinetics and clinical trials]. And all of the 
studies that they were doing were conducted in either US or Europe, 
which was very expensive. We thought that we could start something like 
this here and make it as good as any European or US company in terms of 
quality. We then had good chance of making big. 
8.5.1(c) Planning 
Table 8.1 shows that entrepreneurial teams with business experience that is not of 
direct relevance use planning more often than those that have either relevant business 
experience or no business experience. However, in view of the difficulty in 
distinguishing between different deliberation styles, including planning, no definite 
conclusions should be drawn from this (see Chapter 6). Most of the planning done 
was of a fairly simple nature with a bit of forward thinking and was useful for the 
teams to fill the necessary gaps. For example, Dr Richard Brandon (Genetraks) said of 
their decision to hire a chief financial officer (CFO) before fundraising: 
Well, the next step was to bring in Stephen Hendricks, who was pretty 
much the chief financial officer. We had got only three people. We all 
were chiefs but he was doing finances. He has got an accounting 
background and an MBA background as well. So he knew all of those 
things and he had a lot of experience in running his own business and also 
in attracting finance to other people’s business by acting as consultants. 
Once we got to a certain stage, so he came in and did that part of the 
business. 
 
 There is, however, no particular single decision or an aspect of a decision for 
which planning is done or favoured. It appears to be used for many types of decisions.  
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8.5.1(d) Expert Advice 
Entrepreneurial teams with no business experience rely on external expert advice 
more often than entrepreneurial teams with either relevant business experience or non-
relevant business experience. A closer look reveals that most such advice concerns 
fundraising or drafting a robust business plan. Even when entrepreneurial teams with 
relevant experience use expert advice, it is usually for fundraising or IP issues. In 
many cases, it occurred just prior to a person having relevant business experience 
joining the team. For example, Dr Andrew Wilks (founding scientist, Cytopia) spoke 
about getting the help of Dr Kevin Healey to write a business plan. That was just 
before Medica Holdings, a pooled development fund formed by Dr Kevin Healey, 
funded Cytopia and Dr Healey became CEO of Cytopia. Similarly, Dr Alan 
Robertson advised Rothschild (a VC firm) on the business plan of Pharmaxis and was 
later hired as CEO soon after Rothschild decided to fund it. 
  While there was a higher incidence of the use of external experts by 
entrepreneurial teams with no business experience, entrepreneurial teams with 
relevant business experience tended to rely more often on an internal expert, if there 
was one. 
8.5.2 Non-Deliberative Styles 
There was a much higher incidence of not seeking the advice of experts (even when it 
seemed to be clearly warranted) by entrepreneurial teams that did not have any 
business experience or had non-relevant business experience (see Table 8.4). For 
example, one of the respondents spoke of the initial fundraising in this way: 
I suppose one of our real problems was that we wanted the company to 
remain in our hands and we wanted to remain the major shareholder of it. 
And the big people that we approached like Macquarie Bank and other… I 
can’t remember the names but there were quite a few of them. The main 
problem was that they also wanted to be the major shareholder, maybe 
have five per cent, and we were not prepared to do that. So that was really 
the big stumbling block. And once we got used to this idea of making it a 
public company and then it seemed…it is much better way to go. 
 
In fact, it went further when they did not take expert advice for even the public listing 
of their company: 
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Mr X was talking to a lot of people and I think he got a businessman 
called Mr Y, and then he spoke to some of his mates and they quickly 
arranged for it at that stage. We got totally disillusioned trying to get 
funding from other sources. Mr Y, who was involved in mining 
company… 
 
TABLE 8.2 INCIDENCE OF NON-DELIBERATIVE STYLES DURING INITIAL START 
Æ Prior Experience Relevant  No Non-relevant  
Æ Number of Entrepreneurial Teams 9 12 6 
Non Deliberative Styles       
Convictions 2 (0.222) 4 (0.333) 2 (0.333) 
Deliberation-partial 1 (0.111) 0 1 (0.167) 
Not Directed Search 1 (0.111) 0 1 (0.167) 
No expert advise 1 (0.111) 14 (1.167) 10 (1.667) 
Not clearly defined idea 2 (0.222) 3 (0.25) 3 (0.5) 
Total 7 (0.778) 21 (1.75) 17 (2.833) 
 
 It is again entrepreneurial teams with no or non-relevant business experience 
where convictions and not clearly defined ideas more frequently occur in decision-
making. 
8.5.3 Deliberation Facilitators 
Entrepreneurial teams that have relevant business experience and those that have no 
business experience are more attentive to what they know and what they do not know 
(see Table 8.2). They are attentive to their strengths and weaknesses across a range of 
issues. However, those who do not have relevant business experience seem to be 
particularly attentive to their limitations and their strengths and weaknesses related to 
their technology (which may not generally include the business dimension of their 
technology).  
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TABLE 8.3 INCIDENCE OF DELIBERATION FACILITATORS DURING INITIAL START 
Æ Prior Experience Relevant  No Non-relevant  
Æ Number of Companies 9 12 6 
Deliberation Facilitators       
Knowing ones limitations/partner/technology 
environment 12 (1.333) 13 (1.083) 1 (0.167) 
Prior relevant experience 3 (0.333) 1 (0.083) 0 
Decision facilitator 4 (0.444) 4 (0.333) 1 (0.167) 
Symbiotic 1 (0.111) 0 1 (0.167) 
Formal business training to be more efficient 0 2 (0.167) 1 (0.167) 
Second opinion 0 3 (0.25) 2 (0.333) 
Predisposition to the idea 1 (0.111) 2 (0.167) 0 
Very defined idea 1 (0.111) 0 0 
Total 22 (2.444) 25 (2.083) 6 (1.00) 
 
 Some of the entrepreneurial teams with no business experience had thought 
about their limitations and had been proactive in undertaking formal business training. 
Similarly, entrepreneurial teams with no business experience or non-relevant business 
experience sought second opinions on some of their choices. For example, one of the 
respondents said he took the advice of his business acquaintances (who did not belong 
to the biotechnology industry) on whether to start a biotechnology business: 
I always had a lot of friends and colleagues in the business sector as well 
as in pure science. I had a lot of encouragement from them to take this 
step…take this jump, really. They basically said that the business side is 
potentially challenging but someone who had actually established a 
research group…. In my case, I had actually built a research centre from 
scratch. I also managed a research program that ended up being quite a big 
one. They said that you had necessary skills to move and manage a 
business and indeed to establish a business. 
 
 Entrepreneurial teams with relevant business experience do not seek second 
opinions. This may simply be due to the perception that it is dangerous to make 
important choices based on second opinions. 
8.5.4 Formal Analysis  
Business plans were common across all the entrepreneurial teams. However, the 
majority of teams made business plans to raise capital, which is one of the first things 
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on the agenda either just prior to setting up a new venture or just after.  Therefore, not 
having a business plan was more the exception than the rule. 
TABLE 8.4 HOW MUCH FORMAL ANALYSIS DID ENTREPRENEURIAL TEAMS WITH VARYING 
BUSINESS EXPERIENCE DO? 
Æ Prior Experience Relevant  No   Non-relevant  
Æ Number of Entrepreneurial Teams 9 12 6 
Formal Analysis        
Business Plan  9 (1.00) 10 (0.833) 5 (0.833) 
Formal planning 7 (0.778) 0 0 
Professional consultants 11 (1.222) 9 (0.75) 2 (0.333) 
Total 27 (3.00) 19 (1.583) 7 (1.167) 
 
 The term ‘formal planning’ is used to emphasise that the nature of planning 
was more structured and comprehensive in nature. However, being structured and 
comprehensive doesn’t necessarily mean that it was elaborate, time consuming or 
required large resources. A small formal planning effort can also give a good 
understanding of the market. For example, Dr Sudhir Pai (Lotus Labs) said: 
We had no other comparison in India to start with. There were only one or 
two companies but not publicly listed, so we could not gather any data 
from them. We discussed with a few pharmaceutical companies who were 
giving out these studies—i.e., they were doing these studies outside. So 
when we checked up with them…for example, the cost of a particular 
study if you do it in USA is Rs 10 million, but when we worked it out it 
could probably be done at Rs 3-4 million. So we could see a huge gap 
there; the only trigger was when we checked with other pharma companies 
about costing involved. We also looked at the market size. We also looked 
at number of patented products that are going out of patents between 2001 
and 2008. That number was huge. So we could see a market and we could 
also see India getting into some kind of patent regime. All of these big 
companies will then have to probably shut shops if they don’t look for 
avenues to grow. All of them started looking at US and Europe generic 
market. So then we thought, ‘OK. If these many compounds are going off 
patent and there are these many companies in India and each company will 
come out with three to four products every year, then we have good 
opportunity.’ We also realised that there were so many companies in US 
and Europe and so many biotech companies coming up and slowly India 
had started looking at opening up for biotech and clinical trail activities. 
 
 Only entrepreneurial teams with relevant experience used formal planning 
methods during the initial start of their company (see Table 8.3). However, all 
entrepreneurial teams used professional consultants more frequently than they 
engaged in formal planning. Of the various types of professional consultants, lawyers 
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and accountants were most often used at the start of new biotechnology ventures. This 
was closely followed by management consultants, especially major management 
consultancies, who were hired to write a robust business plan. Again, entrepreneurial 
teams with relevant business experience took the lead in seeking advice from 
consultants.  
8.5.5 Lack of Formal Analysis  
There is very clear evidence that entrepreneurial teams that do not have any business 
experience are more vulnerable to incomplete analysis and planning. Such 
entrepreneurial teams also don’t make as much use of expert advice or professional 
consultants. This may simply be due to their lack of knowledge of the full range of 
issues that are important to a particular decision. For example, one respondents said: 
Our business plan was never… We never really went to a venture 
capitalist, so it didn’t have to be as perfect as you would probably expect 
from somebody who is starting out fresh and has to approach a VC. We 
did not have that pressure. We did our projections, but it was more for our 
own purpose. We never had to pursue it with somebody. We never were 
under pressure to reach that target. It was good that for first two years we 
did not have any pressure as we got time to understand the market and 
react accordingly. 
 
In the above example, the respondent had enough capital to start and sustain a new 
venture so never felt the need to have a robust business plan. Such instances of self-
sufficiency in capital are rare.  
TABLE 8.5 INCIDENCE OF A LACK OF FORMAL ANALYSIS DURING INITIAL START 
Æ Prior Experience Relevant  No Non-relevant  
Æ Number of Entrepreneurial 
Teams  9  12  6 
Lack of Formal Analysis        
Limited analysis 2 (0.222) 4 (0.333) 0 
No planning 0 5 (0.417) 1 (0.167) 
No Business Plan 0 1 (0.083) 0 
Total 2 (0.222) 10 (0.833) 1 (0.167) 
Planning limitations 3 (0.333) 2 (0.167) 1 (0.167) 
 
 However, there are always going to be some issues associated with a decision 
for which it is genuinely hard to come to any definite conclusion. In such cases, the 
only answer relies in taking a calculated risk based on expert advice (and/or prior 
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experience). For example, Dr Andrew Wilks (Cytopia) spoke about some genuine 
risks related to the development of therapeutics (especially the medical areas on 
which they were working): 
There is no question that both of those areas are incredibly competitive. 
When you do NPV analysis of any drug at an early stage in either of those, 
they can be worth nothing or can be worth billions. It just depends on the 
risk adjustment and probability of success that can be anything from 0 to 
100 per cent depending on how crazy or stupid you might be. [I]t is a roll 
of a dice exercise. If you feel that your science is comparatively new and 
that you are in an area that is very competitive…that is where it depends 
on how confident you are on your science. So you might do your SWOT 
analysis and competitive analysis but unless there is somebody already in 
clinic with exactly what you have got, you are not going to not do it. 
Competition is probably something that you just accept and go along with 
it. 
8.5.6 Contrive and Common Approach 
Entrepreneurial teams resort to common ways of doing things more often than 
designing or contriving new ideas or approaches. However, entrepreneurial teams that 
deviate from common approaches may do so due to creative thinking that had its 
genesis either in their choice to do things differently or in response to an adverse 
business environment.   
TABLE 8.6 WHICH TYPE OF ENTREPRENEURIAL TEAM WAS MORE INNOVATIVE IN 
DECISION-MAKING? 
Æ Prior Experience Relevant  No Irrelevant  
Æ Number of Entrepreneurial
Teams 9 12 6 
Looking for Multiple Options 10 (1.111) 12 (1.00) 7 (1.167) 
Contrive 3 (0.333) 1 (0.083) 0 
Common Approach       
Common approaches 12 (1.333) 5 (0.417) 4 (0.667) 
Thumb rules 0 1 (0.083) 0 
Total 12 (1.333) 6 (0.5) 4 (0.667) 
 
 Surprisingly, all types of entrepreneurial teams had an almost equal propensity 
to look for multiple options simultaneously. When the stakes are high, relying on one 
option may be too risky.  
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8.5.7 Select – Constructive and Considered 
 Each type of entrepreneurial team had a similar average incidence of 
constructive and considered styles of selection in decision process (see Table 8.7).  
TABLE 8.7 WHICH TYPE OF ENTREPRENEURIAL TEAM HAD MORE POSITIVE DECISION 
STYLES? 
Æ Prior Experience Relevant  No   Non-relevant  
Æ Number of Entrepreneurial Teams 9 12 6 
Select – Constructive and 
Considered       
Natural Decision 6 (0.667) 2 (0.167) 1 (0.167) 
Opportunistic 3 (0.333) 5 (0.417) 0 
Negotiation 3 (0.333) 2 (0.167) 4 (0.667) 
Persuasion 0 3 (0.25) 2 (0.333) 
Easy Decisions 0 2 (0.167) 0 
Involvement 2 (0.222) 0 1 (0.167) 
Unexpected Good luck 4 (0.444) 3 (0.25) 0 
Support of influential people 2 (0.222) 3 (0.25) 1 (0.167) 
Managed procrastination 0 1 (0.083) 1 (0.167) 
Need Based Decision 0 2 (0.167) 2 (0.333) 
Trust decisions 0 2 (0.167) 0 
Total 20 (2.222) 25 (2.083) 12 (2.0) 
 
 However, entrepreneurial teams with relevant business experience had a much 
higher incidence of natural decision whereas entrepreneurial teams with no or no 
relevant business experience had to take up the challenge to persuade or negotiate for 
desired options. For entrepreneurial teams with no or no relevant business experience, 
it appeared more difficult to convince someone to put money in the venture or to hire 
a reputable person. For example, Dr Villoo Patell (Avesthagen) recalled the days 
when she started her company from a rented house and it was difficult to convince 
investors: 
So all investors would come to look at Sarkar Nagar office. I used to say, 
‘We are raising the money to build labs. You are not going to see anything 
fancy over here. That’s why I am with you. If I had a fancy lab and it 
would have been running, then why would I be with you?’ 
 
 However, persuasion is also required when people have different viewpoints, 
especially in the case of important decisions. Professor Richard Boyd recalled his 
meeting with the senior management and board of directors of Norwood Abbey so 
that he could persuade them to fund his project: 
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It wasn’t a unanimous decision. There were guys on the Board who were 
not happy about investing their money with immunology when they were 
primarily a medical devices company. But thankfully…. If they eventually 
voted against it, I couldn’t tell you but I would imagine one or two saying, 
‘No, I don’t think it is priority for us.’ But there were enough people on 
the Board who said yes. So, they signed on the budget. So, yes we had to 
convince these two guys who were not happy about it but I think in the 
end they probably thought [it was OK]. 
 
 New ventures (especially in biotechnology) are always short of capital, and 
this makes them more vulnerable to unfair or lopsided deals. The entrepreneurial team 
needs to be careful of this and to try to negotiate a good deal. It is not surprising that 
entrepreneurial teams with no or no relevant business experience are offered an unfair 
deal more often due to information asymmetry. This leads to negotiations. The 
number and intensity of negotiations will depend on several contextual factors, such 
as knowledge of the entrepreneurial team, their monetary situation et cetera. For 
example, one respondent said that venture capital was interested in investing in the 
company provided that they had only contract services in the business model, which 
was unacceptable to the entrepreneur. They reached a decision point when the 
development of IP (the entrepreneur’s wish) was kept intact but the funding amount 
was restricted: 
They were very stupid. I kept telling them. They said that if you don’t 
build this business model, you won’t get funded. They were telling me to 
forget IP. I was saying, ‘For three years there won’t be any money, so we 
have to have Rs 15 crores.’ But they fixed me into Rs 8 crores model. It 
was insufficient. There was no money to play for other two years. So 
January-February 2002 I started raising new funds.12 
 
 It is not surprising that an entrepreneurial team, especially one with no or no 
relevant business experience, will often fail to get an acceptable deal and will be 
forced to look for an alternative due to their pressing needs for funding.  
 Opportunistic and unexpected good luck decisions, while infrequent, appear to 
be equally common to every type of entrepreneurial team. This is expected because 
good luck can happen to anyone and is beyond anyone’s control. 
                                                 
12 1 crore = 10 million 
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8.5.8 Select – Not Constructive or Considered 
As discussed earlier, each type of entrepreneurial team, irrespective of its business 
experience, had the same propensity to choose selection styles that were constructive 
and considered. However, entrepreneurial teams with no or no relevant business 
experience had a much higher incidence of selection styles that were risky and not 
considered (see Table 8.9).  
TABLE 8.8 WHICH TYPE OF ENTREPRENEURIAL TEAM HAD A MORE RISKY AND NOT-
CONSIDERED STYLE OF SELECTION? 
Æ Prior Experience Relevant  No   Non-relevant  
Æ Number of Entrepreneurial
Teams 9 12 6 
Select – Not Constructive or 
Considered       
Ad hoc 0 3 (0.25) 3 (0.50) 
Conflict 1 (0.111) 3 (0.25) 3 (0.50) 
Politics 0 2 (0.167) 0 
Decision in frustration 0 3 (0.25) 3 (0.50) 
Deliberate risk taking 0 0 0 
Forced Upon 0 0 0 
Edict 0 2 (0.167) 0 
Total 1 (0.111) 13 (1.083) 9 (1.5) 
 
 The entrepreneurial team with non-relevant business experience had a much 
higher incidence of selection styles that were risky and not considered. This may be 
due to their applying inappropriate business principles or overconfidence about their 
knowledge. (Otherwise they would have sought expert advice). This seems to be the 
case because they had a higher incidence of ad hoc styles of decision-making. For 
example, one respondent spoke about the vastly different and non-related projects that 
were initiated within the company during the early stages: 
It is our absolute intention and focus of our company that the objective of 
our company is to use this technology to produce products in life science, 
primarily in human medical area. But it doesn’t mean that we wouldn’t do 
things in ag[riculture] or veterinary science or whatever. But we have 
tended to specialise in the human area and that happened because partly 
we received funding to do that and as a consequence of those funding 
partnerships we have developed a lot of expertise in respiratory disease 
and in neurodegenerative disease. So they have become our signature 
areas. But we do have other programs in-house under much lower level 
but where we believe our technology could make a difference. We believe 
that we have right clinical partners to be in a position to generate an 
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edge…like generating some IP and some partnering gives us strong 
position in negotiating a deal within different groups in the area of cancer 
and infectious disease. 
 
 The entrepreneurial teams with no relevant business experience were also seen 
to get into trouble more often, which led to decisions that were not optimal or 
desirable. One respondent spoke about their decision to go for a public offering 
because they were not able to raise equity funding due to their inclination to control 
the company: 
And they went around, saw various contacts of theirs and tried to get some 
funding. And that ended up being more difficult than what we had thought 
earlier. But in the end they decided to go ahead with the public float, 
which wasn’t what we wanted initially. We wanted the company to retain 
control of ourselves but it turned out that probably is unrealistic, so we 
went with a public float.  
8.6 Discussion13 
The analysis in Chapter 7 showed that the process for successful decisions differed 
from that for unsuccessful decisions. This chapter reports the results of the analysis of 
the patterns of decision-making of entrepreneurial teams with varying degrees of 
business experience.   
 Thomas and McDaniel (1990) suggest that past experience and prior 
knowledge create frameworks that are used to reduce ambiguity and create meaning. 
The emphasis is on the notion that what people know influences what they can know. 
The knowledge of context is a factor of individual managerial characteristics that in 
turn will influence firm decision behaviour. Because there is a high level of 
managerial discretion in new ventures, the effect of individual managerial 
characteristics (in this case, relevant experience) on the decision process can be 
substantial. The analysis suggests that this was indeed the case. 
 
 
                                                 
13 The extent to which these findings can be generalised outside the biotech industry is discussed in 
Chapter 10. 
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TABLE 8.9(A) THE CONTRIBUTION OF EXPERIENCE TO THE DECISION-MAKING 
APPROACH: WALD TEST (SEQUENTIALLY ADDING TERMS TO FIXED 
MODEL) 
Fixed term Wald Statistics d.f. Wald/d.f. Chi pr 
Experience 0.62 2 0.31 0.734 
Approach (+/-) 8.88 1 8.88 0.003 
Decision Process Elements (DPE) 3.99 2 2 0.136 
Experience.Approach 6.73 2 3.37 0.035 
Experience.DPE 1.35 4 0.34 0.853 
Approach.DPE 0.34 2 0.17 0.844 
 
TABLE 8.9(B) THE CONTRIBUTION OF EXPERIENCE TO THE DECISION-MAKING 
APPROACH 
Fixed term Wald Statistics d.f. Wald/d.f. Chi pr 
Experience 0.92 2 0.46 0.63 
Approach (+/-) 13.29 1 13.29 <0.001 
Decision Process Elements (DPE) 5.97 2 2.99 0.05 
Experience.Approach 10.07 2 5.04 0.007 
 
 The data for relevant experience were unbalanced with respect to the a priori 
determined positive versus negative elements of the decision process. For the model, 
there were four positive elements (deliberation, deliberation facilitators, formal 
analysis, and selection—considered and constructive) and only three negative 
elements (non-deliberative styles, lack of formal analysis, and selection—not 
constructive and considered). It was therefore necessary to examine the effects of the 
factors using residual maximum likelihood (REML). Table 8.9(a), which illustrates 
the Wald statistics obtained from the analysis, shows a large main effect due to 
approach (p= 0.003) and a significant interaction between approach and experience 
(p= 0.035). This analysis was re-run omitting the non-significant two factor 
interaction terms. The results, presented in Table 8.9(b), show that the main effect for 
the two terms was enhanced and highly significant (p<0.001), as was the interaction 
for approach and experience (p= 0.007).  
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TABLE 8.10 TABLE OF PREDICTED MEANS OF EXPERIENCE.APPROACH 
   Positive Approach Negative Approach 
Relevant Experience 3.108 0.37 
No Experience 1.921 1.222 
Non-relevant Experience 1.567 1.5 
 
 The predicted means of the interaction between experience and approach is 
shown in Table 8.10. The average SED (standard error of difference) was 0.6233. 
Table 8.10 clearly shows that the high value of positive approach and relevant 
experience is the main contributor to the significance of the interaction between 
experience and approach.  
 The analysis shows that entrepreneurial teams with relevant business 
experience tend to make much more thoughtful decisions than entrepreneurial teams 
with non-relevant or no business experience. The former type of team tends to use 
more deliberation and formal analysis for any particular decision. It is also possible 
that decisions by entrepreneurial teams with relevant business experience are more 
holistic in nature. Indeed, entrepreneurial teams with relevant business experience 
made fewer ad hoc decisions and had fewer instances when they had to make a 
decision under unpleasant circumstances. 
 Entrepreneurial teams with non-relevant business experience were more 
susceptible to so-called negative styles than entrepreneurial teams with no business 
experience. Similarly, teams with non-relevant business experience used positive 
styles (such as professional consultants) with less frequency than teams with no 
business experience. This may possibly be due to their ‘half knowledge.’ They know 
that it is important to plan and deliberate on commercial issues (related to both 
technology and business), but they do not know issues that are specific and vital in 
biotechnology. For example, a person with business experience (such as from an IT 
industry) will be familiar with the process of fundraising but may not be completely 
aware of nuances (such as the evaluation approach) that are very typical in the 
biotechnology industry. This type of individual may therefore have unreasonable 
expectations.
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Does Relevant Experience Make a 
Difference to the Outcome? 
 
 
 
Norman Vincent Peale: Empty pockets never held anyone back. Only empty heads and 
empty hearts can do that. 
 
Leonardo da Vinci: Experience does not err. Only your judgments err by expecting from her 
what is not in her power. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                             
 
 
In Chapter 7, the outcome of a decision was shown to be associated with some 
characteristics of the decision process. Chapter 8 explored the relationships between 
the decision process and the experience of the entrepreneurial team. This chapter takes 
the next step by analysing the relationships between the type of experience of the 
entrepreneurial team, the respective style of the decision process and the outcome. 
 Does relevant experience make a difference to the decision process? Do these 
differences lead to a better outcome? If there is clear evidence of such relationships, it 
will be of great significance for decision-makers, policymakers and academics.  
 Some researchers have made an attempt to link experience to performance. 
However, careful empirical assessment requires that the experience which makes a 
genuine difference to the decision process be clarified and the characteristics of the 
decision process that affect the outcome are identified.  
9.1 What Scholars Have to Say on the Effect of Experience on Performance 
Reuber and Fischer (1994:365) see experience playing a central role in new venture 
formation: 
[P]rospective business owners would have some criteria against which to 
assess their own readiness for start-up, to identify areas in which they 
might want to gain further experience, or to gain insights on ways to 
capitalize on the experience they do have, such as entering particular 
industries. 
 
Reuber and Fischer (1994) report that even though it would be logical to think 
that entrepreneurs’ experience affects firm performance, empirical research has 
yielded mixed results. (See the summary of their literature review in Table 9.1.) 
Reuber and Fischer (1994) conclude that this variation in results may be due to great 
variety in the experience and performance measures used and in the definition of 
‘entrepreneur’. For their own study, Reuber and Fischer (1994) constructed 17 
measures of performance covering a wider set of dimensions.  
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STUDY Industry 
Examined 
Management 
Experience 
Industry 
Experience 
Small Business 
Experience 
Owner and/or 
Start-up 
Experience 
Educational 
Experience 
Performance 
Measure(s) 
Bates (1990) Many x previously been a 
manager (Y/N) 
   + level achieved Business survival 
Keeley and Roure 
(1990) 
Technology-based x general management 
level (Y/N) 
x previous firm in 
same industry 
(Y/N) 
  x level achieved Discounted returns 
to investors 
Cooper, Woo and 
Dunkelberg (1989) 
Many + level managed 
(workers, managers) 
 x small (100 
employees) and 
large firm 
experience (Y/N) 
+ previously owned a 
business (Y/N) 
+ level achieved Initial size of firm 
Sandberg and 
Hofer (1987) 
Many x managerial experience 
in a related industry 
(Y/N) 
x management 
experience  
 x owned and/or 
started other firm 
(no/was a success/not 
success) 
x level achieved Return on equity 
Duchesneau and 
Gartner (1989 
Fresh juice 
distributors 
+ familiarity with 7 
functional areas 
    Profits, salaries 
Stuart and Abetti 
(1990) 
Technology-based + highest management 
level in previous firm  
  + composite of 
number of start-ups, 
roles, success 
- level achieved Composite of 
growth and profit 
Dyke, Fischer and 
Reuber (1992) 
Five different 
industries 
+ composite variable of 
number of years previous 
management experience 
and number years of 
previous experience with 
similar products 
+ management 
experience  
 + number of previous 
start-ups 
x number of years 
Previous business 
ownership 
x level achieved Sales; profit; 
employees; growth 
in sales, profit, 
employees; 
business stage  
Van den Ven, 
Hudson, and 
Schroeder (1984) 
Educational 
software 
 x number of years 
in software 
industry 
- small business 
experience (Y/N) 
 + level achieved Growth (sales, 
employees, 
customers) 
subjective 
assessment 
+ denotes a significant and positive relationship with performance; - denotes a significant and negative relationship with performance; x denotes a relationship with 
performance that was not significant. 
TABLE 9.1 LITERATURE REVIEW BY REUBER AND FISCHER (1994) - RELATING EXPERIENCE TO FIRM PERFORMANCE  
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While research into the experience-performance interaction has not produced 
clear outcomes, venture capitalists and other investors clearly value prior management 
experience (Reuber & Fischer, 1994). In fact, Reuber and Fischer (1994:366) go to 
the extent of saying that ‘[e]ven authors who do not find a relationship between the 
experience of the entrepreneur and firm performance are hesitant to conclude that 
experience, or lack of experience, is inconsequential.’ 
 Reuber and Fischer (1994) and Reuber (1997) ascertain that certain types of 
experiences were more closely related to firm performance than others. Experience in 
strategic planning, developing a business plan, developing global markets/operations, 
financing and strategic alliance formation was found to be positively related to 
performance.1 Significantly, these authors also found a significant negative 
correlation between start-up experience and R&D expertise. They reason that this may 
be because those who had spent more time in R&D would have spent less time in 
start-up activities or their management. 
Reuber (1997) found that prior industry experience was significantly 
correlated with expertise in the areas of R&D, feasibility analysis, developing global 
operations/markets and inventory control. She concluded that tacit knowledge of the 
owners’ own sector was related to firm performance and that knowledge of any other 
sector was related to neither tacit knowledge in the owners’ own sector nor 
performance.2 She also found that there is more benefit from having smaller amounts 
of different types of previous experience than having larger amounts of one type of 
experience. Gavetti et al. (2005) and Politis and Gabrielsson (2005) reached similar 
conclusions in their empirical research.  
9.2 Operationalisation of the Study 
Whilst Reuber and Fischer (1994) and Reuber (1997) have provided an understanding 
of relationships among experience, expertise and performance at a micro level, the 
 
1 Reuber and Fischer (1994) have defined these as expertise, not experience. The difference between 
experience and expertise was discussed in Chapter 8.    
2 Brockmann and Simmonds (1997), in their empirical research, found that only experience in the 
industry was significantly related to the use of tacit knowledge by CEOs. Similarly, McDaniel et al. 
(1988) found a positive correlation between job experience and job performance. It is no surprise that 
in the Barringer et al. (2005) study, 76 per cent of the founders had prior experience in the same or a 
closely related industry.  
                             
 
approach in this research was less detailed. In analysing the relationships between 
experience and performance, the decision process was used as an intermediary 
construct. The research assesses the differences between the decision process of a 
person having relevant experience and one not having relevant experience and then 
relates the characteristics of the process to the performance. 
 The ‘initial start’ has been taken as one decision, as in the previous chapter, 
and for similar reasons. It is difficult to isolate performance on particular activities 
from the performance of particular individuals (Reuber, 1997). The first question (i.e., 
performance related to a decision) was addressed by taking into consideration only 
those initial starts for which one could make a clear judgment on whether they were a 
‘good’ start or a ‘troubled’ start. By taking initial start as a decision, one can take into 
account the performance of particular individuals because there are only a few key 
decision-makers during the very early stages of a start-up. Importantly, for this 
analysis it is the performance of the entrepreneurial team and not each individual, 
unless the entrepreneurial team had just one individual assessed. 
Only those firms among the case study firms on which a clear judgment could 
be made regarding performance were included in this analysis of the relationships 
between decision-making, experience and performance. Due to peculiarities related to 
biotechnology, many constructs related to performance—sales, earnings, profit and 
market share et cetera—that are generally used by researchers cannot be used. In the 
majority of the cases, a biotechnology company’s value will be based on its IP and it 
takes a lot of resources to develop a product. Put simply, business models in 
biotechnology are vastly different from those in other industries. 
The selected companies all started between 1998 and 2002. They had a range 
of business models. In this situation, it would not have been wise to use one common 
measure of performance (Chandler & Hanks, 1994). This is because a contract 
research biotechnology company doing well may have lesser market capitalisation 
and ROE (return on equity) than an average drug discovery company. There was also 
 203
                             
 
a need to be sensitive to the business environment, as the sample includes companies 
from Australia and India.3  
In operationalising the performance indicators of the initial start, the 
suggestion of Venkataraman and Ramanujam (1986) to use both financial and 
operational indicators is useful. This was made feasible by judging the achievements 
of the company on its prior determined objectives (which were gathered from 
secondary sources).4 Using this approach to characterise the performance of a venture 
at the initial start was not difficult. Nevertheless, for the analysis of the performance 
outcomes, only those companies were used where the evidence for performance was 
very clear. This did tend to leave out those cases where the company was performing 
(or seem to be performing) in the middle range—i.e., performing neither particularly 
well nor badly. 
9.3 Does Experience Make Any Difference to the ‘Initial Start’ Outcomes? 
Seven of the case study companies had a troubled start and eight had an impressive 
start. Of the seven companies that had a troubled start, six had entrepreneurial teams 
that did not have any business experience (TN) and one had an entrepreneurial team 
with non-relevant business experience (TI). Of the companies that had an impressive 
start, seven had entrepreneurial teams with relevant business experience (IR) and one 
was found to have no business experience (IN). 
 This suggests that there is a strong relationship between relevant experience 
and performance (at the decision level). The majority of companies having 
entrepreneurial teams with relevant business experience were doing very well. By 
contrast, a majority of companies having entrepreneurial teams with non-relevant 
business experience had troubled starts.  
                                                 
3 Merz et al. (1994) quote Hoy et al. to emphasise the need to measure growth (and so the 
performance) of a venture by keeping context in perspective. However, it is unclear whether they 
themselves have followed this advice; it is not mentioned in their research methodology and, if they 
used it, it is not clear how they operationalised it. They only give broad outlines of the industries they 
were looking into: business services, manufacturing, construction and wholesaling. It is unclear 
whether their markedly different conclusions were influenced by their research design. For example, 
they found that unfocused entrepreneurs were significantly more likely than the others to perceive 
themselves to be operating in a hostile business environment. 
 
4 This approach is useful because otherwise, according to Brush and VanderWerf (cited in Brush, 
1992), there is no consensus among researchers on the construct of entrepreneurial success. 
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 The next step in this analysis was the assessment of the relationships between 
the decision process, prior experience and performance. This was achieved by 
examining the differences in ‘average’ counts on each of the elements of the decision 
process (deliberation styles; non-deliberative styles; deliberation facilitators; formal 
analysis; lack of formal analysis; select—constructive and considered; and select— 
risky and not-considered) for TN, TI, IR and IN.    
9.3.1 Deliberation Styles  
There was a very large difference in the frequency (or number) of deliberation styles 
used by new ventures that had a troubled start compared with those that had an 
impressive start. The latter use positive styles of deliberation as much as 3.33 times 
more than the former. In fact, only one company had an entrepreneurial team with no 
business experience that used deliberation styles much more than others. Perhaps this 
can explain their impressive initial start (see Table 9.2). 
TABLE 9.2 DELIBERATION STYLES LINKED TO THE TYPE OF EXPERIENCE AND 
PERFORMANCE  
  Troubled Start Impressive Start 
 Æ Prior 
Experience 
(No.  of 
Firms/Entrepreneurial 
Teams) 
No – TN 
(6) 
Non-relevant – TI 
(1) Total (7)Relevant - IR (7) No – IN (1) Total (8)
Deliberation 
Styles             
Deliberation5  3 (0.500) 0 3 (0.429) 12 (1.714) 3 15 (1.875)
Logic 2 (0.333) 0 2 (0.286) 8 (1.143) 2 10 (1.25)
Planning 1 (0.167) 0 1 (0.143) 3 (0.419) 0 3 (0.375)
Expert Advise 1 (0.167) 0 1 (0.143) 4 (0.571) 2 6 (0.75) 
Internal expert 
advice 2 (0.333) 0 2 (0.286) 5 (0.714) 0 5 (0.625)
Directed search 0 0 0 0 1 1 (0.125)
Total 9 (1.500) 0 9 (1.286) 32  (4.571) 8 40 (5.0) 
 
Note: The number (not within brackets) indicates the total number of that particular sub-element found 
in various categories (i.e., TN, TI, IR and IN). Because the number of decisions assessed within each 
category is different, it is more prudent to compare the average of ‘incidence’ of sub-elements in each 
                                                 
5 ‘Deliberation’ is used to denote active and conscious thinking, careful thinking, creative thinking and 
discussions. It doesn’t include logic and knowing thy area. The former approaches are considered to be 
more proactive whereas the latter approaches are more passive. 
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category. The same method (and logic) has been used in the following tables. (Refer also to the coding 
style discussed in Chapter 5.) 
9.3.1(a) Deliberation 
On average, new ventures that had an impressive start deliberated 4.37 times more 
frequently than those with a troubled start. The TN group deliberated about 3.428 
times less than IR, and there was no sign of deliberation in the lone TI case. The IN 
group, in contrast, deliberated most and nearly twice as much as IR and six times as 
much as TN. A closer look at the data shows that all the instances of deliberation seen 
in TN were found in one company (i.e., the remaining five did not have any known 
instance of deliberation). Even the TN company that deliberated on various issues did 
so superficially, missing several key variables related to the market and regulations. 
 Unlike the TN group, the IR group of companies was more likely to undertake 
deliberation that led to an in-depth understanding of issues related to a decision. For 
example, with regard to a decision related to organisational structure of Phenomix, Dr 
Keats Nelms said: 
We worked through that a lot with our lawyers. We had a corporate 
lawyer who was helping us with corporate structure and taxation…PWC, 
there was a guy there. The biggest question was what was the best 
structure from a taxation point of view. So we had all this money that we 
were going to be getting. It was essentially that Phenomix Corporation 
was the one that was giving it to us. We would then be taxed on it. So how 
do we transfer money from the US company to the Australian subsidiary 
without having a huge tax burden? We did this by placing a collaboration 
structure in place. Essentially we were collaborating and they were paying 
us for the work we do plus 10 per cent. So we were making a 10 per cent 
profit even though it is an internal company transfer. Essentially it is a 
collaborative agreement that Phenomix Corp pays us for the work we do. 
So that’s also why two independent companies were formed. That way we 
minimise our tax burden. 
 
One respondent from the IN group said that they deliberated endlessly not 
only on the business model but also on regulatory issues. They even took advice from 
an expert on how to raise capital. Getting an expert’s opinion on the latter aspect 
proved to be the key to success: 
It was a chance meeting. One of the co-founders knew Professor XYZ 
through family connection. We had almost agreed to sign a term sheet by 
a venture fund, but we wanted some advice by someone who knew things 
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better. He [Professor XYZ] suggested that he is not in a position to advise 
because he is not aware of the ground realities in India, but somebody he 
knew knows better, and that was Mr ABC. 
9.3.1(b) Logic 
Simple logic was widely used to develop an understanding of a decision to identify 
options and to reach conclusions. However, it appeared to be used less often than 
deliberation in both types of ventures—i.e., both ‘troubled starts’ and ‘impressive 
starts.’ Even then, the latter used it 4.37 times more frequently than the former. This 
may be due to the wider experience and knowledge base of the latter group. In most 
cases, logic was either used for simple decisions or was backed by extensive 
experience in that area or else followed by a careful analysis. 
9.3.1(c) Planning 
Instances of planning were less frequent than deliberation in both kinds of ventures. 
This may be due to the fact that during the very initial stages, the concern is more 
about getting started and with issues such as funding. Only after its foundation does a 
company start to plan ahead on different fronts. For example, financial needs were 
taken care of very early in the formation of Phenomix. Once secured, the directors 
planned to build facilities. Dr Keats Nelms stated: 
So I was primary operational director here and Steve Kay was the primary 
person in the US, and we both began hiring teams of people in both sides. 
Chris Goodnow was also an employee as CSO, but he retained his position 
at ANU. So he was limited to the scientific side of things. I was more the 
operational person here. That’s when we started developing facilities. We 
started at John Curtin School by renting the lab space. I looked at a lot of 
places for alternative animal lab space. We ended up fitting at Innovations 
Building after convincing ANU to do that. In the meantime, Chris had 
recently written this major national research facility grant to build this 
building. He and I then convinced ANU to build a third level on that 
building, where we are sitting now, for Phenomix. 
 
9.3.1(d) Expert Advice/Internal Expert Advice 
The results indicate that IR group of firms use the services of expert advisers 2.57 
times more often than the TN (see Table 9.2). That expert advice may come from an 
internal team or it may be derived externally. The IR group could be expected to use 
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internal experts more frequently than external experts. However, these more 
experienced teams were likely to use services of external experts whenever required. 
For example, Professor Barrie Finnin (Acrux) said: 
One of the things that we did when we moved past the technical stage was 
to bring to the board of Acrux people with pharmaceutical industry 
experience. For example, we now have Ken Windle on the board. Ken was 
previously the CEO of Glaxo Wellcome for Asia. So he had a real big 
pharmaceutical company experience. We brought on to the board a person 
by the name of Jim Foght. Jim was the ex-managing director for DuPont 
Pharmaceutical in Europe. He then later went into venture capital for 
biotech. Although he is based in Chicago, he has real industry experience. 
Now as we are getting to more mature stage, that’s the sort of expertise 
you need to be able to draw on. But with regard to the original 
understanding of what was required to develop the drug product; we at the 
university over here had a very good handle on it. 
9.3.2 Non-Deliberative Styles 
Non-deliberative styles of decision-making occurred five times more frequently in the 
group of firms having a troubled start than in those that had an impressive start (see 
Table 9.3). 
TABLE 9.3 NON-DELIBERATIVE STYLES LINKED TO THE TYPE OF EXPERIENCE AND 
PERFORMANCE  
  Troubled Start Impressive Start 
 Æ Prior 
Experience 
(Number of 
Firms/Entrepreneurial 
Teams) No  - TN (6) 
Non-relevant –
TI (1) Total (7) Relevant – IR (7)No – IN (1) Total (8)
Non-Deliberative 
Styles             
Convictions 3 (0.5) 0 3 (0.429) 1 (0.143) 0 1 (0.125)
Deliberation-partial 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Not directed 
search 0 0 0 0 0 0 
No expert advice 8 (1.333) 3 11 (1.571) 0 1 1 (0.125)
Not clearly defined 
idea 3 (0.50) 1 4 (0.571) 2 (0.286) 0 2 (0.25)
Total 14 (2.333) 4 18 (2.571) 3 (0.429) 1 4 (0.5) 
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 While firms in the TN group appear to use convictions more often than those 
in the IR group, their use is the most infrequent of any group. Among the TI and IN 
firms, no decision was based on convictions.  
 The group of firms that had troubled starts made relatively little use of expert 
advice, even when they lacked in-house experience or capabilities. For example, one 
respondent whose company (in the TN group) had a troubled start said: 
Neither of us had any business background, even not in our families. So 
you really don’t know what to anticipate. You really don’t know what 
your cash flows will be; what you need to invest in and where not to invest 
in; how many people we need to take et cetera. These kinds of details are 
not easy to plan without prior experience. We gathered that information 
over a period of time. We had even planned to get some instruments from 
outside, but they got stuck at Customs because they were second-hand 
instruments. 
 
In contrast, new ventures with an impressive start were more aware of their 
needs and would seek advice from experts or professionals. Within the group of firms 
with troubled starts, those that had non-relevant business experience were 
surprisingly reluctant to seek expert advice. The data shows that except for one 
instance involving regulatory guidelines, expert advice could have been useful for 
business related issues such as financing and business models et cetera. This suggests 
that TI firms were more prone to overconfidence related to business matters and were 
oblivious to the fact that many business rules are industry specific.  
  It may not be unusual that an entrepreneurial team has only a broad 
understanding of the idea during the initial start. However, it surely helps to have a 
clearly defined idea. The data reveals that two TNs did not have clearly defined ideas. 
However, one became very focused after a person with relevant experience joined it 
as its CEO. Similarly, the only IR to start with a less defined idea became more 
focused after a person with relevant business experience joined them. Later, they also 
drew on the help of professional consultants. One respondent from this group said: 
When we started out, we did not know exactly what that niche was going 
to be, but we knew we had skills needed to go and figure that out. That 
time we weren’t thinking too clearly about the distinction between biology 
and chemistry or small molecule chemistry versus biologics. I think as we 
built the technologies we have been more aware of these distinctions. Our 
emphasis so far has been on genomics and small molecule chemistry. 
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9.3.3 Deliberation Facilitators 
Just being aware of the business environment and limitations helps to not only facilitate 
decisions but also provide real-time information that in turn may be helpful in making 
quick decisions. The IR firms appeared to be better informed about their business 
environment and limitations (see Table 9.4). For example, one respondent said that they 
were always aware of their business environment without having to expend too many 
resources on it. In fact, knowing how to be always informed without expending too 
many resources is equally important and may give competitive advantage:  
Certainly you have to follow on what the competition is. We were 
fortunate in that. We got in and there was really nobody else. We had, I 
think, pretty good advice from patent attorneys when we framed the 
claims on the patents. We believe that we have a got a very strong patent 
position. Now that doesn’t mean that there won’t be threats from 
alternatives that are completely different, and you have to be sure that you 
are aware of them. I think the ways by which you could know your 
competition is that you obviously have to monitor the patent literature and 
you also have to monitor the scientific literature. A lot of that is done not 
only by printed material but also by word of mouth in conferences and so 
on. So that’s why networking is so important. Even though people won’t 
disclose confidential information, very often you get a lot of warning 
about what company is looking at what drugs and what products and so 
on. You shouldn’t have things come out of blue. 
 
TABLE 9.4 DELIBERATION FACILITATORS LINKED TO THE TYPE OF EXPERIENCE AND 
PERFORMANCE 
  
  Troubled Start Impressive Start 
 Æ Prior Experience
(Number of Firms/Entrepreneurial 
Teams) 
No  - TN 
(6) 
Non-
relevant – 
TI (1) Total (7)
Relevant  - 
IR (7) 
No – IN 
(1) Total (8)
Deliberation Facilitators             
Involvement of experts across 
functions 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Knowing one’s limitations/ 
partner/ technology 
environment 1 (0.167) 0 1 (0.143) 7 (1.0) 4 
11 
(1.375) 
Prior relevant experience 0 0 0 2 (0.286) 0 2 (0.25)
Decision facilitator 1 (0.167) 0 1 (0.143) 3 (0.429) 0 3 (0.375)
Symbiotic 0 0 0 1 (0.143) 0 1 (0.125)
Formal training to be more 
efficient 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Second opinion 1 (0.167) 1 2 (0.286) 0 0 0 
Predisposition to the idea 1 (0.167) 0 1 (0.143) 0 0 0 
Very defined idea 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 4 (0.667) 1 5 (0.714) 13 (1.857) 4 
17 
(2.125) 
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 Certain incidents or information may prove to be critical in facilitating a 
decision. While these may happen at any time and to anyone, they are not completely 
dependent on chance. For example, one respondent said that he was allowed to retain 
his tenure as professor in the university and still carry out his entrepreneurial activity. 
This facilitated his decision to start a venture. But this cannot be said to be pure 
chance; it is more a case of opportunity coming to the prepared mind. This is because 
(in this case) if the concerned person had not taken the initiative to start a venture and 
make a request to the university, he would not have the option. He said: 
We got approval from the highest body of the council of the university 
that we could start putting the venture together. By October, we had 
concluded things regarding equity, structure and so on. End of October 
and early November is actually when the company started up. So things 
moved very fast after I got back from sabbatical. Within a few months we 
were up and running. 
 
 It is observed that the TN and TI groups of firms sought a second opinion 
more often than the IR group. As discussed earlier, getting a second opinion is not a 
robust form of deliberation and was generally not favoured by a person having 
relevant experience.  
9.3.4 Formal Analysis  
There does not seem to be much dispute about the use of business plans among TN, 
TI, IR and IN firms. Almost all of them seem to have a business plan. Differences in 
the quality of the business plan would be expected, but that was not part of this study. 
As such, a definite comment on the quality of each firm’s business plan cannot be 
made.   
TABLE 9.5 FORMAL ANALYSIS LINKED TO THE TYPE OF EXPERIENCE AND 
PERFORMANCE  
  Troubled Start Impressive Start 
 Æ Prior Experience 
(Number of Firms/Entrepreneurial 
Teams) 
No  - TN 
(6) 
Non-relevant 
– TI (1) Total (7)
Relevant  - 
IR (7) 
No  - IN 
(1) Total (8)
Formal Analysis              
Business Plan  4 (0.667) 1 5 (0.714) 7 (1.00) 1 8 (1.00) 
Formal planning 0 0 0 7 (1.00) 0 7 (0.875)
Professional consultants 4 (0.667) 0 4 (0.571) 10 (1.429) 0 10 (1.25)
Total 8 (1.333) 1 9 (1.286) 24 (3.429) 1 25 (3.125)
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 The main difference between new ventures having a troubled start and those 
with an impressive start can be seen with respect to the use of formal planning 
methods and professional consultants. The former seem to be completely oblivious to 
the use of formal planning (at least during initial start) and the rigour that it can bring 
to any decision process. One respondent said: 
We had an algorithm for ranking projects. The key things in it were 
market size, the total cost to develop the product, the chance that we can 
develop the product—i.e., technical feasibility. I think the total cost for the 
development of product is the key thing because that depends on the 
regulatory procedures—i.e., if we can do an abbreviated development 
program from the regulatory point of view. And also the other key thing is 
the advantages of that product. 
 
The IR group of firms tend to use professional consultants twice as often the 
TN group (see Table 9.5). Such consultants were generally used (at least during initial 
start) for two reasons: guidance on patents (patent attorneys) and guidance on 
business plans/models (management consultants). 
9.3.5 Lack of Formal Analysis  
Instances of a lack of formal analysis were much more frequent in the group of firms 
that had a troubled start than those that had an impressive start. 
TABLE 9.6 LACK OF FORMAL ANALYSIS LINKED TO THE TYPE OF EXPERIENCE AND 
PERFORMANCE  
  Troubled Start Impressive Start 
 Æ Prior Experience 
(Number of 
Firms/Entrepreneurial 
Teams) No – TN (6) 
Non-relevant –
TI (1) Total (7) 
Relevant  
- IR (7) No – IN (1)Total (8)
Lack of Formal 
Analysis              
Limited analysis 1 (0.167) 0 1 (0.143) 1 (0.143) 0 1 (0.125)
No planning 4 (0.667) 0 4 (0.571) 0 0 0 
No Business Plan 1 (0.167) 0 1 (0.143) 0 0 0 
Total 6 (1.0) 0 6 (0.857) 1 (0.143) 0 1 (0.125)
Planning 
limitations 1 (0.167) 0 1 (0.143) 3 (0.429) 1 4 (0.50)
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 It is unusual not to have a business plan in a biotechnology start-up. Only one 
of the 15 firms reported that they did not have a business plan. However, despite 
these formal plans, there was a more frequent lack of adequate foresight in the TN 
group. This may be due to a lack of adequate knowledge about the subject, as is 
reflected in response of one respondent: 
At that time I don’t think it was a very logical and well thought out 
process. I came to the conclusion that I wanted to start a company and I 
guess, come what may, that was what I was going to do. 
 
New ventures often face genuine planning limitations because of the 
unpredictable nature of many variables. However, it pays to take small steps and plan 
ahead, always bearing in mind the contingencies involved. Examples of such 
planning limitations, such as assessments related to the efficacy of prospective 
therapeutic molecules in pre-clinical stages, have been discussed previously. 
  Among the 15 selected firms, planning limitations were found more in the 
ventures with impressive starts than in those with troubled starts. One possible 
explanation for this is that such firms were more aware of the various issues and 
variables associated with decisions. The more aware one is, the more information one 
seeks. There may also be more instances when one is not able to obtain the desired 
information. Conversely, if one is aware of only a limited set of issues, there may be 
fewer instances of limitations in the required information. 
9.3.6 Select – Constructive and Considered 
There was a marked difference in the frequency of positive decision styles between 
those firms with impressive starts and those with troubled starts. In fact, the former 
group had five times the frequency of positive styles (see Table 9.7). 
 Ventures where the founders had relevant prior business experience and were 
successful (the IR group) had a much higher frequency of natural decisions compared 
with the TN group. It may be that prior relevant experience facilitates decision-
making. There were cases where even decisions that would seem to be complex and 
critical were taken without much hesitation, if decision-makers were experienced. 
One respondent discussed their decision to raise money themselves and to not accept 
any VC funding: 
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It was a pretty easy decision, really, that we raise the money ourselves 
from the outside world, and we are happy to take the responsibility to run 
the business ourselves. 
 
   TABLE 9.7 ‘SELECT - CONSTRUCTIVE AND CONSTRUCTED’ LINKED TO THE TYPE OF 
EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE 
  Troubled Start Impressive Start 
 Æ Prior Experience
(Number of 
Firms/Entrepreneurial Teams) 
No – TN 
(6) 
Non-
relevant – 
TI (1) Total (7)
Relevant – 
IR (7) No  - IN (1) Total (8)
Select – Constructive 
and Considered             
Natural Decision 1 (0.167) 0 1 (0.143) 5 (0.714) 0 5 (0.625)
Opportunistic 2 (0.333) 0 2 (0.286) 2 (0.286) 1 3 (0.375)
Negotiation 0 0 0 2 (0.286) 0 2 (0.25)
Persuasion 0 0 0 1 (0.143) 0 1 (0.125)
Easy Decisions 0 0 0 1 (0.143) 0 1 (0.125)
Involvement 0 0 0 2 (0.143) 0 2 (0.25)
Unexpected Good luck 0 0 0 4 (0.571) 1 5 (0.625)
Support of influential 
people 0 0 0 2 (0.286) 0 2 (0.25)
Managed procrastination 1 (0.167) 0 1 (0.143) 0 0 0 
Need Based Decision 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Trust decisions 0 0 0 0 1 1 (0.125)
Total 4 (0.667) 0 4 (0.571) 19 (2.714) 3 22 (2.75)
 
Many other entrepreneurs will find this to be a critical decision and perhaps 
would spend a lot of time discussing alternative routes to VC funds. In fact, most 
people would think of other options only after they had failed to draw the attention of 
VCs, as was the case with some examples in the study. 
There were low levels of negotiation and persuasion in both troubled and 
impressive starts. One would normally expect more negotiation and persuasion, 
especially while sourcing funds from VCs. This may be due to respondents hesitating 
to talk about their negotiations and persuasions. Alternatively, they may have 
conveyed such decisions as natural decisions, thinking that minor negotiations are 
part of all such kinds of decision-making and there is nothing particular about it. 
Respondents generally only talked about negotiations or persuasion when a decision 
did involve a lot of negotiation and persuasion. For example, one respondent said: 
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Oh, Yes! There was a lot of healthy discussion. There were some very 
strong supporters and there were those who probably were concerned… 
But the decision was taken and it was the right decision. 
 
 Another surprising thing to note is that unexpected good luck occurred 
relatively frequently in new ventures that had an impressive initial start. It did not 
occur in troubled ventures. Half of that good luck is related to funding that happened 
because of a strong social network or because the idea proved to be unique but its full 
significance was not gauged earlier. One respondent said: 
Thus, we foresaw some scope, but definitely we did not realise that we 
will grow so much. We have been growing at almost 100 per cent every 
year. If I look back at my projections when we started off with this idea, 
we would have probably done about 40 to 50 per cent of what we have 
actually done today. That’s the kind of growth we have seen. It has turned 
out to be a fantastic idea. 
 
However, it is to be noted that the scientific or business ideas that resulted in 
‘above expectation’ gains rested on strong foundations and systematic research and 
on people who had a tremendous amount of experience in that area. Often such 
‘above expectation’ gains would have been hard to achieve despite the experience of 
the decision-makers and systematic research. That’s why they have been called 
unexpected.  
 There were few instances of ‘involvement’ because, in the initial days, it was 
often a single entrepreneur or a very small entrepreneurial team. It was only after 
initial fundraising and/or an extension to the entrepreneurial team with a few senior 
managers (in the early days) that involvement became important. 
 The support of influential people always helps, and most certainly during the 
initial start, which is a defining period for any new venture. The two instances where 
this occurred were both ventures where the founders had relevant prior experience 
and the new venture secured above average funding.  
9.3.7 Select – Not Constructive or Considered 
There were few instances of what could be termed ill-considered decision-making in 
the group of firms that had impressive starts. This was in marked contrast with those 
ventures that had troubled starts (see Table 9.8). 
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TABLE 9.8 ‘SELECT - NOT CONSTRUCTIVE AND CONSIDERED’ LINKED TO THE 
TYPE OF EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE 
  Troubled Start Impressive Start 
 Æ Prior Experience 
(Number of 
Firms/Entrepreneurial Teams) No – TN (6)
Non-
relevant  - 
TI (1) Total (7)
Relevant – 
IR (7) No – IN (1) Total (8)
Select – Not 
Constructive and 
Considered             
Ad hoc 2 (0.333) 2 4 (0.571) 0 0 0 
Conflict 0 0 0 1 (0.143) 0 1 (0.125)
Politics 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Decision in frustration 2 (0.333) 1 3 (0.429) 0 0 0 
Deliberate risk taking 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Forced Upon 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Edict 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 4 (0.667) 3 7 (1.00) 1 (0.143) 0 1 (0.125)
 
 The ad hoc style of decision-making generally does not involve systematic 
assessment and is not based on relevant experience or expertise. Decisions made in 
such a way can have serious negative consequences immediately or later. One TI case 
study respondent provided this example: 
I guess it started when we went to meet friends in Sydney and they asked 
how the research was going. Professor Z said that it’s going well and we 
had started getting results [and] that we get [equity] funding 
[now]…because at that stage we were not eligible for ARC funding. That 
has changed. I am going back probably to 1998-99. And these people were 
business people that had started a variety of companies in multimedia and 
various other things. And basically they wanted to set up a biotechnology 
company.  
 
The decision that followed from this situation was made in haste without 
much due diligence on the projects involved. In fact, the concerned businessman 
wrote a business plan later but without taking the help of any person with relevant 
experience. It is not surprising that they failed to raise any private equity. This led to a 
situation where they had no resources. Cornered and frustrated, they decided to go for 
public listing, even though the projects were very early stage projects. This led to a 
very low valuation and impaired future funding. 
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The above example shows that a lack of relevant experience can have a 
debilitating effect on the firm because decision-makers might be more prone to ill-
considered decision-making.  Such decision-making may lead to poor decisions that, 
in turn, can create vicious circle.  
9.4 How Significant is the Effect of Experience on the Decision Process                             
and Its Performance? 
 
The data for the performance of the decision (which was found to be related to the 
relevant experience) were unbalanced with respect to the a priori determined positive 
versus negative elements of the decision process. For the model, there were four 
positive elements (deliberation, deliberation misc, formal analysis and selection) and 
only three negative elements (non-deliberative styles, lack of formal analysis and 
selection—not constructive and considered). It was therefore necessary to examine 
the effects of the factors using residual maximum likelihood (REML). Table 9.9, 
which presents the Wald statistics, shows that there is a large main effect due to 
approach (p<0.001) and a significant interaction between approach and the 
performance of the initial start of the venture (p<0.001).  
TABLE 9.9 DOES APPROACH MAKE A DIFFERENCE TO THE PERFORMANCE OF THE 
DECISION PROCESS? 
Fixed Terms Wald Statistic d.f. Wald/d.f. chi pr 
Start 5.27 1 5.27 0.022 
Approach (+/-) 12.12 1 12.12 <0.001 
Decision Process Elements 11.3 5 2.26 0.046 
Start.Approach 24.39 1 24.39 <0.001 
   
TABLE 9.10 TABLE OF PREDICTED MEANS OF PERFORMANCE.APPROACH  
  Positive Approach Negative Approach 
Troubled 0.39 2.241 
Impressive 2.676 1.057 
 
* Average Standard Error of Deviation = 0.6582 
  Further analysis based on predicted means for the start.approach interaction 
(Table 9.10) shows that positive approach leads to a better start for a new venture, 
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which is more likely seen among people with relevant experience. By contrast, a 
troubled start by a company (mostly seen when people with no or no relevant 
business experience) is found to be related to a negative approach to the decision 
process. 
9.5 Conclusion6 
This analysis clearly shows that among these ventures relevant experience made a 
difference to the outcome. The analysis also provides strong evidence that the way it 
makes a difference to the outcome is by affecting the decision-making process. There 
was a consistent pattern of decision-making that can be associated with each of the 
two broad groups, entrepreneurial teams having relevant business experience and 
those that did not have relevant business experience. In both cases, the relevant 
technology experience was effectively a prerequisite and was taken as a given. 
  Entrepreneurial teams having relevant business experience appeared to 
deliberate and analyse issues and decisions more often than those that did not have 
relevant experience.7 In that way, their decisions tend to have a double advantage, 
first, due to their relevant experience and, second, because they draw on more 
information. It is no wonder that they have a greater chance of being successful.  
  The implicit assumption in this interpretation is that the possession of the right 
set of information related to a decision is key. Casson (1982), with his theoretical 
modelling, and Fiet et al. (2005) have emphasised this dependence. Having the right 
information for decisions is dependent on the right set of experience and use of 
appropriate decision processes.  
  Experienced entrepreneurs are more likely to search for information within a 
specific domain of business ideas (Politis, 2005; Fiet et al., 2005) while novice 
entrepreneurs have fewer benchmarks to assess whether the information they have 
gathered is appropriate.  It has also been shown that successful entrepreneurial teams 
                                                 
6 The extent to which these findings can be generalised outside the biotech industry is discussed in 
Chapter 10. 
7 Many researchers—e.g. Cohen & Dean (2005)—have shown that the top management team (TMT) 
plays an important role and is related to performance, as evidenced by good evaluations of a company. 
This research takes an additional step to show which type of TMT has a better chance of giving better 
performance.   
 218
                             
 
use different types of deliberation methods more often than formal planning 
methods.8 This indicates that relevant information can also be obtained in real time 
and without being elaborate. Professional consultants and experts are shown to play a 
key role in decision processes that have superior outcomes. In addition, 
entrepreneurs’ social network also helps to expand the boundaries of their rationality 
by increasing their knowledge and information (Singh et al., 1999). Therefore, an 
entrepreneurial team with broader experience is likely to have a wider (more varied) 
social network and more chance of being well-informed across all domains. The 
entrepreneurial team will be less likely to benefit from cooperation or information 
gained from network partners if it does not possess the necessary knowledge and the 
capacity to absorb information (Witt, 2004). 
  Formal analysis is more related to planning in a systematic and 
comprehensive manner. This need not be very elaborate (Russo & Schoemaker, 
2002:157-158). It simply means that important variables have been thought about and 
an informed choice made. Relevant experience helps in such instances when 
resources are limited and the cost of an elaborate search is prohibitive. Experts and 
people with relevant experience can tap into their social networks to provide 
inexpensive and trusted information (Forbes et al., 2006). If there is still a deficit of 
information, they can seek to overcome this by a formal study that has a definite 
limited scope and could be carried out within the available means. Even such limited 
studies may be good enough to give an expert or an experienced person insight on the 
specific issues. They can then make a reasonably good choice by using limited 
information gained from such formal means. 
 Brown and Eisenhardt (1998) and Eisenhardt (1989) have emphasised the 
importance of real-time information in decision-making in a dynamic industry. This is 
because decision-making has to be fast but robust in a dynamic environment.9 This 
                                                 
8 This is in keeping with an observation made by Hambrick and Crozier (1985) that successful firms 
are in the habit of using all available channels for acquiring crucial information: outside board 
members, professional associations, consultants, suppliers, customers and others. They also maintain 
that successful high-growth firms even bring in one or more senior level executives with big company 
experience to complement the owner-founder(s). 
9 According to Forbes (2005), ‘the study of Judge and Miller supports Eisenhardt’s view on the 
significance of a dynamic environment context, but the study by Baum and Wally suggested that these 
issues were important across a range of environment contexts.’  
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research shows that this is indeed the case. The research goes further in suggesting 
how that real-time information is gained and what facilitates the process. It has been 
shown that ‘people with domain-relevant experience are likely to spend less time 
gathering information in a decision situation, because they will already have a stock 
of applicable knowledge’ (Forbes, 2005:358). According to Forbes (2005:358), ‘when 
people with domain-relevant experience do seek information, they are likely to gather 
it faster, because they are more familiar with the sources of information available in 
that domain’ and their domain relevant experience helps them to analyse information 
more quickly. Lord and Maher (cited in Forbes, 2005) found that experienced people 
possess a relevant organising framework or ‘schema’ that facilitates the storage, recall 
and interpretation of data. So while an inexperienced person may find a situation 
difficult, an experienced person may find it relatively easy (Ganster, 2005).  
 All the above factors, when put together, give an experienced person or expert 
an edge over an inexperienced person in problem and opportunity identification and 
evaluation. They are able to discern the key variables associated with the decision or 
issue.10 Most importantly, they are able to perceive the issue in the right context. It is 
through this advantage that they are able to find a way through the deficient areas of 
information and seek their rectification in a judicious manner. Therefore, their ability 
to make relatively quick decisions is not a sign of ad hoc or ill-considered processes 
(Ganster, 2005). 
 A closely linked feature to the above observation on relevant experience is the 
breadth of the relevant experience. The importance of diversity of experience was 
discussed earlier when it was emphasised that the presence of technology experience 
was taken as a given in a biotechnology venture. As such, the analysis focussed on the 
presence or absence of relevant business experience. Reuber (1997) and Reuber and 
Fischer (1994) sought to relate various aspects of business management to 
performance. They also put forward the idea that a broader set of experience would be 
relevant at a higher managerial level. Following this, it might reasonably be expected 
that business experience in a relevant sector would expose a person to all the facets of 
                                                                                                                                            
 
10 Courtney and Lovallo (2004) state that decision-makers can make rigorous early stage R&D 
investment decisions in even the most uncertain environments by identifying ‘what they would have to 
believe’ to support that investment. It is on the basis of these beliefs that they assess the relative value 
of the current project with any of the (historical) reference cases. 
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the business, although his or her expertise will be focused on some areas. On the basis 
of his or her breadth of business experience, an entrepreneur would be able to usefully 
contribute to, or at least bring to light, diverse aspects related to an issue or decision. 
An entrepreneurial team having a mix of relevant business experience and relevant 
technology experience will stand a better chance of growth and survivability. This 
seems to be the case in this research.11 
 This discussion has focussed on how entrepreneurial teams can greatly 
improve the decision process. It is equally important to emphasise that they are also 
able to greatly reduce their mistakes by avoiding decision process styles that are 
counterproductive. In fact, the difference is more striking when one compares the 
relative instances of negative styles associated with entrepreneurial teams with no 
relevant experience and the positive styles used by entrepreneurial teams with 
relevant experience.  
 This research shows that entrepreneurial teams with no relevant experience 
tend to make less informed decisions. They were often simply unaware of issues and 
various dimensions associated with issues and decisions. It is perhaps for this reason 
they often neither seek the help of experts or professional consultants nor deliberate 
and analyse adequately. This is not to say that they make ad hoc and intuitive 
decisions. Ad hoc styles of decision-making were found to be an exception rather than 
the rule. None of the types of entrepreneurial team favoured ad hoc styles. This is an 
important conclusion that will be discussed further in the next chapter. 
 The analysis has shown that relevant experience does make a positive 
difference to the decision process, which then has an impact on performance. 
                                                 
11 Papadakis et al. (1998) say that a TMT’s aggressive strategy is directly related to more information 
and cross-departmental involvement. Using this line of thought, one would expect that given the need 
of a high-tech venture to be aggressive (and for that purpose duly informed), an entrepreneurial team 
with ‘mixed’ experience (taken here as a parallel construct of ‘cross-departmental’ experience) would 
be more suitable.  
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Key Findings: Discussion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Philip Green: I am brave, but I take a view. It is an educated view. I am careful. I am not reckless. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                             
 
The debate on the characteristics of entrepreneurial decision-making has been 
continuing with no definite resolution. Most researchers characterise entrepreneurial 
decision-making as opportunistic, intuitive and ad hoc. Other researchers regard it as 
no different to any other decision-making. This research was undertaken to explore 
empirically the characteristics of entrepreneurial decision-making in a specific 
context. In this research, the process of individual decisions taken by the 
entrepreneurial team was analysed. An effort was also made to link the process to its 
outcome. This chapter summarises the findings of this research, discusses their 
significance and suggests future directions for research. 
10.1 Key Findings 
Contrary to the dominant belief, this research has found that, among a large group of 
entrepreneurs in a high-tech sector, there was little evidence of successful 
entrepreneurial decision-making that could be characterised as opportunistic, intuitive 
and ad hoc. The entrepreneurs were found to make decisions in a way any other 
person would make them. The analysis included successful and unsuccessful 
decisions. Intuitive and ad hoc styles of decision-making occurred more frequently in 
unsuccessful decisions. Successful decisions were generally carefully planned, made 
use of expert advice and involved decision-makers with relevant prior experience. 
 In a new venture, an individual or a set of individuals has to deal with a large 
set of variables that ordinarily in a bigger company are dealt with by a larger set of 
individuals who have resources (human and material, if not always time) at their 
disposal. In the new venture context, along with the many variables, the 
entrepreneur/entrepreneurial team often has to deal with a fast-changing business 
environment. This only accentuates the challenge for a single entrepreneur or a small 
set of people with limited resources. Having to make decisions in such an 
environment and still be successful tends to give the impression of their having a 
godly gifted sixth sense. This study, however, reveals that entrepreneurs do plan in 
most cases (especially if it is an important decision), particularly for successful 
decisions.  
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Box 10.1 Contributions of this Study 
Research Questions 
 Is there such a thing as ‘entrepreneurial’ decision-making?  
o If yes, what are its characteristics? 
o If not, then does/do an entrepreneur/entrepreneurial team make(s) decisions? 
 Is the performance of a decision made in a new venture related to the way it has been made? 
 Is there any relationship between the experience of the entrepreneurial team and the initial 
start of the new venture? 
 Is there any relationship among the experience of the entrepreneurial team and the way they 
make decisions and the performance of the new venture? 
 Key Findings 
 Entrepreneurial decision-making is not a distinct style of decision-making with special 
characteristics—i.e., different styles of decision-making are seen in different types of 
decisions. 
 Decision processes in successful new ventures are seen to be function of the 
nature/characteristics of the decision. 
 Decision processes in successful new ventures are seen to be function of the context of the 
decision. 
 Good decision processes will increase the chances of expected decision outcomes. 
 The experience of decision-makers plays a major role in how a decision is made. For example, 
more positive aspects of a good decision process are observed when the 
entrepreneur(s)/entrepreneurial team have relevant experience.  
 Decision processes in successful new ventures are a function of the relevant experience of the 
entrepreneur/entrepreneurial team. 
Methodological Contributions 
 An empirically grounded conceptual framework for examining the decision process in a new 
venture. 
 Suggestions related to methodological aspects of empirical research at the micro level where a 
‘decision’ is the unit of analysis. 
 Research design to relate the performance of an individual decision at the ‘decision’ level. 
 224
                             
 
Their planning is, however, not the ‘traditional’ sort of planning, as used in the 
strategic management literature. Their planning is most often in the form of an 
elaborate mental plan or schema1 of what to do, when to do it and how to do it. To an 
observer (and in the traditional sense), their style might seem to be unsystematic and 
ad hoc. However, they may actually be ‘unsystematic in a clever way’ (Miller et al., 
1960:160). Such a mental plan or schema, if not understood properly, might be 
considered intuition or a gut feeling (in the popular sense). In Chapter 2, an example 
from Mowen (1993) showed how decisions based on a schema, if not well 
understood, can easily be termed as a ‘gut feeling’ decision. Another example from 
this research is given in Box 10.2. On probing, it is seen that intuition as used by this 
decision-maker is not similar to intuition as used in the popular sense but is closer to 
the definition used by Mitchell et al. (2005) (Refer to Chapter 2). 
                                                 
1 Busenitz and Lau (1996) have also talked about the importance and popularity of the use of schemas. 
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Box 10.2 Excerpts of a Conversation with Mr Gordon Milliken (MD, Cryosite) 
DS: And how did you actually validate that this concept [of providing service for storing cord-blood 
cells] would work in Australia, more from marketing point of view? 
GM: Intuition. 
DS: This is indeed interesting because I haven’t come across a [business] concept like that. 
PF: Well, the concept exists in US. In fact in the early days, the consultant that we talked about… he 
talked about cord blood storage companies in the US. So it was really there that this was one 
possibility that we can do…from the early days of information memorandum. I think I should dig 
out information memorandum. I think it was mentioned. But I can’t remember. But it was certainly 
there as a possibility but no-one had driving passion to do it. I think Theo saw it as a way of 
getting short-term cash flow, which is important. And we didn’t have to convert big institutions to 
do it because we have got market for individuals. You can spend a lot of money in trying to assess 
the market, but we took the view that if it worked in America and was acceptable in America, then 
it would work here. 
DS: How did you go about assessing the actual market size? 
GM: That’s easy. There are about 250,000 births in Australia a year. Our target client base is the 
people who have a private obstetrician… not necessarily but probably have their baby in a private 
hospital. And that’s about 60,000. Our stated objective was to have 2 per cent of all births in 
Australia, which is 5,000, or about 100 a week. So we worked out how good the business would be 
if we choose that and we achieve that. We did the sensitivity analysis for different percentages. So 
the market size is quite easy to work out, but then you have to subtract people who can’t afford it, 
people who don’t want to do it and people who don’t know it. And then you are left with quite a 
less number of it. 
DS: And how did you decide on this magical figure of 2 per cent? 
GM: We just heard that there is about 2 per cent market penetration in the US. And we said that that’s 
good enough for us. I have just come back from US and they are still sticking to the fact that at 
least 2 per cent of all births and not 2 per cent of all private births. You will figure out that 2 per 
cent of all births is about 8 to 9 per cent of private births, which will be quite good for us. There is 
quite a lot of attraction because the cord blood business and the traditional sample storage business 
are current income businesses. It means that you send the bills every month or every year for doing 
no work. That’s what our major investors like about the business. With cord blood you get to the 
point where if you are successful and you continue to get increased numbers for every month 
forever, the company will survive just on the income of that. So you need to keep the doors open. 
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 So the appropriate question to ask is not related to planning per se but to the 
quality of the planning. The quality of a decision will be influenced by the decision-
makers’ understanding of the issue—what the issue is; what information is required; 
what information is available or not available; and from where to get the information. 
This research found that entrepreneurial teams that had relevant experience in both 
technology and business were more likely to make successful decisions than teams 
that lacked such experience. Why? ‘Probably the major source of new Plans is old 
Plans’ (Miller et al., 1960:177). Miller et al. (1960:178) suggest that what is 
remembered is not the exact plan related to the specific details of the problem or 
opportunity but a ‘metaplan’ from which a large number of different plans can be 
generated as needed. It means that the decision process is a function of relevant 
experience that leads to a more holistic understanding of the situation. It is perhaps 
because of this that experienced entrepreneurs and teams are more aware of their 
strengths and deficiencies—i.e., the relevant experience makes one realise the limits 
to one’s analogical thinking. This awareness perhaps also encourages them to seek to 
remove deficiencies, to the extent it is possible. Relevant experience may result in the 
development of a ‘schema’ and ‘metaplan’ (and an appreciation of their fallibility), 
but where prior experience is much less relevant, such a schema may be misleading. 
Box 10.3 shows how a schema based on non-relevant experience can prove to be 
destructive. 
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Box 10.3 Schema Based on Non-relevant Experience 
Gavetti et al. (2005:694): 
 
‘Many factors contributed to Enron’s startling failure, but headlong diversification based on loose 
analogies played an important role. After apparent success in trading natural gas and electric power, 
Enron executives moved rapidly to create markets for other goods ranging from coal, steel, and pulp 
and paper to weather derivatives and broadband telecom capacity. Analogical reasoning seemed to 
drive the expansion. Executives looked for markets with certain characteristics: fragmented demand, 
rapid change due to deregulation or technological progress, complex and capital intensive distribution 
systems, lengthy sales cycles, opaque pricing, and mis-matches between long-term supply contracts 
and short-term fluctuations in customer demand (Salter, Levesque, and Ciampa, 2002). On the 
broadband opportunity, for instance, Enron Chairman Kenneth Lay said:‘[Broad-band]’s going to start 
off as a very inefficient market. It’s going to settle down to a business model that looks very much like 
our business model on [gas and electricity] wholesale, which obviously has been very profitable with 
rapid growth’ (Gas daily, 2000). However, the analogical reasoning failed to appreciate important, 
deeper differences between the market for bandwidth. The broadband market was based on unproven 
technology and was dominated by telecom companies that largely resented Enron’s encroachment. The 
underlying good, bandwidth, did not lend itself to the kinds of standard contracts that made efficient 
trading possible in gas and electricity. Perhaps worst, in broadband trading Enron had to deliver 
capacity the ‘last mile’ to a customer’s site, an expensive challenge that gas wholesalers did not face.’ 
 
 While deficiencies in the basis for decision-making may occur due to a 
specific issue or a specific variable in a particular issue, there may also be higher 
order deficiencies due, for example, to the lack of a person in the team with relevant 
business experience. If the entrepreneur(s)/entrepreneurial team are aware of such 
general deficiencies and seek to remove that deficiency early by hiring an individual 
with the required skill set, they can make their collective schema fuller, which 
improves decision-making abilities. It also becomes an issue of willingness on the 
part of decision-makers to be able to realise and accept those deficiencies (specific or 
higher order) and seek to overcome them. 
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 Cohen and Dean (2005) observe that top management teams (TMTs) play an 
important role and have an effect on the performance of the firm.2 The quality of 
TMT in a new venture context is largely a function of the nature of experience of the 
entrepreneur/entrepreneurial team. That experience provides the basis for gauging the 
importance and priority of each decision. More importance means more care vis-à-vis 
that decision. A higher priority also means immediate attention and a relatively quick 
decision on that front.  
 
Source: Bettis and Prahalad (1995) 
Figure 10.1 How Experience Plays a Role 
This study supports the empirical findings of Dean and Sharfman (1996) that more 
information leads to a more accurate perception of environmental conditions. More 
information also leads to a more accurate perception of the concerned decision. This 
study supports their contention that ‘in unstable environments, top managers who fail 
to systematically collect and analyse information about environmental trends and 
constraints will be much more likely to lead their organisations in nonviable strategic 
directions.’ 
 This study found strong relationships among the experience of the decision-
makers, the decision process and the outcome of the decision. Figure 10.1, derived 
from Bettis and Prahalad (1995), shows how experience feeds back into shaping the 
processes of information assessment. The model could be interpreted to show the 
important constructs of a decision process: information (data), deliberation and formal 
                                                 
2 Many researchers have worked on TMTs (top management teams) from many different angles. A 
quick search on Hhttp://scholar.google.comH and ProQuest results in many articles. However, this was 
not central to this research so was not pursued.  
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planning (analytics), nature of experience of the entrepreneurial team (dominant 
logic), values and expectations, options/choices/approaches (competitive strategy), 
measures of performance, and iterations (learning). 
 But how exactly does a new venture with limited resources overcome 
drawbacks and bring robustness to the decision process? Entrepreneurs or 
entrepreneurial teams, because of their limited resources, seek to overcome 
deficiencies, which are typically related to ‘good’ information. They use a variety of 
methods to enable reasonably good answers within the constraints of time and money. 
A critical issue is the methods used and their appropriateness. Previous experience 
and social networks3 play a key role in accessing and assessing the required 
information to make a decision, which is influenced by the nature and context of the 
decision (see Figure 10.2). 
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Figure 10.2 The Effect of Context, Nature of Decisions and Experience on Planning 
                                                 
3 It is not social networks per se that help; the quality (and relevance to needs) of social networks is 
more important.  
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 In order to overcome their limitation of time and resources, entrepreneurs 
more often do critical point planning. This is similar to the following observation by 
Miller et al. (1960:166): ‘When subjects are put under pressure to find a concept in 
the smallest number of questions, they may try to keep track of the entire set of 
hypothesis through which they are really searching.’ Critical point planning seems to 
give them the confidence of having dealt with major ‘known’ issues. The 
entrepreneurs were more inclined to use deliberative styles, the experience of their 
staff and the services of an expert or consultant.  
 Formal planning methods were not used often but when used seemed to have 
a considerable impact on the success of the decision. Formal planning is definitely 
more robust (Dean & Sharfman, 1996), but is used more sparingly. This is because 
‘perfection has its price, and value analysis should be reserved only for the most 
complex and important decisions, especially those that are now-or-never and can’t be 
reversed or substantially revised later’ (Russo & Schoemaker, 2002:157). These were 
more often seen in successful decisions that were important in nature and successful 
ventures in general. Even for ‘big bet’ decisions, decision-makers can improve their 
chances by using simple techniques that may be either formal or informal (Brown & 
Eisenhardt, 1998; Courtney & Lovallo, 2004; Russo & Schoemaker, 2002 etc.). It is 
not strange that Nieuwenhuizen and Kroon (2003) found in their empirical research 
work that small industrialists take ‘calculated risks’—i.e., considered action. 
 Experience in a relevant field underpins both access to networks and the 
assessment of issues. Experience provides a guide to what, when and how much of the 
information is sourced from whom. Therefore, the quality of relevant experience is 
the foundation for much entrepreneurial decision-making.  
 An entrepreneurial team with the required set of relevant skills will be more 
likely to know the gravity of a decision. Wherever information gaps are present for 
taking a reasonably informed decision, they will seek further information. In such 
instances, the use of experts or professional consultants, with complementary insights, 
can be very useful (Ottesen, 2005). In addition to using experts and consultants, they 
may even be prepared to conduct a formal study. Such a study would generally be to 
give broad trends rather than prove a hypothesis beyond doubt. Of course, any 
decision-maker would prefer to be in the latter category, to make a completely 
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informed choice. However, such an ideal condition is hard to achieve (in new 
ventures and in large companies). 
 This study shows that entrepreneurs often seek multiple options for a decision 
and assess them simultaneously. This process is not one of developing complex 
models but more of identifying and exploring the key issues and proximate questions.  
 An entrepreneurial team will not be innovative in every decision. In fact, most 
decisions made in a new venture are based on common approaches. This is similar to 
the process of innovation that typically involves a high level of knowledge reuse. For 
some types of decisions, there are certain standard procedures to follow, as discussed 
in previous chapters. In some cases, a common approach or option will be modified to 
suit the needs of a venture. However, sometimes an option or an approach will be 
taken that will not be so common. One can then call that option or approach 
innovative. For example, Metahelix (an agri-biotech company) opted to start a seed 
business with the purpose of not only generating immediate cash (a common 
approach) but also not being dependent on another company to bring to market the 
traits they were developing for certain crops. This also meant they might reap higher 
returns by keeping more of the value chain to themselves. However, the study found 
that such innovative options or approaches were not common. 
 Often it is the common approach implemented efficiently which best fits the 
requirement that makes the difference to an outcome. The process of implementation then 
becomes more important. This inevitably involves micro-level managerial decisions 
rather than strategic decisions. The results of this study show that the 
entrepreneurs/entrepreneurial teams that had requisite skill sets and experience (in both 
business and technology) generally fared well. It appears that relevant prior experience 
not only helps develop a more informed schema but also helps facilitate proper 
implementation. 
 In short, this study suggests that, in contrast to the simplistic views of many 
authors (as discussed in Chapter 2), it is imperative to take a balanced approach to 
understanding decision-making. For example, Busenitz (1999) says: 
Some authors have argued for ways to improve one’s decision-making by 
protecting against the influence of biases and heuristics (Bazerman, 1990; 
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Russo and Schoemaker, 1989). However, in the entrepreneurship context, 
the use of biases and heuristics may be potentially advantageous [Italics 
added]. 
 
Of course, heuristics may be more commonly seen in entrepreneurship. 
However, as shown in previous chapters, important decisions based only on heuristics 
can be dangerous. Heuristics must be used intelligently because working models are 
open to change.  
 In addition to the emergent approach to decision processes, the study has shown 
the importance of a systematic and comprehensive approach (as used in this research) to 
analyse a situation (problem and opportunity). However, it is essential to emphasise that 
the comprehensive approach referred to here is closer to the construct of a holistic 
schema and is not akin to the ‘algorithm’ type of approach (Miller et al., 1960:164) of a 
major investment study by large corporations. The capabilities of the decision-makers 
and the nature of the decision process are inevitably interrelated: while neither wholly 
substitutes for the other and strength in both is ideal, some counterbalance is often 
effective.  
10.2 Directions for future research 
This study points to a more realistic framework for understanding decision-making and 
provides a useful foundation for advising decision-makers. However, further research can 
develop the framework. 
10.2.1 Framework and Research Methodology 
The study involved various types of research methodologies. Future research that 
improves upon the research methodology used in this study would be very useful. It 
would be particularly interesting to see what findings other researchers could obtain 
with a similar or an improved methodology. 
 The following note of caution, however, needs to be provided: 
 The findings of empirical analysis of the decision process in the new venture 
context should not be compared to similar studies of decision processes in 
large organisations. This would be bound to lead to misleading conclusions.  
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 The characteristics of the specific concerned decision (e.g., important or less 
important, urgent or not urgent) should be taken into account (Papadakis et al., 
1998) when research is being carried out to the decision level. 
 When the unit of analysis is the decision, performance (if in the research 
design and part of the study) should be related at that level. 
 Langley et al. (1995) have shown how different decisions are interconnected or 
intertwined with one another. They advise to analyse ‘issues’ rather than ‘decisions’. 
While that suggestion may have merit, this study followed the advice of Krippendorff 
(1980) to set a boundary on the unit of analysis. This worked reasonably well. 
Researchers should be careful to set boundaries for their unit of analysis, regardless of 
whether they focus on ‘issues’ or ‘decisions.’4 
10.2.2 Decision Process Framework 
There have been many attempts to develop a generic framework for the decision process. 
(A few are discussed in Chapter 3.) This research made a similar attempt but one more 
specific to a new venture context. 
 The research led to the observation that one can make a generic framework for the 
decision process. However, this has its limitations. One can develop a broad 
understanding of deliberation and formal analysis methods but putting that in a 
framework remains a challenge—i.e., the inside of the deliberation and formal analysis 
box. It is perhaps because of this that Dutton et al. (1993) say that ‘[t]he process of data 
interpretation is not as systematic, sequential and unidirectional.’ However, systematic 
research and concerted effort are still needed to determine whether that statement is true 
or s simply reflects the current lack of understanding of the process. 
10.2.3 The Framework and Generalisability of the Conclusions 
Stebbins (2001:44) states that ‘one problem frequently faced by exploratory researchers 
is the need to qualify, often extensively, their generalizations, which are rarely simple and 
                                                 
4 For example, raising funds by an IPO can be called a decision process and can be analysed as a unit. 
It can also be called a funding issue or an IPO issue. Setting up a credible boundary for analysis is more 
important than its labelling.  
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straightforward; they must usually be qualified, put in context, and related to other 
generalizations.’ 
The generalisability of this study is limited by the focus on: 
 new ventures 
 the biotechnology industry (a high technology, risk prone, long 
gestation and dynamic environment) 
Notwithstanding the necessity for a careful approach to generalisation, the 
framework developed here is an extension of the ideas of other researchers, especially 
Mintzberg et al. (1976). The framework integrates in a systematic manner the 
concepts involved in the decision process and was designed to be a useful generic 
decision process framework. Further testing of the framework in other contexts will 
assess its usefulness. 
More studies across different industries and countries will develop more 
insights into the nature of the decision process within new ventures, their performance 
and their relationship with the experience of the entrepreneurial team, which are clear 
and strong in the case of these biotechnology ventures. It may be that biotechnology 
ventures and entrepreneurs have specific characteristics that differ from, for example, 
software ventures. For example, the general requirement in biotechnology ventures to 
seek external funding may promote a more rigorous approach to planning and 
decision-making. The complexity of the technology and the requirement for careful 
codification of the research, IP and product development may also encourage a more 
considered approach to decision-making. 
10.2.4 Extension of this Research 
One focus for the future work could be the assessment of quality and levels of quality 
for various constructs. For example, it would be very useful to consider the quality of 
deliberation with an expert by looking at the quality of the expert. Similarly, the 
quality (level of relevance and depth of experience) of prior experience could be 
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examined.5 The issue of quality was raised during many fieldwork discussions in this 
research.  
 This research has shown that process is important and must be researched 
within a context. Future research can show how different contextual variables affect 
the process and with what impact (result).  
10.3 The Practical Importance of this Research 
Langley et al. (1995) highlight the ideas of Simon and March and many other 
researchers in cognitive psychology and organisational theory when they portray the 
decision-maker as ‘passive, a receptacle to whom things happen: problems arise, 
opportunities appear, choices are forced, interruptions occur.’ Many researchers seem 
to have applied the same ideas to entrepreneurship. This approach simply dissociates 
the actor from the action. This study has shown the significant association between 
the actor and the action. As such, it helps to open up the lid of the ‘black box’ of 
decision-making in new ventures. Complete rationality, complete comprehensiveness 
and a completely systematic approach have been shown to be a myth. Strategy, as the 
combined effect of significant decisions, is always emergent due to the ever-evolving 
context. Similarly the actors (i.e., the entrepreneurial team) are also emergent in the 
sense that they are continuously learning. 
 From a practical standpoint, this study will be useful to 
entrepreneurs/entrepreneurial teams to assess their readiness to start a new venture. It 
will also help investors, because it provides clues about what to expect from a certain 
entrepreneur/entrepreneurial team vis-à-vis their approach to the decision process and 
behaviour. This gives potential investors and board members an idea of what needs to 
be done to increase the effectiveness of the decision-making behaviour.6  
                                                 
5 For example, this study has taken into account very broadly the industry experience. It would be 
helpful if researchers could show the impact of variables on the quality of industry experience—
whether the business experience gained was in the same country as that where a new venture is located; 
whether the business experience was in a pharma MNC or a biotech new venture etc. 
6 While this study has emphasised the importance of process, some specific personality dimensions 
(such as motivation or achievement) are clearly significant. This has also been brought to focus by 
Ucbasaran et al. (2001:61), 
 Why, when, and how certain individuals exploit opportunities appear to be a function of the joint 
characteristics of the opportunity and the nature of the individual (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). 
Venkataraman (1997) highlighted three main areas of difference between individuals that may help 
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 Last but not the least, the study indicates that the analysis of the decision 
processes of a firm can be a potent indicator of the performance (or expected 
performance) of the firm. As has been concluded by Hart and Banbury (1994:265), 
‘strategy making processes are significant predictors of firm performance.’ One can 
assess the quality of the decision process of a sample of decisions taken in a new 
venture to get a general feel about the quality and nature of the decision process of 
that new venture. The performance of the assessed decision process can also be 
judged (based on the decision specific criteria). This can be supplemented by 
traditional measures of performance (that can be operational, financial or both) for a 
new venture. (The context needs to be borne in mind.) An assessment of a company 
with a two-pronged strategy is bound to be more accurate and holistic than an 
assessment using only traditional performance measures, which management analysts 
or academic researchers have been using. However, it must be noted that the  
operationalisation of this approach may be difficult. 
                                                                                                                                            
us understand why certain individuals recognize opportunities while others do not: knowledge (and 
information) differences; cognitive differences; and behavioural differences. 
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Who Learns What? 
 
 
W. Edwards Deming: Learning is not compulsory but neither is survival. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                             
 
If entrepreneurship is a process of learning1, ‘a theory of entrepreneurship requires a 
theory of learning’ (Minniti & Bygrave, 2001:7). Rae and Carswell (2000) call for a 
better theoretical grasp on entrepreneurial learning through the development of better 
frameworks to understand learning in the entrepreneurial context. But according to 
Cope (2005), there is a lack of relevant empirical analysis and we know surprisingly 
little about entrepreneurial learning. 
 This chapter is about who learns what from the new venture experience. 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990) argue that an organisation’s absorptive capacity will 
depend on the absorptive capacities of its individual members. These individuals 
stand at the interface of the firm and the external environment. As the context 
changes, the goals of a firm often have to be reformulated. This reformulation 
depends on learning by the individuals involved in the process.  This individual 
learning is shaped by the particular history of each person. This is because 
‘knowledge is cumulative’ and ‘[w]hat is learned in one period builds upon what was 
learned in an earlier period’ (Minniti & Bygrave, 2001:7). However, Corbett (2005) 
suggests that individuals acquire and transform their experience (learn) in different 
ways due to ‘learning asymmetries’. This means that each individual in a new venture 
may have a different learning experience due to both their specific role in the venture 
and to their prior experience (Deakins & Freel, 1998).2  
 This study is based on the analysis of entrepreneurial learning of 32 founder-
directors/senior managers in 23 new biotechnology ventures in Australia and India.  
In the following section, how various authors have approached the issue of 
entrepreneurial learning is discussed.  Drawing on this literature helps to develop a 
conceptual framework for this study. This recognizes, however, that the main study 
was designed to focus not on the analysis of entrepreneurial learning but on 
entrepreneurial decision-making.  
 
                                                 
1 According to Sanchez and Heene (cited in Honig, 2001:22), ‘[k]nowledge is located in the beliefs 
held by an individual or individuals within a group, while learning is defined as the process that 
changes the state of knowledge of a particular individual or organisation.’  
2 According to Politis (cited by Rae, 2006:42), it is important to take into account the ‘context’ to 
develop a better understanding of entrepreneurial learning. This is because the content—what is 
learned—is inevitably affected by the context. 
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11.1 Learning in Entrepreneurship 
In today’s dynamic business environment, organisations must constantly review their 
strategies and adapt. This involves a constant, if uneven, process of learning. In this 
light, organisational learning is as important as decision-making. In fact, the ability to 
learn is one of the most important sources of sustainable competitive advantage 
(Feurer & Chaharbaghi, 1995). How useful, then, are the principles of organisational 
learning for understanding learning in the new venture context?   
 Reuber and Fischer (1999:32), based on a review of the literature, propose that 
organisational learning is ‘a group concept signifying a shared cognition among top 
managers.’ But they argue that ‘for small and young firms dominated by a single 
individual, the cognitive process of the firm’s dominant logic will be similar to that of 
the dominant individual’ (p. 32). Deakins and Freel (1998) conclude from an 
empirical study that ‘the learning process especially in SMEs is a crucial part of their 
evolution, as the entrepreneur, through experience, acquires the ability to learn.’  In 
the new venture context, the emphasis is on an individual (or a few individuals) 
responsible for most of the decision-making and implementation.  In this context, the 
limited formal structure gives them more freedom to act based on their personal 
knowledge. In contrast, in the more formal structure of large organisations, 
individuals matter less; individuals are part of the structure and not ‘the’ structure.3 
Concepts such as learning communities or collective memory that play a key role in 
organisational learning theories are less appropriate when applied to the 
entrepreneurship process and the growth process in small firms (Deakins & Freel, 
1998).4 While Reuber and Fischer (1999) and Deakins and Freel (1998) agree that the 
concepts of organisational learning cannot be directly applied to entrepreneurial 
learning, nevertheless learning in new ventures will not necessarily rest with only one 
individual. In new ventures with multiple founders, the learning of the firm during its 
early days will be the cumulative learning of these individuals. While entrepreneurial 
                                                 
3 For a succinct understanding of organisational learning, refer to Huber (1991) and Levitt and March 
(1988).  
4 Take, for example, the concept of ‘collective memory.’ In large organisations, there is a time lag 
between the action and the learning that later may take the form of routines/procedures, whereas in a 
new venture context, action and learning are almost simultaneous.  
Matlay and Mitra (2002:10) have also discussed differences between the nature of learning in 
a big and a small organisation. 
 
 240
                             
 
teams play an important role in establishing new organisations, learning by an 
individual might not always lead to team learning.  
 Entrepreneurs who have been involved in starting up a new venture tend to be 
more successful in starting up and managing their second and third ventures (Feurer 
& Chaharbaghi, 1995; Wright et al., 1997).5 Kolb (cited in Feurer & Chaharbaghi, 
1995:40) defines learning as ‘the creation of knowledge through the transformation of 
experience’.  But to increase our understanding of entrepreneurial learning, we need 
to know more about how and what entrepreneurs learn from past experience.  
 There have been some attempts to analyse the entrepreneurial learning 
process. One approach to assessing the significance of entrepreneurial learning 
involved comparing the relative difference between entrepreneurs’ ‘total stock’ of 
experience at a given point of time and then relating this stock of experiences to 
variations in new venture performance (e.g. Bailey, 1986; Lamont, 1972).  
Another approach involved demonstrating change in the total stock of 
experience (Busenitz & Barney, 1997). Kaish and Gilad (1991) extend this idea 
further, giving it a cognitive dimension. They propose that an individual’s ability to 
combine existing concepts and information into new ideas plays a central role in the 
process of entrepreneurial learning. According to Minniti and Bygrave (2001) and 
Reuber and Fischer (1999), there have been relatively few attempts to study the type 
of knowledge that is developed through entrepreneurs’ career experiences. Even less 
attention has been directed towards the intermediate process where these experience 
are transformed (the ‘how’ of learning) into such valuable expertise and knowledge.6 
Nevertheless, there have been attempts to understand the how of entrepreneurial 
learning, including work by Corbett, (2005), Erikson, (2003), Feurer and 
Chaharbaghi, (1995), Politis, (2005), Politis and Gabrielsson, (2005), Sarasvathy, 
                                                 
5 Surprisingly, the results of research by Westhead and Wright (1998) did not support their hypothesis 
that firms owned by portfolio and serial founders performed better than firms owned by novice 
founders. 
6 Corbett (2007), in his article based on extensive empirical research, equates learning with experience. 
In this article, he sought to relate human capital to opportunity recognition. He states that ‘knowledge 
asymmetries exist because learning asymmetries exist’ (p. 18). 
For the purpose of this research, experience was not same as learning. It is proposed that 
experience affects the type of learning, which in turn will have affects the new knowledge of the 
individual, making it his or her unique experience. It is through sense making of the experience that 
learning happens (Rae & Carswell, 2001:157). Erikson (2003) has theoretically suggested eight 
different categories of entrepreneurs based on the nature of their experience.   
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(2001) and Warren, (2004).7  Sexton et al. (1997) identify the 10 most frequently 
mentioned learning needs of entrepreneurs. It is not clear how generalisable these 
findings are because the results are not linked to a particular context.  Cope (2005) 
argues that much of the content dimension of the entrepreneurial learning task (i.e., 
what entrepreneurs have to learn about) is context-specific and, hence, learning 
priorities may vary according to the industry. Lamont (1972) found that first-time 
entrepreneurs do more contract type work but later endeavor to focus more on the 
development of products. He suggests this indicates that a learning process is 
operating. 
Clearly much needs to be done to understand who learns what and, in doing 
so, to relate content in entrepreneurial learning to the context.  The context for 
entrepreneurial learning has at least two key factors: prior knowledge and the 
circumstantial need for new knowledge or capabilities. The latter is often associated 
with a significant incident that has an effect on the new venture (Cope, 2005; Deakins 
& Freel, 1998; Rae & Carswell, 2000) and the task role the concerned individual 
performs within the venture. 
11.2 Analysing Learning in the Case Study Ventures 
The work reported here is part of a larger study of decision-making in new ventures.  
In pursuing the study of decision-making, information on entrepreneurs’ prior 
experience was acquired. Individual entrepreneurs were asked (during interview) 
about their key learning experiences from their present venture. Hence, the 
information the study acquired about individuals’ key learning is what those 
individuals thought was their most important learning.8  
This information was analysed to assess whether there were relationships 
between prior experience and the characteristics of learning. The analysis was 
extended to consider the effect both of the specific task roles of the individual and the 
composition of the entrepreneurial team on individual learning. 
                                                 
7 Honig’s (2001) empirical study is valuable because it shows different learning processes used by 
intrapreneurs and entrepreneurs. 
8 Therefore, there is no attempt to arrive at a comprehensive assessment of all learning by these 
entrepreneurs.  
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It is important to note that Warren (2004:8) argues, based on previous 
literature, that ‘the articulation of the learning process may be very difficult for 
entrepreneurs, given that much of entrepreneurial learning has been characterized as 
both unintentional and accidental…and that they may be unused to reflecting on such 
issues.’ However, Bailey (1986), based on his research, argues that entrepreneurial 
learning should be regarded as an experiential process in which entrepreneurs develop 
knowledge through four distinctive learning abilities: experiencing, reflecting, 
thinking and acting. For Bailey, the role of  reflecting and thinking means that 
entrepreneurs are completely aware of their learning9. Sexton et al. (1997) have a 
similar perspective and argue that entrepreneurs have very definite ideas about what 
they want to learn. Krueger (2007), based on his literature review, also argues that it is 
not the experience per se but the lessons learnt from it that is more important.  
In the following section, the types of people who are usually involved in 
forming biotechnology ventures and the major functional roles they have are 
discussed. 
11.3 Approach to the Research 
Biotechnology is a highly knowledge intensive area, so it is vital to have a credible 
scientist in the scientific domain of the new venture. The scientist (or scientists) can 
be associated with the company in various capacities. Usually in biotechnology start-
ups, key scientists are the founding team or part of the founding team. This is because, 
notes Zucher et al. (cited in Murray, 2004:645), ‘the performance of many early 
entrepreneurial biotechnology firms [is] dependent upon a close relationship with 
certain star scientists because they [hold] the ‘key’ to tacit knowledge….’ 
 In addressing the ‘who’ dimension of who learns what, three categories of 
entrepreneurs were identified: those with primarily ‘non-relevant’ business experience 
(i.e., not in the same industry); people with primarily science/technology experience 
(and no business experience); and those who have either research and business (i.e., 
mixed) experience, or relevant business experience.10 Of the 32 entrepreneurs in the 
                                                 
9 This is a position similar to that of Senge (1990).  
10 Two individuals had primarily a business background but had been in the 
pharmaceutical/biotechnology industry for more than 20 years and in very senior positions. While they 
were not technologists, they had a very good working knowledge of the science. They were grouped in 
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study, three had only business experience, 20 had only technology experience and 
nine had mixed experience.11  The characteristics of these three broad categories of 
experience are summarised in Table 11.1.12  
In a biotechnology business, the capability to apply knowledge and use 
technology to provide services or develop products is vital. As funding for research is 
usually a major requirement, knowledge of various fundraising mechanisms is also 
vital. Knowledge of markets, project management and often product development is 
usually essential. To some extent, the entrepreneur or the entrepreneurial team can 
draw on extended knowledge or even outsource some activities, but the key decisions 
must be made within the venture.  
     Four major functions need to be taken care of while managing a new venture to 
growth: raising and managing finance; attracting, selecting, and managing people; 
technology strategies (for product development or service provision); and planning (in 
general, and the need to have good business model that couples technology with the 
market needs). It also helps a great deal if the entrepreneur or the entrepreneurial team 
understands the basic and general rules of business (which will include such things as 
the importance of vision, good deal-making techniques etc.). Collectively these five 
areas constitute the ‘what’ dimension in this study13. 
Once the key learning of each individual entrepreneur was obtained, it was content 
analysed and categorised according to the functional areas (discussed above).  
Possible relationships between types of entrepreneur (the ‘who’) and categories of 
learning (the ‘what’) were tested by ANOVA. The average scores in two-way tables 
were analysed using an analysis of variance.14 
 
                                                                                                                                            
the ‘mixed’ experience category. Whereas people with only non-relevant business experience will 
simply be termed as ‘people with only business experience.’ 
11 All the entrepreneurs belong to new ventures set up between 1998 and 2003. The entrepreneur team 
in this research means founder(s) along with senior management people during the very early stages.  
12 Due to the sample size, it was not feasible to use more differentiated categories.  
13 The ‘what’ of learning raised by the entrepreneurs in response to an open-ended question about key 
learning fell largely unambiguously into these categories.  
14 It is possible to test for the main effects of these categorising factors because the interaction between 
them is used as the error (residual) to test for these main effects. It is assumed that this interaction is a 
reasonable estimate of the residual variation. In some situations, it was possible to subdivide the 
degrees of freedom for one factor into simple degree of freedom contrasts that were a priori of 
particular interest or importance.   
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TABLE 11.1 GENERAL CATEGORIES OF TYPES OF EXPERIENCE AND ASSOCIATED ASSUMPTIONS  
CATEGORY CHARACTERISTICS ASSUMPTIONS 
Primarily ‘non-
relevant’ business 
experience 
o Managerial experience of working in ‘non-technology’ functional areas—
finance, accounting, sales, marketing, strategic management, and general 
management. 
o No managerial experience of working in a biotechnology/ pharmaceutical/life 
science related company. 
o Expertise in their functional area, and understanding of other 
‘related’ areas of management/business. Or a firm understanding 
of ‘general management.’  
o Well-developed understanding of general principles of business.  
o Poor understanding of the biotechnology industry and 
peculiarities related to it. 
Primarily 
science/technology 
experience 
o Primarily involved in research-based work either in a commercial or an 
academic organisation 
o Well-developed understanding of the science and the technological aspects of 
the core area based on which the new venture is founded. 
o General understanding of the technological aspects that are related to the core. 
o Expertise in their area, and understanding of other ‘related’ 
areas in science. 
o Little understanding of the ‘general’ principles of business and 
the process of commercialisation. 
o Little understanding of ‘specific’ functional areas in business 
and even the importance of each. 
‘Mixed’ experience o Reasonable (if not well-developed) understanding of the science and the 
technological aspects of the core area based on which the new venture is 
founded. 
o Managerial experience of working in ‘non-technology’ functional areas— 
finance, accounting, sales, marketing, strategic management and general 
management. 
o Managerial experience of working in a biotechnology/pharmaceutical/life 
science related company. 
o Good understanding of the concerned segment of the 
biotechnology industry. 
o Overall understanding of the commercialisation process and the 
important dimensions of various functional areas.  
o Understanding of the relevant science, the commercialisation 
process, and management functions leading to a holistic 
understanding of the business. 
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11.4 Does Experience Affect an Individual Entrepreneur’s Learning? 
Table 11.2(a) shows that there is little significant difference (p= 0.053) in the ‘amount 
of learning’ (i.e., the number of total learning experiences or ‘lessons’ cited) among 
the three categories The influence of prior experience on the amount of an 
entrepreneur’s learning is, however, observed when these individuals are categorised 
into two main groups—those with relevant business experience (i.e., mixed 
experience); and those with no or non-relevant business experience—and compared. 
As shown in Table 11.2(b), the nature of prior experience seems to have a significant 
influence on the total amount of learning by an individual (p= 0.019). The means for 
this effect are 0.697 for the group with no or non-relevant ‘business’ experience and 
0.266 for those with relevant business experience. The SED is 0.1475. Individuals 
with ‘mixed’ prior experience have the least frequency of cited new learning. This 
may be because they already would have undergone quite a lot of learning in both 
technology and business.15 On the other hand, people with only science experience or 
non-relevant business experience have a similar ‘total’ average frequency of learning 
(albeit in different domains), so no source of variation was observed for the total 
learning between these two groups (p= 0.678).  
TABLE 11.2(A) THE EFFECT OF EXPERIENCE ON KEY LEARNING  
Source of Variation d.f.  s.s. m.s. v.r. F pr. (p) 
Experience 2 0.63066 0.31533 4.35 0.053 
Area 4 0.03619 0.00905 0.12 0.969 
Residual 8 0.58009 0.07251   
Total 14 1.24695    
 
* d.f. – degrees of freedom; s.s. – sum of squares; m.s. – mean square; v.r. – variance ratio; and F pr - F 
probability (which determines significance level). 
                                                 
15  According to Argote (cited in Haas, 2006:1173), 
[P]rior experience moves team members up their own learning curves, helping them to build on 
past successes and avoid past mistakes when interpreting and applying external knowledge rather 
than repeating those mistakes.  
An empirical study by Haas (2006) found that the performance of a project is enhanced when the 
capabilities and experience of the team members are more relevant to the ‘focal organisation’ rather 
than if it is of ‘non-specific nature.’ 
                             
 
                             
 
 
TABLE 11.2(B) THE EFFECT OF EXPERIENCE ON KEY LEARNING  
Source of Variation d.f. s.s. m.s. v.r. F pr. 
(Business Exp. or Technology Exp.) 
Vs. Mixed Exp. 1 0.61719 0.61719 8.51 0.019 
Business Exp. Vs. Technology Exp.  1 0.01347 0.01347 0.19 0.678 
Area 4 0.03619 0.00905 0.12 0.969 
Residual 8 0.58009 0.07251   
Total 14 1.24695    
 
 On further analysis, it became evident that individuals with different 
experience also learn differently. (See Tables 11.3(a) and Table 11.3(b)). Table 
11.3(b) shows that the biggest contributors to the residuals (in descending order) are 
due to remarkably different learning preferences shown by individuals with only 
business experience and individuals with only technology experience. For people with 
prior experience only in technology, the key learning is in understanding general 
business concepts. For people with prior experience in business only, the key learning 
is more specific to finance and hiring people. This is understandable, because 
individuals with business experience who are new to the industry will have to learn 
about the industry-specific technology/commercialisation strategies and technologists 
will have to develop skills in project management and understanding and developing 
products/services in a commercial context. People with prior business experience 
only, however, learn very little about general business principles, and individuals with 
only technology experience in general show little enthusiasm for learning about 
finance. 
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TABLE 11. 3(A) WHAT IS THE KEY LEARNING OF WHOM?  
  
Business Experience 
Only 
Technology Experience
Only 
 Mixed 
Experience Average 
Key areas of 
learning 
(No. Of People= 3) (No. Of People= 20) 
(No. Of 
People= 9) 
No. Of 
People= 32 
Technology 
Strategies 0.667 0.75 0 0.531 
Finance 1 0.35 0.444 0.438 
People 1 0.6 0.222 0.531 
Plan 0.667 0.7 0.222 0.563 
Business 
General 0.333 0.9 0.444 0.719 
Total 3.667 3.3 1.33 2.781 
 
* Figure shown for each given category is its respective ‘average,’ which is obtained by dividing the 
total instance of key learning in the respective category by the total number of individuals for the given 
type of experience. 
TABLE 11. 3(B) WHAT IS THE ‘KEY’ LEARNING OF WHOM? – ASSESSMENT BASED ON 
‘RESIDUALS’16  
  
Business Experience 
Only 
Technology Experience 
Only Mixed Experience 
Key areas of 
learning 
   
Technology 
Strategies 0.0145 0.1709 - 0.1855 
Finance 0.2219 - 0.3547 0.1329 
People 0.2125 - 0.1141 - 0.0985 
Plan - 0.0428 0.0636 - 0.0208 
Business General - 0.4061 0.2343 0.1719 
 
                                                 
16 Assessment based on the residual shows the contribution of individual factor to the total residual. 
The higher the value (positive or negative), the higher the contribution. This  suggests  the occurrence 
is not by chance only. For example, people with business experience only show much less learning 
related to general business. See Table 11.3(a). Its contribution to residual is the highest, which means 
the occurrence is not merely by chance. 
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11.4.1 Learning Related to Technology (for Products/Services) 
As biotechnology is a technology business, it is to be expected that people with only 
(prior) business experience will develop some functional knowledge of the technology 
(especially commercially relevant aspects of it). In two cases, the individuals talked 
about having a learning experience related to technology. Surprisingly, perhaps, both 
arose from things they got right. Mr Kim Slatyer (VRI Biomedical) talked about an 
optimum mix of early and late stage products: 
One of the things that I like about our business plan now is that we have 
products that generate revenue in short term but we also have projects that 
might be longer term and have a lot of blue sky. 
 
Mr Gary Redlich (Peplin Biotech) talked about the imperative to have a clear 
product idea that, according to him, many small biotech companies don’t have: 
And another learning experience, and this is not because we got it wrong 
in Peplin but because we got it right and in fact, I have seen it gone wrong 
in far too many companies in Australia. Having a very clear vision of what 
the ultimate product is going to be from the very start and being able to 
put your energy where you need to make choices and to put your energies 
to behaviours that are going to direct you to that product rather than direct 
you to other outcomes, be it scientific credibility or publications, be it 
political glory or anything else. 
 
 People with scientific experience only seemed to learn more about product 
development or services provision. Almost two-thirds of those with prior experience 
only in science reported learning experiences related to this domain.17 
 Quite a few entrepreneurs who had prior experience only in science point to 
learning about the market/business side of the product or services. For example, one 
respondent commented:  
We had a product that could be sold primarily to research biologists. It 
was a product which was less priced, about $5,000 to $10,000 per desktop. 
To sell the product, it required more effort than almost the selling price, 
particularly in the beginning when one needs to give a lot of discounts. 
                                                 
17 However, one individual identified six ‘tech strategies’ learning experiences. Notably, this individual 
was, at the start of the venture, a recent PhD graduate in life sciences. This observation is important 
from  an experience perspective (i.e., less experience, more learning).  
In terms of the impact of this observation on the conclusion and analysis, even if one takes 
this aberration into account, this group has had a relatively high learning experience in technology 
strategies. 
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For example, a $5,000 product has to be sold for $3,000. At $3,000, if you 
are going to engage them for two months discussion, show them demos 
and maybe visit them all the way to America, then the sales strategy 
doesn’t work. [I]f it would have been $50,000 product, then it would have 
been simpler to put our own sales effort and get that initial kick-start to the 
revenues. That is why we had to completely change strategy with gene 
expression stuff. In terms of sales, we had to look for distributors. It was 
not viable to do it ourselves. From that perspective, it would have been 
better to start with $100,000 or at least $50,000 + products. And the 
technology we were creating, we were pretty agnostic… Whether it was 
gene expression or chemistry or clinical, it didn’t matter much. 
 
  A few entrepreneurs with prior experience only in science also emphasised 
the benefits of having a platform technology. Dr Andrew Wilks (Cytopia) said, ‘I 
don’t believe in one-hit wonders or single technology company. You have to build a 
platform and from that platform you have to have multiple opportunities for 
discovery.’ Dr Andrew Humberstone supported that view and added that it is easier to 
sell products based on a platform technology than platform technology per se. Dr 
Villoo Patell (Avesthagen) extended this line of thought by emphasising the need to 
be a multi-product company. Objective assessment related to the development of 
products also seems important. One respondent puts this quite clearly: 
And I think one of the things that I have learnt is that you have to be a bit 
more ruthless on technology development in terms of saying, ‘This is not 
going to work.’ And then putting it to one side. You might come back to it 
later on but you got to… The development of the product development 
process adds a lot of rigor and robustness in the system. And I think prior 
to that we invested too much for too long for things that were dogs and 
were never going to make it. We should have been rigorous about it and 
cutting it off earlier. 
 
 For new ventures in the therapeutic or diagnostic arena, it may be useful to 
take into account the twin needs to have a credible proof of concept earlier (so that if 
it has to fail, it fails early) and to engage regulatory authorities early. Dr Andrew 
Humberstone (Acrux) reflected in this way: 
You [have] got to get human data as quickly as possible. You shouldn’t 
spend too much time and money on developing a product before you have 
got that data to show. It is nice to have lab data to show flux across skin, 
but what does that mean? I think the key to get big pharma company 
interested is to have some human data. We have really focused hard on 
getting very efficient, low-cost development programs to that stage. 
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Entrepreneurs who had a mixed experience did not list any technology related 
learning experience. It is likely that, having worked in the business environment, they 
would be well aware of the need for careful planning and for aligning research 
endeavours with the market. 
11.4.2 Learning Related to Finance 
Cash is king for any business. As the biotechnology business is capital intensive, it is 
imperative for the entrepreneur or entrepreneurial team to manage capital raising and 
expenditure. It is vital to at least understand the mechanism for raising finance. 
Because resources are usually scarce compared with the tasks that need to be 
completed, properly managing finance is as important as raising it. 
TABLE 11.4 SOME KEY FINANCIAL LEARNINGS 
Learning type Quotes 
Better financial 
training 
‘I would prefer to have financial training 
before starting again.’ 
Learning about 
VC process 
‘You learn about the venture capital process 
and the things that they want to hear.’ 
More careful of 
time to raise 
money 
‘I will choose the timing differently. I 
wouldn’t raise money when there is about to 
be a stock market crash. I think I will follow 
the cycles a bit more and when there is a 
boom, I will be out raising money.’ 
Proper 
budgeting 
‘I don’t know if Company X is on your list, 
but with X they were able to raise a lot of 
money at a time when money was plentiful 
and that makes it easy to grow out of 
control. So you grow to an unsuitable level 
and all that happens is that when times are 
tight and money is tough, you got to cut 
programs and look like you have failed.’ 
Realistic 
valuation 
‘You’ve got to be realistic in your valuation 
that you are doing.’ 
Be honest with 
brokers 
‘You have to be honest with your brokers. 
You shouldn’t mislead them. There is 
always a temptation from the press to over- 
or under-estimate your technology; that’s 
going to happen. We have to make sure that 
whenever we are talking, we know the 
limitations of what we are talking.’ 
Streamline cash 
flows 
‘Streamline cash flows will be the second 
important thing.’ 
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 The incidence of reported learning related to finance varies among the three 
categories (see Table 11.3(a)). Learning related to finance seems to be particularly 
high for people with prior experience only in business. A closer examination of the 
data reveals that all the incidences are related to one type of learning: taking the 
company to IPO very early is a bad strategy as it puts enormous amount of 
administrative burden on a very small company (and even restricts future capital 
raising). 
 Individuals with prior experience only in science or with a mixed experience 
identified very few instances of finance related learning (refer to Table 11.3(a)) as 
their key learning.18 This suggests the need to more clearly specify the role of the 
individuals in the venture and, hence, the nature of their experience. 
11.4.3 Learning Related to the Hire and Management of People 
The most valuable resource for a new venture is its people, especially the key people, 
who are usually also the decision-makers. It is imperative for the entrepreneur or the 
entrepreneurial team to assemble an appropriate team. This can be challenging for a 
new venture.  
 It was found that people with mixed prior experience had the lowest reported 
level of key learning related to hiring and managing people while people with only 
prior business experience had the maximum key learning experience in this area (see 
Table 11.3(a)). A closer examination showed that all three cases of such learning in 
the latter case were by one individual who did not have any previous background in 
the pharmaceutical/biotechnology industry. In discussing the need to recruit the right 
set of people, this individual talked about being careful while forming the board (i.e., 
instead of recruiting high profile people, recruit people with a relevant background) 
and problems related to having a major shareholder who doesn’t understand business. 
                                                 
18 It may be that in the former case either their prior knowledge inhibited their understanding of that 
subject or it was out of their functional domain, even in the new venture. For people with ‘mixed’ 
experience, such learning would have already taken place. 
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 People with prior experience only in science had a relatively high frequency of 
key learning episodes in this area. For example, Dr Bernard Flynn (Iliad Chemicals) 
suggested: 
You really need to put in place management capability within the 
company, that you have to work with investors as they have to agree to a 
point where management capability has to be expanded even though there 
is desire to put more money into science. You need to work that as well to 
put in place management capabilities so that you are not drawn along into 
too many different pathways. 
 
Dr Keats Nelms of Phenomix drew different lessons from his experience: 
Hiring high-level key people immediately rather than hiring technical 
people. It may seem that you need someone at a low level, but it is better 
to hire someone who is going to recruit and train those people than it is to 
hire entry level people first. So I think the sequence of order of hiring 
people will be very specific. 
 
 It is vital to have a balance of all skill sets and to ensure that technology and 
business people understand each other’s perspective and contribution. The diversity in 
skill sets is important not only for senior management but also for the board. One 
respondent commented: 
We were too heavily weighted toward science. We had got too many like-
minded people on our board. So we will try and get more variety on board 
early on. 
 
 It is not only hiring senior people that is important; it is equally important to 
get the right people at the junior level who are going to implement the project. 
Managing such staff is also important. Dr Keats Nelms (Phenomix) said: 
I think the bigger [challenge] is related to hiring staff and managing the 
staff. Because there are so many different things that I am having to 
manage that I haven’t had to manage before, even very low-level technical 
people. That’s something that you get better at the more experienced you 
are. 
11.4.4 Learning Related to Planning 
Efficient planning can be one of the key factors on which the success or failure of a 
decision will depend. It becomes more important for a biotechnology new venture in 
which high investments have occurred and the stakes are very high. It is not surprising 
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to find that all the key learning experiences observed by the respondents with prior 
experience in business (whether only in business or in both business and technology) 
talked not about planning per se but about planning realistically: 
[I learnt that] most companies really don’t have a sufficiently crisp plan to 
ensure commercial outcome. And it would invariably take much longer 
and many more dollars than what they have expected because everyone 
takes very enthusiastic and very optimistic [viewpoint] from outset. This 
means that companies generally find them selves undercapitalised and 
they have to go back to the market for money. 
 
 Individuals whose prior exposure was limited to science/technology and those 
with previous business experience had almost the same frequency of key learning in 
relation to planning. However, people with prior experience only in 
science/technology talked more about having a plan per se rather than having realistic 
plans.19 One respondent said: 
[T]o have a plan. And, even if that plan was not a formal MBA class 
business plan, make sure that you always have plans.  
 
An important lesson for some was to identify risks and plan for how to deal with 
them: 
We went from initial discussions to a closed deal within six months 
because it made so much sense. But what we didn’t do at that time was to 
ask what the risk factors were there and how do we mitigate against those 
risks. One of the risks being that the venture capital company can pull 
their money if they want to. So I think we did not see all the risks. We saw 
all the upside but we never looked what the potential downsides were. 
And we ended up having to back our way out of it. We did, fortunately, 
but it was a pretty traumatic process. 
 
 Some people who had only prior science/technology experience also 
emphasised the importance of having a good project management system and 
assessing different options carefully. 
                                                 
19 This may be because learning occurs in small steps. It may also be that once technical people know 
about the benefits of planning, their plans are realistic by themselves because they know better about 
the facts related to working in their technical field. 
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11.4.5 Learning Related to Business in General 
The category ‘business in general’ includes all the other types of learning that affect 
the business. It is perhaps not surprising that there is almost no difference in the 
frequency of reported learning among those with business only and mixed prior 
experience (see Table 11.3(a)). However, those whose prior experience was only in 
science/technology had a much higher relative frequency of reported learning about 
business in general. For example, Professor Barrie Finnin (Acrux) said: 
I think from a personal experience that what I have learnt and continue to 
learn is that when you get into different areas like commercial laws or 
intellectual property or so on… The jargon is very different, so you need 
to learn the jargon. 
 
 Similarly, Dr Keats Nelms (Phenomix) also emphasises the need to keep 
learning: 
For the most part, everything that we have done from the beginning till the 
end has been… there has been some learning that has helped. But really 
with every new step there is a new learning. Just keep going up the 
learning curve. 
 
TABLE 11.5 SOME KEY GENERAL BUSINESS LEARNINGS  
Learnin
g type 
Quotes 
 Be better informed 
of business 
environment 
‘I think the understanding of limitation of Australia is a 
very important thing. Understanding the requirements of 
a good investment and understanding the way the 
entrepreneurial approach needs to deliver that. You got 
to know your stuff.’ 
Better time 
management 
‘Product launch was delayed a little bit so we were hurt. 
I think there we have delayed a little bit, perhaps due to 
inexperience.’  
Efficient decision-
making processes 
‘We started as a very consensus company. Everyone in 
the company was involved in making decisions, but very 
soon you can’t sustain that. You have to have processes 
for making decisions for projects.’ 
Negotiate with 
pharmaceutical 
companies for risks 
‘I think the other big learning would be that you 
negotiate the best sort of deal you can. You want to 
ensure that you not only get your product back but any 
other development that they did [if the collaboration is 
off]. You get access to that preferably without cost. So, 
you just have to protect yourself as best as you can.’ 
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 Other reported general business learning (see Table 11.5) was having 
flexibility in working procedures and efficient decision-making processes; better time 
management; being less of a risk taker; correcting mistakes quickly; being better 
informed about the business environment; and taking into account cultural diversity. 
11.5 How the Nature of the Present Role in the Current Entrepreneurial Team Affects 
Individual Learning 
The analysis in the previous section assessed whether there was a relationship 
between the prior experience of entrepreneurs and what they learned from the 
experience of a new venture.  In this section, the effect of two intermediating 
factors—the functional roles of the entrepreneur in the entrepreneurial team and the 
composition of entrepreneurial team itself—will be explored to gain further insight on 
who might learn what and why.  
In order to be consistent, the same sample was used. In the first instance, the 
three earlier categories—non-relevant business experience only, science/technology 
experience only, and mixed experience—were broken down on the basis of the role in 
the entrepreneurial team of an individual with a particular prior experience.  This 
resulted in four categories. (See tables 11.6 and 11.7.) People with mixed experience 
(M) or prior non-relevant business experience only (B) generally serve the business in 
a general management (GM) role.20 The category of science/technology experience 
only (T) was further segregated into two, as some individuals with this background 
took on the role of business management within the company.21 Others in this 
category had continued to be technologists only, completely leaving the running of 
the business to other members of the entrepreneurial team. These four categories were 
divided further (see Table 11.8) by taking note of the composition of the team the 
entrepreneur was part of. There were three types of entrepreneurial teams22: ones with 
                                                 
20 Again, broad categories were used. In this study, the function in a new venture was separated into 
two— running the business (general management), and developing the science and technology.  
21 This category can be further subdivided, but the small sample prohibited doing so to make any 
reasonable conclusion. Three main categories within this category are: technologists running the 
business completely by themselves, having completely left the science part to other colleagues; 
technologists running the business completely by themselves and overlooking the science area; 
technologists only partially involved in running the business (in association with other team members) 
and at the same time involved with science in the company. 
22 The said individual may be the sole entrepreneur behind the new venture or just one of the 
entrepreneurial team. As said before, even senior managers who joined very early are also considered 
to be part of the entrepreneurial team.  
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primarily technology experience, (N); those that had both research and relevant 
business (i.e., mixed) experience,  (M); and ones that had experience in business but 
not so relevant experience in the specific industry, (UBZ). 
The results in Table 11.6 show that total learning is significantly affected (p= 
0.041) by the interaction of prior experience and the current job. It is observed that 
when individuals’ current role was similar to their prior experience/role, they had a 
lower frequency of learning compared with those who were in a different role.23 The 
means for this effect are 0.686 for the group of individuals in a role dissimilar to their 
previous experience and 0.266 for those whose present job matched their previous 
experience. The SED is 0.1835.  
 Table 11.7(b) shows that the biggest contribution to the residual is from those 
groups where the current role diverges most from the previous one (such as B-GM 
and T-GM). The largest contributors to the residual mean square are not chance 
occurrences. Some of the largest contributors in descending order are: T-GM, 
showing very low learning in finance; T-T, showing very high learning in technology 
strategies; B-GM, showing much less learning related to general business principles; 
T-GM, showing very high learning related to general business principles; B-GM, 
showing high learning in finance; and T-T, showing low learning related to hiring and 
managing people. 
TABLE 11.6 DOES PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE AND PRESENT FUNCTIONAL ROLE AFFECT 
INDIVIDUAL LEARNING? 
Source of Variation d.f. s.s. m.s. v.r. F pr. 
(Exp. relevant to present role) Vs 
(Exp. Non-relevant to present role) 1 0.6607 0.6607 5.23 0.041 
Interaction within (Exp. Non-
relevant to present role) 2 0.0237 0.0118 0.09 0.911 
Area 4 0.056 0.014 0.11 0.976 
Residual 12 1.5158 0.1263   
Total 19 2.2561    
 
 In taking into account the specific roles of individuals in the venture, the 
discussion first concerns entrepreneurs with prior experience only in 
science/technology. Table 11.7(a) shows clearly the differences in key learning 
                                                 
23 Researchers whose prior experience was in a research organisation were considered to be in a 
different role if they were part of the entrepreneurial team in a new venture.  
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between such individuals in the present roles of technologist (T-T) and those in 
general management (T-GM). The former report learning more about technology 
strategies whereas the latter report learning more about people, planning and business 
in general.24 However, those with only prior science/technology experience and in a 
science/technology role (T-T) report greater learning about financial aspects in 
comparison with the T-GM group.25 
TABLE 11.7(A) WHO LEARNS WHAT? 
  B-GM (3) T-GM (9) M-GM (9) T-T (11) Average (32) 
Key areas of Learning           
Technology Strategies 0.667 0.333 0 1.091 0.531 
Finance  1 0.111 0.444 0.545 0.438 
People 1 0.889 0.222 0.364 0.531 
Plan  0.667 0.889 0.222 0.545 0.563 
Business General 0.333 1.222 0.444 0.636 0.719 
Total 3.667 3.444 1.333 3.182 2.781 
 
Note: The first letter stands for prior experience and the second stands for the present role. For 
example, (B-GM) is a non-relevant business experienced person in a general management role. 
The figures in the brackets indicate the number of individuals in that category. 
TABLE 11.7(B) WHO LEARNS WHAT? ASSESSMENT BASED ON RESIDUALS 
  B-GM M-GM T-GM T-T 
Key areas of Learning         
Technology Strategies -0.0079 -0.2079 -0.2974 0.5132 
Finance 0.3228 0.2338 -0.5216 -0.035 
People 0.2291 -0.0819 0.1626 -0.3098 
Plan -0.0659 -0.0439 0.2007 -0.0907 
Business General -0.4779 0.1001 0.4556 -0.0777 
 
 An entrepreneurial team’s overall prior experience does seem to make a 
difference to the learning of individual members. Table 11.7(a) shows that 
technologists who took on a role in general management had more key learning 
experiences, but even more so if they were part of an entrepreneurial team that had 
business experience (see Table 11.8).  The more relevant the experience of the team, 
the more they learnt (T-GM-M > T-GM-UBZ > T-GM-N). Similarly, 
                                                 
24  In an earlier section, it was highlighted that one recent PhD graduate (within T-T) alone accounted 
for six key learning experiences in technology strategies; the observation here doesn’t change much 
even if this is taken into consideration (and adjustment done). 
25 Due to insufficient data, it is difficult to identify the reason for T-T reporting more learning about 
financial aspects than T-GM.  
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scientists/technologists in the role of technologists in a venture having a ‘mixed’ 
experience entrepreneurial team had more learning compared with those in a venture 
with an entrepreneurial team that lacked relevant business experience (T-T-M > T-T-
UBZ).26 The key learning reported by T-GM-M and T-GM-UBZ are mainly related to 
people and general business whereas the key learning reported by T-GM-N is a bit 
more evenly spread, with a maximum concentration in planning and business general. 
It is possible that the breadth of jobs they had to take care of (even though they had 
never done them before) would require them to learn the basics first. Without a person 
with business experience within the team, T-GM-N individuals would have had to 
learn the basics the hard way. This experience would have been their key learning. 
TABLE 11.8 SHAPING INDIVIDUAL LEARNING: PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE, FUNCTIONAL 
ROLE AND THE ENTREPRENEURIAL TEAM 
Key 
Learning  
B-GM-UBZ 
(3) 
M-GM-M 
 (9) 
T-GM-M 
(3) 
T-GM-UBZ
 (2) 
T-GM-N
 (4) 
T-T-M  
(6) 
T-T-UBZ 
 (5) 
Average 
(32) 
Technology 
Strategies 0.667 0 0 0.5 0.5 1.333 0.8 0.531 
Finance  1 0.444 0 0 0.25 0.833 0.2 0.438 
People 1 0.222 1.333 1 0.5 0.333 0.4 0.531 
Plan  0.667 0.222 1.333 0.5 0.75 0.5 0.6 0.563 
Business 
General 0.333 0.444 1.333 1.5 1 0.833 0.4 0.719 
Total 3.667 1.333 4 3.5 3 3.833 2.4 2.781 
 
Note: The first letter stands for prior experience, the second stands for the present role and the final 
stands for the type of entrepreneurial team. For example, (B-GM-UBZ) is non-relevant business 
experienced person in general management role in a team that has non-relevant business 
experience. The figures in the brackets indicate the number of individuals in that category. 
* In both tables (11.7(a) and 11.8), the figure shown for each given category is its respective 
average, which is obtained by dividing the total instance of key learning in the respective 
category by the total number of individuals for the given type of experience. 
 Similarly, the interplay of prior experience, current role and the type of team is 
best seen when the key individual learning of B-GM-UBZ and T-GM-UBZ are 
compared. While both groups reported similar frequencies of learning about 
                                                 
26 The ANOVA did not lead to a significant difference (p= 0.324) between (T-GM-UBZ + T-GM-N) 
and (T-GM-M). Similarly, no significant difference (p= 0.137) was observed for (T-T-M) and (T-T-
UBZ). However, a definite conclusion would be inappropriate until and unless confirmed in a similar 
study with a larger sample size. The ‘simple numbers’ (in Table 11.8) also portray a different picture. 
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technology strategies and planning, the former had much more key learning in finance 
and people whereas the latter experienced the same in business in general. This shows 
the effect of prior experience on the individual learning if the other two (nature of 
present role and type of team) are the same.  
 A comparison of T-GM-M and T-T-M shows that the former had a far greater 
frequency of key learning in people, planning and business in general whereas the 
latter learnt relatively more about technology strategies.27 Therefore, it appears that 
the present role has a great effect on individual learning if the nature of prior 
experience and type of team is the same. 
11.6 Discussion 
11.6.1 Conclusion 
This study explored the impact of prior experience, current role and the 
entrepreneurial team composition on the individual entrepreneur’s learning. Given 
that due to the sample size and focus on a single sector the analysis can only be 
suggestive, some propositions can be advanced. 
The prior experience of an individual entrepreneur affects how much and what 
they recall as their key learning. It is the entrepreneur whose experience is most 
directly relevant to the requirement to run the new venture who has the lowest 
frequency of learning experiences. 
The specific role that an individual plays in the venture shapes their specific 
learning needs and opportunities. For example, a businessperson (with non-relevant 
experience) in a similar role in new venture learns more about finance, people and 
planning (albeit with reference to the new context/industry). 
 Who learns most? It is the entrepreneur with the most distant prior experience 
(vis-à-vis their role in the venture) when that entrepreneur is part of an 
entrepreneurial team that has relevant heterogeneous skills and experiences. For 
                                                 
27 Again, for the cautious reader, it is imperative to bring to light the incidence of a recent PhD 
graduate (here, part of T-T-M) alone accounting for six key learning experiences. Taking this into 
account, the observation doesn’t change relatively. In absolute terms, however, (after adjustment) the 
learning for T-T-M would be more evenly spread across different functions. 
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example, Table 11.8 shows that T-GM-M learns most while M-GM-M learns least. T-
GM-M is closely followed by B-GM-UBZ and T-GM-UBZ in terms of the maximum 
(total) key learning experience. This is understandable if one takes into account that 
mentoring by a person with relevant business experience can be particularly valuable.  
It is no wonder that T-GM-N had relatively fewer key learnings. Researchers have 
stressed the experiential role of learning—the ‘doing’ in entrepreneurial learning. This 
research supports the importance of doing as a key mechanism for learning. It shows 
that a carefully nuanced approach to both prior experience and new venture 
experience will be necessary in future research.  This research also strongly suggests 
that learning by mentoring/coaching may be an important mechanism for 
entrepreneurial learning and a key complement to direct experience.   
11.6.2 Limitations and Future Directions 
The analysis in this study has been limited by the sample size. Therefore, a larger 
scale study would be likely to provide a stronger test of relationships and further 
insights.28 However, it may be worth undertaking similar small-scale studies in 
different new venture contexts before embarking upon a large study. Additional 
small-scale studies would also enable further development of the analytical 
categories.   
 One dimension of the entrepreneurial experience that requires further 
specification is that of the nature of managerial experience. This applies to both prior 
experience and the role in the new venture.  The specific functional roles, the level of 
managerial experience (e.g., prior responsibility for decision-making) and the context 
of that experience (e.g., small firm or large firm, or established firm or new venture), 
all require careful specification.29  
                                                 
28 However, in most studies, some categories will always be small in comparison with other categories. 
For example, there will be few individuals with absolutely no relevant/related  (either science or 
business) experience venturing into biotechnology.  
29 There have been a few attempts to develop studies along these lines. For example, Westhead et al. 
(2005:413), in their empirical research, concluded ‘streams of experience accumulated by novice 
entrepreneurs are not the same as those reported by serial and portfolio entrepreneurs.’ [The study by 
Westhead et al. (2005) was based on an extensive survey (using a structured questionnaire) of novice, 
portfolio, and serial entrepreneurs in Scotland.] 
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 Another dimension that might be incorporated in future research is that of the 
quality of learning. Cope (2005) suggests that from whom entrepreneurs learn has a 
significant impact on the quality of their learning. The research reported here also 
suggests that interaction with a strong and experienced entrepreneurial team can 
provide an effective learning environment. However, this will first require the 
establishment of sharper and well-defined criteria for determining levels of ‘quality.’  
 
Figure 11.1 Entrepreneurial Learning 
 It is important to emphasise that the process of new venture development and 
the experience of entrepreneurial learning depend significantly on not only the sector 
but also the wider context. Many regions now provide an increasingly rich milieu for 
new venture development through the supply of specialised and experienced business 
support (e.g., intellectual property advice and strategic consulting), opportunities for 
outsourcing (e.g., product development, product trials, purification of compounds and 
marketing) and access to vital resources (e.g., capital, managers with relevant new 
venture experience and business angles). Therefore, while decision-making remains 
largely the role of the entrepreneur (while the board supports the entrepreneur), 
learning is an increasingly distributed activity reflecting the increasing division of 
labour.  While an entrepreneur will require less ‘know how’ and ‘know why’ in these 
distributed new venture/learning systems (Figure 11.1), there will be a need for ‘know 
what’ (although less so with the rise in knowledge intensive business services), ‘know 
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who,’ and ‘know when’.  As such, what entrepreneurs learn, what they need to learn, 
how they learn and from whom they learn will be highly context specific.  
 
 
Source: Crossan et al. (1999:532) 
Figure 11.2 Learning as Dynamic Process: Integrating Levels 
  The suggestions from this research on the role of the entrepreneurial team in 
facilitating learning and Cope’s (2005) ideas about generative learning at the 
entrepreneurial team level point to the importance of integrating the analysis (and 
practice) of entrepreneurial learning with new venture learning (i.e., at an organisation 
level). One useful direction for future research will be exploring how the 
individual/team develops the foundation of new venture learning.  Crossan et al. 
(1999) have addressed this issue. Their work contributes to integrating entrepreneurial 
learning (seen usually at an individual level) with ‘organisational learning.’
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Who was Interviewed
                             
 
List of Australian Companies  
 
  
Name of the 
Company Name of the Person Job Title (at the time of Interview) 
        
1 Phenomix Dr Keats Nelms Senior Director 
        
2 Biotron Dr Michelle Miller CEO 
    Prof Chris Parish Founder + Board Member 
    Prof Angela Dulhunty Founder  
        
3 Proteome Systems Dr Keith Williams CEO + Founder 
    Dr Marc Wilkins Founder 
    Dr Jenny Harry Founder + Director (Discovery and Diagnostics) 
        
4 VRI Biomedical Dr Peter French Managing Director 
    Mr. Kim Slatyer CEO + Founder 
    Prof Patricia Conway Chief Scientist 
        
5 Cryosite Mr Gordon Milliken Managing Director + Founder 
    Dr Peter French Board Member + Founder 
        
6 Cytopia Dr Kevin Healey MD + CEO + Founder 
    Dr Andrew Wilks Chief Scientist + Founder 
        
7 Acrux Dr Igor Gonda CEO 
    Dr Andrew Humberstone Director (Pharmaceutical R&D) 
    Dr Barrie Finnin Founder + Chair (Scientific Advisory Board) 
        
8 Norwood Abbey Mr Bernie Romanin Sr. Vice president (Corporate Dev.) 
    Assoc. Prof Richard Boyd CSO (Norwood Immunology) 
        
9 Epitan  Dr Wayne Millen Chairman 
        
10 Plantic Technologies Mr David MacInnes MD + CEO + Founder 
        
11 Clone International Dr Richard Fry CEO + Founder 
        
12 Evogenix Dr Merilyn Sleigh CEO 
    Dr Greg Coia Research Manager + Founder 
        
13 Iliad Chemicals Dr Bernard Flynn  Director + Founder 
        
14 BioDiem Prof Robert Borland Director + Founder 
    Mr Tom Williams MD + Founder 
        
15 Genera Biosystems Dr Karl Poetter CSO + Founder 
        
16 Pharmaxis Dr Brett Charlton Medical Director + Founder 
    Dr Alan Robertson CEO 
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17 Genetraks Dr Richard Brandon Founder + Bioscience Director 
        
18 CBio Dr Wolf Hanisch Founder + CEO 
    Mr Stephen Goodall Founder + Director 
        
19 Peplin Mr Gary Redlich Founder + ex-CEO 
    Mr Michael Mullins ex- Company Secretary 
        
20 Genetic Solutions Dr Gerard Davis Founder + Managing Director 
    Dr Jay Hetzel Founder + Scientific Director 
        
21 Tissue Therapies Dr Zee Upton Founder + CSO 
        
22  Prana Biotech   Professor Colin Masters 
Exec. Director + Chairman (Scientific Advisory 
Board 
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List of Indian Companies 
 
  Name of the Company Name of the Person Job Title (at the time of Interview) 
        
1 Ocimum Biosolutions Ms Anuradha Acharya CEO + Founder 
        
2 Genotex International  Mr. C Devender Reddy Managing Director + Founder 
        
3 Bigtec Pvt. Ltd. Mr. B Chandrasekhar  Director + Founder 
        
4 Jalaja Technologyis Pvt. Ltd. Mr Raja Seevan Director + Founder 
    Mr Ramapathi Director  
        
5 Metahelix Life Sciences Pvt. Ltd Dr Gautham Nadig Director + Founder 
        
6 Strand Genomics Dr Vijay Chandru Chairman + CEO + Founder 
        
7 Avesthagen Dr Villoo Morawala Patell CEO + Founder 
        
8 Thinkgen Mr Rama Subramaniam CEO + Founder 
        
9 Lotus Labs Mr Sudhir Pai Managing Director + Founder 
        
10 Genotypic Technologies Pvt. Ltd. Dr Sudha Narayanan Rao Director + Founder 
        
11 Helix Genomics Dr B V L S Prasad Director + Founder 
    Mr Mohan CEO + Founder 
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Questionnaire 
 281
 Firm Identification♣ 
1. Name of the Firm ………………………………………………………….. 
Street Address ……………………………………………………………... 
City, State, Postal Code ……………………………………………………. 
Category of Firm1 …………………………………………………………… 
Year Established  …………………………………………………………… 
Current Revenues …………………………………………………………… 
Current Profits ………………………………………………………………... 
No. Of employees ……………………………………………………………. 
 
Entrepreneur Identification 
2. Founder(s) Name ………………………………………………………… 
Present designation ………………………………………………………….. 
Age ……………………………………………………………………. 
 Sex ………………………………………………………………………. 
 Educational Qualification(s) …………………………………………………. 
University obtained from ……………………………………………………… 
 Previous employment institute(s) ……………………………………………… 
 Position(s) held ……………………………………………………………….. 
 Family background …………………………………………………………… 
 
 
 
                                                 
♣ Try to get information related to Revenues and Profits by Annual Reports or by Primary resource.  
 
- Antibiotics 
o Diagnostics 
o Vaccines 
o Enzymes and Speciality Chemicals 
o Bioinformatics 
o Aquaculture 
o Biofertilisers/ Biopesticides 
o Veterinary 
o Environmental 
o Agriculture 
o Life Science Instruments 
o Others ……………………………………………………. 
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 Conception of Idea♠ 
3. When did you first think of starting up your own business?  
• How serious were you then about starting a new venture?  
4. What were the ideas (on types of business) you were contemplating with?  
• Why did you find these ideas worth considering? (Ask about each idea) 
5. From where did you initially get these ideas?  
• A discussion with colleague or clients or suppliers during previous 
employment 
• Formal market survey reports 
• Research Publications 
• Overseas visit 
• Seminars, Exhibitions, Trade Shows 
• Informal network outside office 
• News items in business magazines, newspapers, etc. 
• Others (Please specify) ………………………………………. 
6. How much knowledge you had about being in this business (Use 5 point Likert 
scale)?  
• Were you aware of the government rules and regulations set up by DBT, 
Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Health and Ministry of Chemical and 
Fertilizers? If yes, how were you aware of? Did you personally read those 
documents? 
• Were you aware of your potential clients? If yes, how did you come to know 
about them? Did you discuss your concept with your potential clients? 
• Were you aware of the patent laws of the country? To what extent did you 
have knowledge about patent laws? How were you aware of? 
• Knowledge about ‘generic’ industry practices like payment modes, profit 
structure, technology licensing rates, etc? 
• The knowledge about technological field related to your business idea? 
                                                 
♠ This is the time prior to establishment of the new venture (i.e., taking a formal office space). It starts 
from the initial days when different ideas start coming up in entrepreneurs’ mind to the stage when s/he 
has finally made up his/her mind to commit to one or two specific ideas (i.e., just prior to taking final 
step of setting up an office). 
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 • Did you have any formal/ informal training in business administration? How? 
• Were you keeping track of generic national trend, generic sectoral trend (both 
national and international)? How? 
7. Of the several ideas in your mind, what did you finally decide on?  
• Why did you decide to go for it and not others? 
• Whom did you first discuss your idea with; whom you think was competent 
enough to at least be able to understand your concept? What was s/he doing 
then? 
8. What were your main concerns when you were making final decision regarding start-
up of a new venture based on your final choice of the idea?♦ (In priority order. Use 
Prompts!) 
• Were these concerns due to lack of complete information that couldn’t be 
gathered comprehensively? If yes, why was it difficult to gather? 
•  Or were there any other particular reasons for these concerns of yours? 
• How did you choose to mitigate these concerns before moving forward in 
decision-making? 
• Did anyone help you? Who? What help did s/he provide you? 
9. What were the resources that you had readily disposable at your hand?  (Talk about 
Finance, Technological equipments, Expert advise on various things) 
                                                 
♦ Vital factors: 
 
• Difficulty in hiring qualified staff 
• Difficulty in retaining qualified staff 
• Substitutability of product/ services 
• Many competitors or likelihood of new competitors 
• Difficulty in gauging market needs 
• Lack of competitive supplier market 
• Keeping clients satisfied 
• Reputation of the firm 
• Seeking new markets  (domestic or foreign) 
• Quality of product/ service + Efficient production 
• New Government regulations  
• R&D to offer new services or products 
• Financing 
• Lack of customer responsiveness  
• Lack of government incentives (tax credits, income tax holidays, R&D grants, technology 
support, soft interest bank loans, venture funding, etc.) 
• Co-operation with other institutes or firms 
• Location 
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 10. What was the triggering point that prompted you to take the final plunge to realize 
your idea? (i.e., any particular reasons that it happened then.) 
• When was it?  
11. Did you think about opportunity costs (i.e., this option vis-à-vis other possible 
options) of your endeavour? 
12. How defined was your business at the point when you started your business? Did you 
have a formal business plan2 then?  
• If no, why did you not feel its importance then?  
• Do you think that if there would have been a serious attempt to write a business 
plan, many concerns that you raised earlier would have been lessened and you 
would have been surer about the efficacy of your decisions? 
• WHEN DID YOU THINK OF HAVING ONE? WHY THEN? 
• What were the sections that were part of it?  
• Who drafted your business plan? How much help of others were taken? How 
much were you involved in that? 
13. Of the things (vital as well as not so important) that were there in business plan, how 
was the information collected for it? (Specially probe with respect to ‘Concerns 
(listed earlier)’ that were due to lack of information- were these concerns included in 
Biz Plan?) 
Looking back to this stage what were the most vital decisions that you think are 
to be made? Of these, which do you think are difficult to make? What makes them 
difficult? 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Formal business plan has to be a written document and an effective device of communication with the 
outer world. 
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 Incubating♥  
Infrastructure 
14. Where did you first set-up your office? 
• How did you decide on it?  
• Any changes thereafter? Why? 
Finance 
15. In what stage of development was your ‘proprietary’ technology/ product at the time 
of the start (if not a CRO)? 
16. Did you think in advance about a stage3 of your ‘proprietary’ technology/ product in 
which you thought of initiating to reap commercial value out of your technology? 
Which stage was that? 
17. Were you aware of minimum required fixed costs to start your business? 
• Were your aware of recurring costs that has to be borne before you reached the 
stage, in which you were to start exploiting it commercially. 
18. In order to take your venture forward, what different routes did you choose to 
mobilise funds?4 What factors did you take into account in making your opinion 
regarding these routes? Who were involved in this decision? 
19. When did you finally decide to take this route?5  
• How long did it take to implement it?  
• Is this the usual time?  
• Did you face any obstacles?  
• What measures did you take to rectify it? 
                                                 
♥ Incubating can be defined as the stage in which initiatives are taken across several different 
functional areas that are of importance to business in concern, once an organisation has formally come 
into existence. This stage comes to an end when a semi-formal shape has been given to the organisation 
and first mile has been covered across all dimensions by garnering support by convincing important 
‘others’ about the concept. (Ideally ask the entrepreneur, when had he reached this time and discuss the 
issues related to different functional units within this time period). 
3 Be it somewhere in the middle or taking it forward all alone. 
4 Both in terms of raising funds or doing consultancy, providing services, etc. 
5 In terms of raising funds, talk about the very initial two to three ways (be it bank loans, angel 
investor, government funding, VC or even an IPO). 
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 • Retrospectively, do you think that it was possible for you to avoid these 
obstacles? 
R&D and Technology Capabilities (Physical Infrastructure)6 
20. Did you have R&D collaboration7 with any other institute during early stages of your 
company?  
• Why did you choose to collaborate with them?  
• Who else helped you in deciding for the choice of appropriate R&D partner? 
• What were the major criteria that were looked into before making a decision?  
• Pick an example, and discuss more. Were you sure about the appropriateness of 
the decision at the time of decision? If not, why were you unsure? Why could 
those uncertainties be mitigated? 
21. What were the technology capabilities and equipments that you had in-house when 
you started off?  
• Why did you decide on them?  
• Who suggested? 
22. Were there any other technologies (or equipments) that were of importance but you 
couldn’t afford to get them in-house? How did you manage them? 
23. Did you later get these technologies in-house? When? Why then? 
Suppliers 
24. Before buying any equipment(s)/technologies, did you search for other competing 
technologies and other suppliers? 
• How did you get information about other suppliers? (Who did it for you?) 
• Did you ask for quotes from other suppliers? 
25. Did you involve anyone else in making these ‘buy’ decisions (e.g. technology 
experts, someone who can get discountsθ, etc.)?  
                                                 
6 Get as much information as possible from the company website regarding their technology 
competencies and check what sort of equipments/ technologies are required for that.  
7 Background information from Factiva and the company website. 
θ Who helped in negotiating the deal? 
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 • Were they in-house or part of informal network or formal consultation or mix? (If 
in-house, when were they appointed and how were they appointed?) 
26. What were the major criteria that you scrutinised most before making any important 
‘equipment/ technology’ purchase from a supplier?  
27. Did you ever feel that you didn’t get the most competitive deal that you could have 
got? Explain. 
28. How do you decide on the suppliers for lab material that are needed on regular basis?   
Intellectual Property⊗ 
29. Were there issues like your proprietary technology development being dependent on 
proprietary technology of someone else, or someone else claiming so? 
30. When did you realise that?  
31. What measures did you take to guard your proprietary technology?  
• Who advised you on that?  
• How long did it take to reach a conclusive decision? 
32. Did you go for global patent or specific to few countries?   
• Why only those specific countries?  
• How did you decide on them? 
Planning: Scalability, Marketing and Pricing (this includes Alliances⊕) 
33. Did you look into scalability issue of your proprietary technology in order to make it 
profitable commercially?  
• How did you look into that?∅ (how ideas about them were obtained, assessed on 
what factors, any conflicting situation, means to reach resolution for the conflict) 
• Who were involved in it? 
• How long did it take to come up with your scalability road map? 
                                                 
⊗ Try to get as much information as possible from secondary sources about intellectual property owned 
by the company and in which places. (Use Factiva.) 
⊕ Quite a bit of knowledge, especially related to alliances, can be obtained at the company website and 
Factiva.  
∅ What were different issues that you took into consideration while analysing this aspect?  (Issues like 
proto-type testing, a step prior to setting up manufacturing or large-scale operation). 
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 34. When did you make the first attempt to identify the growth of revenues over a period 
of time (i.e., revenue projections)?  
35. Who were involved in bringing forth these projections? 
36. What issues were considered to come up with those projections? 
• How big is the market? 
• How fast is the market growing? 
• What share do you intend to capture over a period?  
• Who are the competitors? 
• Is it attainable? Is the market capacity full or does it have scope? 
37. How the relevant information for revenue projections were obtained? 
38. What did you plan to bring your product/service to the market?  
• How did you decide on the route∇ that you are going to follow? (Criteria taken 
into account; people involved; any conflict and its resolution) 
• When did you finally decide on this? How long did it take to decide⇑? 
39. If it were to involve building ‘alliance’ or ‘strategic partnerships’, when did you start 
looking for partners? 
• How many ‘potential’ partners were you talking to? Were you considering them 
simultaneously or one after the other (i.e., after talks with previous didn’t 
materialise)? 
• How did you come to conclusive decision regarding the efficacy of decision to 
partner with X vis-à-vis others⇓? (Please explain different stages through which 
this decision went through, including imp. aspects that were looked into and how 
these were looked into and who were involved at each stage?) 
40. When was market roll out strategy formulated?  
• Who was involved in developing market roll out strategy? (In what capacities?) 
• What was the basis of your market roll out strategy? (Factors◊ taken into 
consideration and how decision about each factor was attained?) 
                                                 
∇ Going solo or licensing or joint venture. 
⇑ From the point of having known this idea to finally giving it a shape. 
⇓ Ask for an example with which talk for alliance was going on but eventually broke down. 
◊ Example: price of your service/ product, revenue projections etc. 
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 • Did it delineate explicitly how much percentage of market you were targeting and 
over a period of time how much will be attained? 
• Were there different viewpoints for the market roll out strategy?  
• How the final decision was achieved after these different viewpoints were raised? 
• How long did it take it take to come up with this strategy? 
41. How did you decide on the pricing?  
• Who were involved? 
• When was it decided?  
• Were there different viewpoints for pricing?  
• How the final decision was achieved after these different viewpoints were raised? 
42. How did you get your lead customer(s)? When was this?  
• Did your lead customer prove useful later in furthering your market by giving 
positive references? 
43. Were you flexible in your approach to pricing to generate more revenues? 
• When was that decision taken?  
• Why was that decision taken? 
• Was it worth (in long run and short run)? 
Management  
44. When did you have the Board of Directors for the 1st time? Who were they? What 
role did the Board play in decision-making?  
45. Was there anyone in Board of Directors, who was not a shareholder? Why was s/he? 
How did you decide? Whose consent did you take before nominating him/her? 
46. When did you have the Scientific Advisory Committee for the 1st time? Who were 
they? What was the significance of the Board for you then? 
Find about the major appointments during this stage by Factiva and then probe 
why they were appointed then; how they were appointed; any immediate changes 
                                                 
  Many things regarding this can be obtained at the company website and Factiva. 
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 associated with their appointment; etc. (If it can’t be found out in Factiva or Co. 
website, then ask about it in the end). 
Demonstratingψ 
Finance 
47. Please explain different funding that you got at various points of time in order to keep 
you further going? 
48. Did you face hurdles in any of the occasions? 
49. Did you expect those hurdles? If yes, how did you know about them? (Take an 
example.) 
• What precautionary measures did you take? How did you know about these 
measures? 
50. Take an example of the hurdle you faced. What was it?  
• Why was it? 
• What was done to rectify the situation?  
51. Who were involved during each successive round of funding and what was their role?  
52. Did at any point of time were you being compelled to change your operational ideas 
or goals in order to receive those funds? Give an example. 
• Did you agree?δ Why or why not?  
• Did the change mean a big shift from what you were doing? 
• How long did it take to finally decide on the change?    
Revenue 
53. Were there instances when you were not able to achieve revenue targets?  
• How often did you miss these targets?  
                                                 
ψ Demonstrating is a stage when the organisation has managed to pass through birth pangs but is still 
surviving on life support systems. The whole stage is dedicated to making the organisation healthier to 
be go to the next stage of growth and development without support. (Ideally, ask the entrepreneur when 
had s/he reached this time and discuss the issues related to different functional units within this period.) 
δ While one might be compelled into making few decisions but still big strategic changes, one is 
expected to hold ground based on logical thinking and rationality. Does this logic apply? Probe on 
these lines. 
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 • During which time period? 
54. Did it lead to crisis like situation anytime?  
• Why did that situation arise?  
• Did it lead to major strategic change? What were they?  
• How long did it take to make these decisions?  
55. How did you come to conclusion about benefits of change?  
• Did you face any resistance?  
• If yes, how did you overcome it? 
56. Did it bear fruit in ameliorating the condition?  
• If not, why?  
• How further you refined it? 
Market and Sustainability 
57. Did you have rethink of your market rollout strategy? When?  
• Why? 
• How was this reassessment done? (Different strategies considered, how ideas 
about them were obtained, assessed on what factors, any conflicting situation, 
means to reach resolution for the conflict) 
• How much time did it take to reach decision?  
• Did it have a positive outcome?  
58. Were you aware of your major competitors reaction (given your target    
clients/markets)? 
59. Did you think about probable competitors reaction to any of your moves? 
• How did you come to those conclusions? 
• What were your potential strategies to ward them off? 
• How were decisions on those potential strategies taken?  
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60. What were the factors that you thought will keep your advantage for long?↑ 
• When did you realise advantages of your service/ product? 
• How did you come to these conclusions? 
61. Was there a change in strategy (like introduction of new product/service outside your 
earlier technology domain) in order to keep growing or even to preserve the desired 
status?↓  
• What was the change? 
• Why was the change? 
• Who first discerned that change is needed? 
• Was it easy to make others see the need for change and the efficacy of the 
proposed solution?  
o If not, how did the situation was managed? 
• How long did it take to finally approve of it? When? 
• Were there other alternatives that were considered? Were they considered one by 
one or efficacy of each was considered simultaneously? 
• Do you feel that any potential alternative was left because of lack of complete 
information? 
Operations (also includes Alliances) 
62. When did you start your scale-up for operations? Why? 
• Did your plan to scale-up your operations move as per the scale-up assessment 
done earlier?  
                                                 
↑  
- Good relation leading to repeat buy 
- Govt. Protection 
- Not too attractive market for big players and new players not being a threat because 
of first mover advantages 
- Cost competitiveness 
- High quality standards 
- Strong Patents  
- Continuous introduction of new products/services in the related technology domain 
- R&D in-house capability 
- Relationship with major R&D Institutes 
- Others (specify) …………………………………………….. 
↓ Does this question complement Qs 56-58 in (Revenue) or is it repetitive? 
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 • If not, were the changes drastic in nature? 
o If yes, how did the efficacy of these were ascertained before you 
proceeded with the change (i.e., learning by doing, planned due diligence, 
expert opinions, etc.)? – An example 
o If it was a minor change, how did you decide on the efficacy of changes 
(i.e., learning by doing, planned due diligence, expert opinions, etc.)? – 
An example 
• If there is a conflict of opinion, how the decision is made on the desirability of 
those conflicting opinions? – An example as above. 
63. While broadening your operations, were you looking forward to new strategic 
alliances (apart from the ones’ previously discussed)?  
• When did you start thinking of new alliances? 
• What were the reasons for it?  
• How the decision on the desirability of an alliance was looked into? (i.e., factors 
taken into account) 
• Who were involved in this decision-making in its various stages? 
• Were there any counterviews at any stage? If yes, what action was taken towards 
it? 
64. When did ‘quality’ become a concern for you?  
• How did this ‘quality’ concern come into being?  
• Was ‘quality’ a concern for you prior to this? 
• Who were involved in the process to obtain quality standards par excellence? 
• Were there any sorts of impediments in the way to obtain desired ‘quality’ 
standards?  
o What were these? 
o How was it overcome? 
• How long did it take put the desired quality standard in practice? 
ManagementΘ 
65. When were different top managementΔ appointments?⊥  
                                                 
Θ Almost all questions can be answered by the person concerned themselves.  
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 • Why were they appointed at that point of time? 
• Who were involved in their appointment decision? 
66. How did you manage to convince him/her in joining your company?  
67. Were they involved in any crucial decisions that changed strategy of the company in 
a major way as compared to before their joining? 
• How were they able to impress stakeholders including you?  
• What was the time gap between their joining and change in strategy? 
• Was it effective? 
• If not, how soon was it rectified?  
• Explain the procedure from detection of not so fruitful results and redesigning the 
‘changed’ strategy?  
• Who else were involved? 
• Did that particular functional department exist just prior to the recruitment of that 
particular top management? 
o If yes. Who was heading? 
o Was there a bit of resistance, if the person in charge obtained to remain 
with the company? 
o How was the problem managed?  
 
 
  
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Δ COO, Director (R&D), Director (Marketing), Director (Finance), Director (Accounts), Others (if any) 
⊥ Many appointments can be found at the company website and Factiva. Their impact in the form of 
immediate decisions can be also be found in Factiva. 
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Aide Memoire                                  
(an example) 
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Aide memoire for Pharmaxis 
Decisions Recognition Deliberation Formal Analysis Common Approach Contrive Decision Selection 
              
Dr William Bill Cowden/ Dr Brett Charlton       
        
Origin of idea       
Initial Funding- Seed investment by Rothschild       
Market Potential  etc….       
        
Initial diseases when started (Praxis)       
Diseases being added steadily later on        
Asthma, Cystic fibrosis, COPD, Autoimmune diseases       
        
Asthma diagnostic by 2005 (From drugs to diagnostic)       
        
$ 9.35 mn Raise- Round B Funding       
Price of the share:$2.50/share       
Who was assisting?        
        
Ardiol market potential could double       
        
Dr Alan D. Robertson/ Mr Gary Phillips       
        
$ 9.35 mn Raise- Round B Funding       
Price of the share:$2.50/share       
 Who was assisting?        
        
IPO       
Price per share:$0.50/ share       
Why this is much below share price for Round B?       
Timing       
Underwriters: Wilson HTM Corporate Finance (see 11/11/03)       
Money to be raised $ 21mn       
Valuation/ Market Cap       
        
Manufacturing facility in Frenchs Forest       
        
Growth Strategy to take individual product ahead.       
        
Market strategy: to target specialist respiratory physicians       
        
Any Product Strategy/ R&D strategy       
        
ADR Level 1       
Any other style of raising funds       
Timing       
Bank of New York       
        
Projections       
Asthma diagnostic by 2005       
Marketing approval for bronchiectasis with TGA by 2006       
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Informed Consent Form 
  
 
‘Informed Consent’ Document 
 
 
Name of Researcher: Mr. Deepak Sardana                             Title: PhD student 
Research Address: 
National Graduation School of Management 
The Australian National University 
The Sir Roland Wilson Building (120) 
McCoy Circuit, Acton 
Australia. ACT0200 
Tel:+61 2 6125 9837 
Fax:+61 2 6125 4895 
E-mail: deepak.sardana@anu.edu.au 
 
Thank you for your participation in this research. Should you have any questions, 
you are encouraged to ask at any time. Your queries are regarded as important to 
me; you are welcome to contact me at any time via the contact details provided 
above. 
 
Brief Project Description: 
 
The objective of my research is to explore the process by which successful 
entrepreneurs established their new venture in particular to understand decision-making 
process in the early stages of formation. The purpose is to improve the framework used 
to understand early stage decision-making. The study will be limited to entrepreneurs in 
biotechnology industry and are based in Australia and India. 
 
Detailed statement regarding consent and confidentiality: 
 
I (the participant) understand that I am being briefed on the research purpose 
and methods. The researcher had informed me that his research would include the 
information provided by me with the possibility of quotations of this information. I (the 
participant) understand that participation in this research is voluntary. I (the participant) 
am aware that I have the rights to choose not to participate, and that by choosing to 
participate (i.e., to answer the questions put forth by the researcher in an interview) I do 
so wilfully and that absolutely no coercion, inducement or influence is involved. In 
addition, there is nothing that impairs my decision to participate in this interview. I (the 
participant) also understand that I can withdraw from this at any time and the data 
provided to the researcher prior to withdrawal can be used unless otherwise stated by 
me. I (the participant) do understand that I can review the information provided by me 
at any point of time as I (the participant) will be provided a copy of the final report of 
the interview prior to publication in any form. I (the participant) also confirm that I have 
knowledge that I can exercise any of the following options regarding the use of 
information provided by me and I can change my choice related to it during any point of 
time. 
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 The researcher had briefed to me that the information provided by me shall be dealt 
in one of the following ways as approved by me: 
 
1. I allow all the information to be used completely and in quotes identifiable to me 
if it is desired, as I believe that there is no such information that will affect me 
adversely. (……………………..) 
2. I allow the selective information to be used in the form of quotes identifiable to 
me and these are not liable to affect me adversely. The rest of the information 
should be used as per confidentiality clause put forth in point 3 given below. The 
information to be considered confidentially will be conveyed to the researcher by 
me. (………………………) 
3. I want the researcher to use information provided by me, such that my real name 
or the name of the firm shall not be used in the written report. (………………..) 
a) The researcher has assured me that all information provided by me shall 
be treated as confidential and that no one will have access to this 
information (both in raw data and published format).  
b) If granted permission to audiotape, the tape record will be kept secure 
and that only researcher shall have access to it.  
c) I (the participant) will receive access to a copy of the final report of the 
interview prior to publication in any form, so there is the opportunity to 
offer any changes to the report, if necessary. 
 
As the researcher has assured me of all the above conditions; I have willingly 
provided him with requisite information and allowed the researcher to tape-record the 
interview session. 
 
 
 
Participant Sign:………………………………        Researcher Sign:…………………  
Participant Name:…………………………….        Researcher:   Deepak Sardana 
Date:…………………………………………...         Date:…………………………… 
 
 
If you have any other queries, please contact: 
Human Research Ethics Committee 
Research Services Office 
Chancelry 10B 
The Australian National University 
ACT 0200 
Tel:+ 61 2 6125 2900 
Fax:+61 2 6125 4807 
E-mail: Human.Ethics.Officer@anu.edu.au 
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Evolution of the Framework 
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Concept Development                      Decision Formulation Decision Selection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure. Generic Framework for Decision Process in New Ventures - Post Pilot Fieldwork & Analysis 
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Figure. Generic Framework for Decision Process in New Ventures - Post-Fieldwork and First Round of Analysis 
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